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ABSTRACT 
Bidirectional Translation, devised by the author, is a 
structured approach to the teaching of addition and subtraction 
which aims to give children greater understanding of 
arithmetical operations. The approach systematically involves 
both: 
the translation of numerical representations into hypothetical, 
real world contexts; 
and 
the extraction of the appropriate numerical operations from 
hypothetical, real world contexts. 
It is this emphasis on translation from and to both the 
numerical representation and realistic contexts which gives 
rise to the name, Bidirectional Translation. 
An experimental group of 90 primary one children were taught to 
add and subtract (within 10) by the method of Bidirectional 
Translation. Post-test comparison of the experimental subjects' 
performance with that of a control group showed significantly 
superior performance on the part of the experimental subjects 
in terms of the utilizability of addition, the evocability of 
addition, the utilizability of subtraction and the evocability 
of subtraction for five different classes of verbal context, 
namely: Part-Part Whole, Separating, Joining, Equalizing and 
Comparison contexts. In all instances the probability of the 
results being chance ones were less than 5% and in most, were 
less than 1%. 
In both the experimental and control groups, most children 
performed better when they were required to utilize concepts 
than when they were required to evoke concepts. Similarly they 
performed better when they were required to add than when they 
were required to subtract. The differences, however, were not 
always significant. 
It is suggested that the effectiveness of the methodology of 
Bidirectional Translation is rooted in a structure which allows 
the child to make his/her thinking explicit and which allows 
the teacher to monitor this. 
CONTENTS 
It may be, that in a thesis of this size, the reader does not 
wish to read everything or, indeed, to read the text in the 
order in which it is written. There follows, therfore, a 
summary of what is in each of the ten chapters. 
Chapter 1 PRIMARY SCHOOL MATHEMATICS AS A PROBLEM AREA is 
introductory in nature and considers why mathematics should 
have a place in the school curriculum together with some 
examination of why mathematics is generally perceived as 
'difficult'. 
Chapter 2 THE PROCESS PROBLEM AND THE TRANSLATION PROBLEM is an 
attempt to clarify what is meant by problem solving per se and 
how this pertains to mathematics. It is argued that what has 
traditionally been seen as mathematical problem solving in 
schools is TRANSLATION rather than PROCESS problem solving. 
Chapter 3 MATHEMATICAL CONCEPTUALIZATION tries to grapple with 
what this unobservable process might be. In so doing, it 
introduces and tries to make connections between some 
psychological concepts which have been described in the 
literature, namely: evocability, utilizability, intuitive 
intelligence, reflective intelligence and metacognition. 
Chapter 4 THE CONSTRUCTIVIST VIEW is, as the title might 
suggest, a consideration of three Piagetian concepts, namely; 
classification, seriation and conservation, in terms of their 
implications for the teaching of mathematics in school. it 
suggests that Piagetian ideas may have little direct relevance 
for the teacher of mathematics. 
Chapter 5 THE NEO-PIAGETIAN VIEW provides an account of 
mathematical learning which suggests that young children are 
far more capable than Piagetian theory gives them credit for. 
This alternative perspective gives primacy to counting. 
Chapter 6 THE BEGINNINGS OF THE EMPIRICAL WORK explores the 
counting abilities of thirteen primary one children in the 
researcher's own class. The findings show that all of these 
children can count to 10 when there has been no formal input by 
the teacher. 
Chapter 7 THE CONTINUATION OF THE EMPIRICAL WORK develops the 
researcher's investigations with her own class of primary one 
children by teaching them to add and subtract (within 10) using 
the method of Bidirectional Translation, an approach which she 
herself devised. The results are encouraging insofar as the 
children appear to understand what they are doing. 
Chapter 8 THE EXTENSION OF THE EMPIRICAL WORK continues the 
work described in the previous chapter by testing the method of 
Bidirectional Translation experimentally. The design, subjects, 
stimuli, apparatus and procedure are all described. 
Chapter 9 THE RESULTS, as suggested by the title, are 
tabulated, described and analysed. Broadly speaking the 
experimental subjects performed better than the control 
subjects though there are more detailed variations within this 
generalization. 
Chapter 10 CONCLUSIONS FROM THE DATA draw together the findings 
of the previous three chapters in an attempt to explain the 
phenomenon under investigation, namely children's learning of 
the concepts of addition and subtraction. It is argued that 
because the approach to teaching these concepts appears 
meaningful to the children, Bidirectional Translation does not 
conflict with a Piagetian conception of children's learning. 
PRIMARY SCHOOL MATHEMATICS AS A PROBLEM AREA 
The Nature of Mathematics and its place in the Curriculum 
Education, formal or otherwise, may be thought of as the 
process of enabling the individual to become an autonomous 
human being. The curriculum is that set of events which the 
individual experiences in the name of formal education. Many 
demands are made on the curriculum for the development of 
certain knowledge, certain skill, certain concepts and certain 
attitudes to have high priority. And what is deemed to be of 
high priority at one point in time may have little significance 
at another. In all of the debate surrounding curricular 
content, it is rarely, if ever, disputed that mathematics is 
important and should be a significant part of the curriculum. 
Why? 
The simple, and simplistic, answer is that mathematics has 
utility. In our society some degree of mathematical skill is 
taken for granted, just as some degree of literacy is. Without 
skill in mathematics and reading a measure of independence is 
lost. However, a more penetrating response to the question of 
why mathematics is deemed important raises philosophical 
questions as to why this particular subject matter has to be 
defended as worthy of conveying to others. 
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Phenix (1964) argues that mathematics is a discipline in the 
Symbolic Real= of Meaning. By this he means that mathematics 
has a commonality with language insofar as language is a 
symbolic system for communication. However, mathematics differs 
from ordinary language insofar as: 
1. it is an abstract means of communication with no necessary 
referents in reality; 
2. its symbolism, designed to achieve complete precision in 
communication, is artificial. 
From this it follows that what is abstract and artificial and 
neither concrete nor pragmatic is not going to be learned in 
some ad hoc, casual fashion. However, since, for Phenix (1964), 
mathematics is such a basic means of 'experiencing' meaning, it 
should be an essential part of the curriculum. 
Hirst (1965) argues that there are certain discrete 'forms of 
knowledge', of which mathematics is one, which are central to 
all but the simplest kinds of human activity. One may not 
always, according to Hirst (1965), be fully aware of how 
influential these 'forms of knowledge' are on one's daily 
functioning but they do define and regulate our lives in the 
sense of extending and elaborating the meaning of human 
experience. The various 'forms of knowledge' (seven in all - 
mathematics, science, morals, aesthetics, religion, human 
sciences, history) are distinct insofar as each has its own 
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system of interconnected concepts and each has its own 
validation procedures. 
It is clear, even from this scant account of Phenix and Hirst, 
that mathematics may be seen as a distinctive way of making 
sense of the world. 
The power of mathematics as a means of representing and 
communicating human experience has, in pedagogic terms, been 
interpreted variously but there are two discernible strands, 
for which the following descriptors are crude and incomplete. 
Historically, there has been the 'old' mathematics; conceived 
of more or less as a list of things to be 'done'. Having 'done' 
long multiplication of money, the teacher then proceeds to 'do' 
fractions or whatever may be next on the list, always 
emphasizing the computational processes as processes and paying 
scant attention to the interrelationships between processes. 
Then there has been the 'new' mathematics which aims for 
'understanding' on the part of the child. To this end there has 
been a flood of structural material designed for use in the 
classroom. Through exploration of the material, the child 
allegedly perceives pattern and regularity, discovers 
procedures, and through investigation and experimentation 
develops a cohesive understanding of mathematics as a dynamic 
body of connected parts. As the former may be restrictive in 
what the teacher must 'do' and the child must learn, so the 
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latter may be so fluid and nebulous as to defy any assessment 
of what has been learned. 
From these very different views of what mathematics teaching 
means, there would appear to- have emerged some sort of 
compromise. Mathematics, as the term is now typically used in 
Primary Education, refers to three distinct but not discrete 
components of Shape, Measurement and Number (Dept. of Ed. and 
Sc., 1979). Shape embraces the notions inherent in spatial 
relationships: height, length, width, - symmetry, perspective, 
scale, two and three dimensional shapes and their properties, 
patterning and tessellations. Measurement means the 
quantification of a continuous amount, such as the weight of 
the sand, the length of the ribbon and so on. Implicit in the 
measurement process is the idea that we can only measure to a 
certain degree of accuracy; which depends on the measuring 
instruments used and the purpose behind the measuring activity. 
Over ontogenetic time, at least three stages in the development 
of an understanding of measurement can be distinguished: 
1. comparison (ordering, equality, inequality, conservation, 
estimation, approximation); 
2. use of arbitrary units (tinfuls, cubits, lentils, pendulum); 
3. use of standard units, their notation and interpretation. 
Number refers to the quantification of discrete amounts. This 
demands a computational precision based on sound 
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conceptualization of counting, place-value, the four processes 
of number, integers, fractions, proportion and probability. 
Clearly mathematics teaching is now conceived of as more than 
just computation. It is now seen as a part of one's general 
education, because even the most cursory reflection on what is 
a brief and incomplete taxonomy of content, draws attention to 
the importance of mathematical ideas in our daily lives. These 
ideas are basic to our understanding of, and competent 
functioning in, our environment as is exemplified in being able 
to tell the time, count our money, calculate the amount of 
curtain material needed, measure recipe ingredients, read 
timetables, and deal with charts, graphs and diagrams. This, 
however, is not to suggest that mathematics is merely a form of 
'social arithmetic' for which mastery of the most basic skills 
is sufficient. While on the one hand, mathematical content (as 
just described) does have an immediate utility, what gives it 
that utility seems to be rooted in the mathematical morphology, 
as the following section will try to explicate. 
Mathematics as a Means of Representation 
Mathematics is not only a body of knowledge. It is a process. 
Mathematics makes extensive use of symbolic notation and many 
different situations can be expressed by the same mathematical 
statement. For example, the addition and subtraction 
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relationships between the numbers 3,4 and 7 (using them 
positively: 3+4-7,4+3=7,7-3=4 7-4=3) can, according to 
Carpenter & Moser (1982), be classified into at least six types 
of verbal contexts which in turn can describe potential real 
life situations: 
Type 1- Joining 
Jean has 3 sweets. She buys 4 more. How many sweets does she 
have now? or Jean has 3 sweets. How many more does she need to 
have 7 sweets altogether? or Jean has some sweets. She bought 4 
more. Now she has 7. How many sweets did she have to start 
with? 
Type 2- Separating 
John has 7p. He gave 4p to Bob. How much money has he left? or 
John has 7p. He lost some money. Now he_has 3p left. How much 
money did he lose? or John has some money. He gave 4p to Bob. 
Now he has 3p left. How much money did he have to start with? 
Type 3- Part-Part-Whole 
There are 3 girls and 4 boys in the group. How many children 
are there in the group altogether? or There are 7 children in 
the group. 4 of them are boys. How many are girls? 
Type 4- Comparison 
There are 3 girls and 7 boys in the group. How many more boys 
are there in the group? or There are 3 girls in the group. 
There are 4 more boys than girls in the group. How many boys 
are in the group? or There are 3 girls in the group. This is 4 
less than the number of boys in the group. How many boys are in 
the group? 
Type 5- Equalizing - Add On 
There are 3 boys and 7 girls in the group. How many boys should 
join the group so that there are the. same number of boys and 
girls? or There were 3 boys in the group. 4 more boys joined 
the group. Now there are the same number of boys and girls in 
the group. How many girls are in the group? or 7 children each 
want a carton of milk.. Mary gave out 3. more cartons of milk. 
How many cartons had she to put out to begin with? 
Type 6- Equalizing - Take Away 
There are 3 cups and 7 saucers on the table. How many saucers 
should I take away so that there are the same number of cups 
and saucers on the table? or There were 7 knives on the table. 
I put 3 of them away so that there would be the same number of 
knives as forks. How many forks were on the table? 
Chapter 1 Page 13 
PRIMARY SCHOOL MATHEMATICS AS A PROBLEM AREA 
That different real life situations can be mathematically 
synonymous has important implications. Because the same 
mathematical statement can apply to more than one situation, 
results which have been obtained in one situation can be seen 
to apply to a different situation. Thus not only can 
mathematics be used to explain what has happened, it can be 
used to predict what will happen in a situation not yet 
experienced: as in how much petrol will be needed for a car 
journey not yet undertaken, or how much carpeting will be 
needed for the new house. This dual function of mathematics to 
explain and predict means that mathematics is an enormously 
powerful means of mental representation: that is, of how 
information is taken in, coded and remembered such that people 
behave on the basis of informed choice. As Lovell (1979) 
states, in mathematics lie "the origins of the concepts with 
which we structure the world". 
The Disquiet about Mathematics 
In spite of the central importance of mathematics in our lives, 
attitudes to mathematics appear to be negative. The authors of 
The 10 to 14 Report (The Consultative Committee on The 
Curriculum, 1986) point out that "many adults find little 
application for the mathematics of their schooldays in later 
life" and that "to claim to be 'no good' at mathematics is to 
invite sympathy rather than derision". Bell et al (1983) in 
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their review of school children's attitudes to mathematics 
report that: 
1. the` utility of mathematics was not always readily 
perceived by pupils; 
2. "throughout school a decline in attitudes to 
mathematics appears to go on". 
As well as negative attitudes towards school mathematics, there 
is concern as expressed in official publications and by the 
public at large - about the low levels of mathematical 
competence of many children both in primary and secondary 
schools. Brown (1979) cites two sources of evidence, Rees 
(1972) and Levy (1977), which suggest that there may be at 
least some justification for the criticism. Bell et al (1983) 
argue that if 'falling standards' is a fact, then the 
phenomenon owes as much to social and cultural factors as it 
does to the reality of mathematical attainment. Moreover, Bell 
et al (1983) point out that the 'falling standards' trend is 
world wide. 
However, as McIntosh (1977) points out, the dissatisfaction 
with the mathematical understanding of the young has a long 
history. As far back as the turn of the century reports have 
been published which suggest that while children may be 
mechanically accurate in computation, they were unable to apply 
their skills in contextualized situations. McIntosh goes on to 
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list the recommendations for improvement in mathematical 
understanding which were being suggested sixty to one hundred 
years ago! They were as follows: 
1. Don't start formal work too early. 
2. Use materials and start from practical activities. 
3. Give children problems and freedom initially to find 
their own methods of solution. 
4. Children must have particular examples from which to 
generalize. 
5. Go for relevance and the involvement of the child. 
6. Go for reasons and understanding of processes. Never 
give mechanical rules. 
7. Emphasize and encourage discussion by children. 
8. Follow understanding with practice and applications. 
McIntosh's contention is that although there is not evidence of 
falling standards there is nevertheless a serious problem: 
While the above mentioned list of recommendations is almost 
universally agreed in principle, "their translation into 
accepted and practical terms for the majority of primary 
teachers has not yet come about". 
The researcher's experience of 20 years of teaching children 
between the ages of 5 and 14 years would, broadly, agree with 
McIntosh's view that mathematics education has emphasized a 
'skills-in-a-vacuum' approach. The methodological route for 
presenting any mathematical topic goes something as follows: 
1. cursory reference to concrete material; 
2. graded presentation of, and practice in, what Brown 
(1979) refers to as "algorithmic skills" with the 'bright' 
children completing more and more examples to keep them 
busy (this variously being referred to as reinforcement, 
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enrichment or extension exercises! ), while the 'dull' 
children struggle to apply the formula(e) to a few 
'simple' examples; 
3. application of algorithmic skills to 'problems' 
involving numerical computation: this stage being tacitly 
recognized as the prerogative of the 'bright' children. 
Nor is this account of mathematics teaching idiosyncratic. 
Skemp (1971) claims that: 
What is inflicted on all too many children and older 
students is the manipulation of symbols having little or 
no meaning attached, according to a number of rote- 
memorized rules. 
This, in spite of official arguments that the "main reason for 
teaching mathematics is its importance in the analysis and 
communication of information and ideas" and that "the mere 
manipulation of numerical or algebraic symbols is of secondary 
importance" (Department of Education and Science, 1985). 
If this method of teaching were successful insofar as it 
resulted in people being mathematically competent and 
confident, the end might justify the means. But the difficulty 
created by this method of teaching is clearly delineated by 
Skemp (1971): 
Learning to manipulate symbols in such a way as to obtain 
the approved answer may be very hard to distinguish, in 
its early stages, from conceptual learning. The learner 
cannot distinguish between the two if. he has no 
understanding of mathematics. And all the teacher can see 
(or hear) are the symbols. Not being a thought reader, he 
has no direct knowledge of whether or not the right 
concepts, or any at all, are attached. The way to find out 
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is to test the adaptability of the learner to new, though 
mathematically related, situations. Mechanical computation 
does not do this. 
Thus it would appear that there are two distinct facets to 
mathematics: on the one hand there is the manipulation of 
symbols in approved and recognized ways, and on the other there 
is conceptual learning. Most teaching attention appears to be 
addressed to the former. Even with the advent of SPMG Infant 
and Primary Mathematics (1981) and of Ginn Mathematics (1983), 
the two most recent innovations in Scotland, maths education in 
the primary school seems to be based on the premise that "if a 
child repeats a meaningless process enough times it will become 
meaningful" (Holt, 1964). This is not to say that teachers are 
necessarily satisfied with this approach, nor that they should 
be, but, given the constraints of time; of policy at school, 
regional and national level; and the emphasis on providing a 
broad and balanced curriculum in the primary school; it is as 
much as many teachers can do to try to implement the schemes or 
programmes of work which they may feel have been foisted upon 
them. 
The Problem 
The problem with the 'skills-in-a-vacuum' approach to maths 
education seems to be rooted in two questionable assumptions: 
firstly, the assumption that there is a necessary, 
unidirectional progression from using concrete material through 
Chapter 1 Page 18 
PRIMARY SCHOOL MATHEMATICS AS A PROBLEM AREA 
learning algorithmic skills to applying the skills in so called 
problems and, by extension, the second assumption, that 
conceptual understanding of, and computational mastery in, a 
mathematical task are one and the same thing. 
Dealing with these assumptions in reverse order, what does it 
mean to have conceptual understanding of and computational 
mastery in a mathematical task? 
Conceptual understanding refers to a network of meaningful 
relationships which underpin the performance of skills. 
Conceptual understanding is exemplified by the ability to 
remedy a memory failure and go back to 'first principles' 
and/or adapt a skill or procedure to a new situation. As Bell 
et al (1983) point out: 
The real importance of the conceptual structure is that as 
a richly inter-connected network it constitutes a stable 
memory structure, in which any particular link which fades 
is relatively easily reinstated. 
They go on to say that: 
The learning of a new concept or relationship implies the 
addition of a node or link to the existing cognitive 
structure,. thus making the whole, if anything, more stable 
than before. 
Computational mastery, on the other hand, refers to sets of 
useful tools in the form of standard procedures. These tools 
are the skills which have been distilled out of a variety of 
diverse strategies. They are the final, shorthand versions 
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which mathematicians through their extensive experience have 
deemed useful ways of attacking the calculations required in 
mathematical tasks. To be able to perform these skills requires 
remembering what to do first, next, last and so on in any given 
' mathematical operation. As Bell et al (1983) point out, "the 
learning of a skill requires the establishing of a set of more 
or less arbitrary links between the steps". 
Relatively recent research by Rees (1972) and Brown (1979) has 
shown that the identification of the mathematical operation 
(that is, having a conceptual understanding of what is 
required) and its computation (that is, of being able to effect 
the algorithmic skill) have a fairly low positive correlation. 
In other words, being able to perform the algorithm need not 
imply any conceptual understanding of what one is doing and 
conversely, understanding does not guarantee computational 
proficiency. Similarly, Begle (1979) concludes that 
improvements in computation and in higher level acquisitions 
(comprehension, application and analysis) develop relatively 
independently of each other, with not very much interaction, 
and that "computation achievement is something quite different 
from achievements at higher cognitive levels". 
Since conceptual understanding and computational mastery are 
not one and the same thing, it now remains to turn to the first 
assumption, that there is a necessary, unidirectional order 
Chapter 1 Page 20 
PRIMARY SCHOOL MATHEMATICS AS A PROBLEM AREA 
from concrete experience through repetitive practice to the 
application of mathematical skills 
, 
in potentially real 
situations. 
In using concrete material, one is attempting to illuminate 
what otherwise might be too abstract for comprehension. It was 
Bruner (1966) who said that "any domain of knowledge can be 
represented in three ways: enactive representation (actions), 
iconic representation (pictures) and symbolic representation 
(symbols)". While Bruner pointed out that the younger the child 
the more likely he/she would be to use enactive representation 
and later progress through iconic to symbolic representation, 
he did also stress that "actions, pictures and symbols vary in 
difficulty and utility for people of different ages, different 
backgrounds, different styles". Thus . concretization of a 
thinking task is a strategy which can facilitate the thinking 
process. It is not something that must. immutably be regarded as 
a pre-requisite to further, sophisticated thought but should, 
rather, be regarded as an integral part of thinking which may 
at times be useful. 
Empirical support for this argument can be found in at least 
one source. The classic Wason four-card-selection task (Wason & 
Shapiro, 1971) requires subjects to solve the problem of naming 
those cards and only those cards which need to be turned over 
to determine whether the rule is true or false. When 
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presented in the abstract form of 'if a card has a vowel on one 
side, then it has an even number on the other', subjects 
frequently cannot solve the problem but when the task is 
presented in the concretized version of 'if I go to Manchester, 
then I travel by train'; then the majority of subjects can 
solve the problem. More interestingly, however, is the finding 
of Johnson-Laird et al (1972) that practice on a concretized 
version does not transfer to subsequent abstract presentation. 
While for Piaget (whose work will be considered in subsequent 
chapters) intellectual growth consisted of a series of 'stages' 
through which the individual has to pass before being capable 
of mature thought, for Bruner et al (1966) the growth of the 
human intellect is a successive mastering of the three forms of 
representation. However, for neither Bruner nor Piaget is there 
the suggestion, not even the implication, that as the 
individual takes on greater sophistication in thinking he/she 
never 'regresses' to less sophisticated modes of thought. Both 
acknowledge that the typically 'mature' thinker will, in 
situations for which more 'immature' modes of thought have not 
been fully worked through, revert to less 'mature' modes of 
thought when abstract and symbolic forms do not serve the 
purposes of the individual. The 'mature' thinker who does not 
concretize a thinking task does not do so because he/she does 
not need to. The 'mature' thinker who, on the other hand, will, 
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in certain situations, concretize a thinking task, does so 
because he/she needs the support of concretization. 
The utility of concretization, then, is as an aid to thinking 
and reasoning. As an end in itself, the use of concrete 
material probably has little value. If, in using concrete 
material, there is no attempt to strip. the 'noise' from the 
activity and extract the underlying 'mental meaning', it seems 
unlikely that the concretization has been of much benefit. It 
follows, therefore, that rather than view concretization as a 
necessary pre-requisite to thinking, it would be more 
appropriate to regard concretization as a prop to thinking, a 
prop which becomes less and less important with increasing 
maturity in thought but which may nevertheless be called upon 
from time to time. 
Application or Abstraction? 
If we can argue that the, traditional importance placed on 
concrete materials (both in terms of their intrinsic value and 
in terms of temporal positioning) is largely mythical, can the 
same be said of the emphasis placed on algorithmic skill 
practice followed by the application of such skills in problem 
form? It is certainly an assumption (albeit tacitly held) that 
"verbal problems are difficult for children of all ages" 
(Carpenter & Moser, 1982), and that children must learn the 
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necessary operations "before they can solve even simple verbal 
problems" (Carpenter & Moser, 1982). 
But someone who lacks the skill to compute the division 
operation suggested by the task, 'John wants to share 9 sweets 
equally amongst himself, Tom and Harry, so how many sweets will 
each boy get? ' may nevertheless be able to carry out the task. 
The task could be correctly effected by sharing out: by 
constructing a one-to-one correspondence between boys and 
sweets or, at a more advanced level, by repeated subtraction. 
Very young children can, and do, solve simple verbal problems 
using their own invented /developed procedures (Carpenter & 
Moser, 1982; Starkey & Gelman, "1982). This would suggest that, 
contrary to folklore, children do not learn maths and then 
apply it but rather, from their experiences of applications in 
the real world they abstract the mathematical properties from 
the applications. Clearly such a proposition is too simplistic 
to account for the learning of 'pure' and advanced mathematics, 
but for the initial introduction to the formalisms of this 
means of communication, it does have an appeal. 
The intuitive appeal for the view that young children may 
abstract rather than apply their mathematical knowledge gains 
some support from the following analysis. 
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The experienced, practising teacher will in all likelihood have 
noticed children's mathematical behaviour, when the children 
are required to solve verbal problems. Something approaching 
one or more of the following patterns may have been observed. 
First there are the children who never really become engaged 
in the task. They state that they don't understand, don't know 
what to do, don't want to explore the task. They may try to ask 
the teacher or somebody else what the solution/answer is. This 
is the case of children, as they themselves have clearly 
indicated, not being able to conceptualize what is required, 
within the constraints of the given task; in which case the 
children are being asked to engage in a task which, to them, is 
meaningless when, instead, they should be engaged in some 
kind(s) of work which is a precursor to the task in hand. For 
these children, the application of mathematics does not seem a 
viable proposition! 
Next there are the children who engage in the task using what 
the teacher might regard as an 'immature' approach (even when 
these children have allegedly been taught more sophisticated 
algorithms), such as carrying out a division task by 
constructing a one-to-one correspondence. For such children it 
is vitally important that they be allowed to become confident 
in carrying out tasks by this fashion. When thoroughly secure 
in their own methods, the possibility of the task being 
effected more economically by an alternative method, such as, 
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say, repeated subtraction, can be suggested and/or 
demonstrated. And finally, when the children begin to make the 
transformation for themselves into symbolic representation, the 
algorithmic skills can be explicated for potential application. 
For such children their initially 'immature' approach is a 
function of their understanding of the concept of division and 
until such times as they can appreciate the utility of the more 
conventional solution procedures, it cannot be said that they 
are applying what they have been taught (but which, it seems, 
they have not learned! ). 
Finally, there are the children who engage in the task and 
isomorphs of the task with confidence, using the most economic 
and appropriate algorithmic skills. Such children have 
developed a 'higher-order principle': a combination of 
understanding and rules which are stored in memory and which 
can be retrieved to address similar tasks in a quick, routine 
way. While these children are applying their knowledge, it is 
not at all clear that the application follows the abstraction. 
It just appears that way now that application and abstraction 
have become integrated with each other. 
The children who exhibit the third type of behaviour are a 
'pleasure' to teach. They probably don't have much need of the 
teacher anyhow! The children who exhibit the first type of 
behaviour are viewed by the teacher as having problems and in 
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need of remedial help which the teacher has no time to give 
them! 
But it is the children who are exhibiting the second type of 
behaviour who are most interesting from the point of view of 
developing the children's mathematical thinking. These children 
are making very clear to the teacher their level of immaturity 
or sophistication in mathematical thinking. This unwitting 
exposure by the children is the very phenomenon which will 
allow the sensitive teacher to facilitate the children's 
development and one which teachers should be at pains to 
nurture. 
From the above discussion, it seems that the assumption that 
algorithmic skills practice necessarily precedes their 
application is false. The obverse suggestion, that skills 
practice should follow experience in verbal problems, is just 
as unsatisfactorily extreme: one cannot apply skills which one 
has not learned. The possibility emerges that there should be 
some sort of compromise, not in the sense of reducing our 
expectations of pupils (since many would argue that these are 
already too low), but in the sense of strengthening the links 
between the algorithmic skills and the mathematical 
understanding. The relationship between the two should not be 
viewed as unidirectional, but rather as bidirectional. 
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The content of this first chapter has, perhaps, painted a 
somewhat depressing picture of the current state of 
mathematical achievement. If this phenomenon of low 
mathematical achievement were easy to understand, then it would 
presumably be possible to attenuate the worst effects of this. 
However, the issues involved are complex. The remainder of this 
thesis is an attempt to analyse what the issues might be and 
further, an attempt to address them. Chapter two considers the 
nature of 'problems' and 'problem solving' in relation to 
school mathematics. 
In summary: 
(i) though mathematics is an important constituent in our 
competent functioning in the world, mathematics teaching is 
viewed, retrospectively, as being of little value, by many 
people; 
(ii) children have, historically, found it difficult to apply 
computational skills in contextualized situations; 
(iii) this may be a function of teaching methodologies which 
subscribe to limited behavioural objectives and aim at 
'transmission' models of learning; 
(iv) conventional assumptions underlying mathematical learning 
are now held to be questionable and thus the time is ripe for 
revising such assumptions in the light of alternative teaching 
strategies. 
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The researcher's interest in formal arithmetical competencies 
in children, springs from her sympathy with the literature 
(Brown, 1979; Cockcroft, 1982; Bell et al, 1983; Hughes, 1983;, 
Hughes, 1986) in which it is argued that children see little if 
any relationship between arithmetical operations and their 
applications in the real world; and from her extensive 
experience in primary education where the children's lack of 
understanding of the significance and/or utility of mathematics 
was, sadly, evidenced on an almost daily basis. Essentially, 
the point of concern is that, crudely put, children may know 
how to compute but this does not ensure that they know when to 
compute. 
This phenomenon of relating the how and the when in mathematics 
is frequently referred to as problem solving. As Polya (1981) 
points out, mathematical "know-how" can be thought of as the 
ability to solve problems. The general consensus of alarm 
expressed by many researchers (Ballew & Cunningham, 1981; 
Threadgill-Sowder & Sowder, 1982; Wollman, 1983; Moyer et al, 
1984; Fischbein et al, 1985) about children's poor problem 
solving performance is neatly summed up in the following 
quotation by Carpenter et al (1980): 
If it were. necessary to single out one area that demands 
urgent attention, it would clearly be problem solving. At 
all age levels, and in virtually every content area, 
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performance was extremely low on exercises requiring 
problem solving or application of mathematical skills. 
it is, however, the present author's contention that great care 
should be taken in using the terms, PROBLEM and PROBLEM 
SOLVING; which should not be conflated with the term, 
APPLICATION OF MATHEMATICAL SKILLS. The remainder of this 
chapter then, is concerned to make the distinction between the 
two clear, by arguing through negative example that problem 
solving is much more than the application of mathematical 
skills, but that the application of mathematical skills is, in 
itself, of enormous importance. This strategy may seem clumsy 
and laborious but it is felt necessary, by this author, to make 
the distinction between problem solving and application of 
mathematical skills absolutely clear. 
Firstly, what is meant by the terms, PROBLEM and PROBLEM 
SOLVING? 
A problem is a hindrance, a blockage which prevents us from 
easily or immediately realizing an objective. Newell & Simon 
(1972) define a problem as a situation in which a person wants 
something (the goal state) but does not know immediately how to 
achieve the goal state, given his/her present conditions (the 
initial state). 
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Problems are pervasive and various. They can be: 
large - how to deal with drug abuse; 
small - how to locate one's misplaced spectacles; 
short range - how to get into the car when the keys are locked 
inside; 
long range - how a spinal injury victim can learn to walk 
again; 
well defined and specific - how to calculate how much wallpaper 
is needed for the sitting room; 
general and poorly defined - how to teach children to become 
mathematically effective. 
Problems are thus to do with the actuality of our being. They 
are part of our individual and corporate reality and manifest 
themselves in the context of a person's or people's cognitive 
and affective constructions of reality. Simplistically put, 
this means that if one does not construe a given situation as 
being problematic - either through lack of interest or lack of 
perception - then there is no problem for that person! Equally, 
what is a problem for a person today may not be a problem 
tomorrow because one's perceptions of the same set of 
conditions have changed. More than that, however, if one knows 
immediately how to proceed and how to effect a solution when 
faced with a set of conditions, one is not faced with a 
problem. Instead, one is faced with an exercise, a task or even 
just a chore. Yet it may be that that exercise, task or chore 
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was once a problem given that when confronted with a set of 
conditions for the first time we will, to a greater or lesser 
extent, be novices in how best to proceed. The inter-dependence 
of problem and problem solving is reflected in the terms being 
used interchangeably. Problem solving is the need to do 
something about what is perceived as a problem. Conversely if 
there is no problem there need be no problem solving activity. 
As has been implied above, problem solving is goal directed 
behaviour to effect a solution to what is seen as personally 
challenging to the individual. The individual's engagement 
with the problem, therefore, requires the person to make 
judgements, to reason, to understand, to remember, to pay 
attention; all of which can be described as thinking processes. 
Such thinking processes are active (in the sense that one has 
to do them personally - they cannot be done for one), 
exploratory (in the sense that at any point they can be 
abandoned - all decisions are tentative and subject to 
revision), and experienced-based (in the sense that one 
probably does not think about things one cannot conceive of). 
Thinking is a cognate human activity. It is reasonable, 
therefore, that problem solving or thinking should feature 
large in the formal education of the individual. 
But what are the implications of such claims for mathematics 
teaching? 
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One implication is that for the learner a range of choice and 
discretion over the mathematical tasks he/she engages in might 
be helpful. The teacher, quite understandably, need not 
necessarily be able to determine what will, or will not, truly 
engage the learner. Nevertheless, the teacher must manage the 
children's learning such that, as Burton (1980) points out; 
The mathematical task must pose a question which is 
intriguing or meaningful to children of the relevant age. 
The question need not always be real in the sense of being 
environmentally based since it has been found that 
children get greatly involved and achieve high 
satisfaction from cognitive challenges of the puzzle 
variety. The important factor is that the question is so 
posed that there is the chance for it to become their own. 
Another implication is that as a result of the task the 
learner's thinking should have been facilitated. In some way or 
ways the learner should 'know' more at the end of the task than 
he/she did at the beginning. This 'knowledge' is not so much of 
the declarative variety of 'knowing that' as of the procedural 
variety of 'knowing how', such that the learner is less 
dependent than previously on rigid algorithms and restrictive 
heuristics as strategies for problem solution. For Burton 
(1980), this will happen provided the task "calls out a range 
of explicit problem solving skills and procedures which are 
reinforced during the problem solving process". 
According to Burton (1980), the skills are to do with 
"comprehension, transformation and communication". These skills 
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are divided into two categories, representational skills and 
information analysis skills. 
Representational. skills are those which facilitate the 
construction and/or use of different modes of presentation 







Information analysis skills are those of collecting, 
organizing,. analysing and presenting information: 
1. Using representational skills to identify data and 
information; 
2. Making knowns and unknowns explicit; 
3. Using systematic arrangement of information; 
4. Presenting data. 
Burton's procedures for problem solving are the methods of 
tackling a problem such that the problem is moved into the 
domain where skills can be applied. The procedures are seen as 
being dynamic and are divided into three categories: 
Entry procedures are those which enable the solver to get 
to grips with the problem. They are the mechanisms which 
expose the problem and make it amenable to attack. They 
include techniques such as trial and error, defining of 
terms and relationships, information ordering and so on; 
Attack . procedures move the problem towards solution, 
although not always successfully. They include techniques 
such as working backwards, trying related problems, trying 
special cases, using empirical argument and the systematic 
control of variables; 
Extension procedures attempt to answer the question, 
'where do we go from here? '. They increase the solver's 
understanding of the problem' and help him to place the 
problem in a known context or to develop understanding of 
a new context. Extension procedures include generalisation 
to a class of problems, finding isomorphic problems and 
creating new problems. 
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Burton (1980) suggests that problem solving is a means by which 
mathematics can be pursued. At the same time she points out 
that the skills and procedures which are required to solve 
problems are not the exclusive preserve of mathematics but are 
appropriate to "other experimental activities". This type of 
activity emphasises the thinking processes for obtaining 
solutions. It demonstrates the need for, and gives practice in, 
understanding problems, developing and carrying out solution 
strategies, and evaluating outcomes. As such these problems are 
what Charles & Lester (1984) would describe as PROCESS 
PROBLEMS. 
If PROBLEM SOLVING is a process and the PROBLEMS to be solved 
are process problems, how does this tie up with typical 
problems in mathematical textbooks? Let us consider the 
following examples: 
example 1 Marty saw 59 old cars and 38 new cars. How many 
did he see altogether? (Ginn Mathematics, 1983); 
example 2 In a 500 kilometre stock car race all 17 
starters were able to finish. How many kilometres were 
driven in all? (Ginn Mathematics, 1983); 
example 3 There are 12 classes in Marshall Primary School. 
Each class has 34 pupils. If 37 pupils are absent, how 
many pupils are present? (Ginn Mathematics, 1983); 
example 4 How many lemonade bottles, each containing 1.55 
litres, can be filled from a tank which holds 372 litres? 
(S. P. M. G., Heinemann, 1981). 
It was suggested earlier that, for the learner, the element of 
choice might be facilitative. In the typical situation, in 
schools, the only person likely to be making the choice as to 
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whether or not the learner would be addressing any of the above 
four examples would be the teacher! It was further argued that 
problem solving enabled learning by extending comprehension and 
communication. It is not at all clear that, in the four 
examples above, communication and comprehension are being 
extended particularly if we apply some intuitive analysis of 
what the child is possibly doing. 
These examples came from children's textbooks, therefore it is 
reasonable to assume that the children would be required to 
read the problems for themselves. There is nothing wrong with 
making reading demands of the learner provided he/she can read. 
Reading involves more than being able to decode words. It means 
the skill of extracting meaning from words written on a page, 
the competent performance of which involves bringing to the 
text what knowledge one already has of a topic (Goodman, 1967; 
Ryan & Semmel, 1969). If the learner's reading skill is not 
commensurate with the structural/lexical/contextual complexity 
of the text, then the learner cannot begin to think 
mathematically, but this does not mean that the learner could 
not address the problem if it were presented in some other 
medium. In other words, what is being argued here, is that in 
textbook type mathematical problems the variable of reading may 
be given a place of undue importance. 
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A second. demand being placed on the learner is that he/she has 
to translate the linguistic expression into mathematical 
symbolic notation. This means having some sort of conceptual 
awareness of the task. Conceptual awareness is shown by the 
ability to remedy a memory failure and go back to first 
principles and/or adapt a skill or procedure to a new 
situation. In the developing child, the concept will be 
available to a greater or lesser extent. For example he/she 
might correctly solve the problem, 'Jim has 3 marbles and his 
friend gave him 4 more. How many marbles does Jim have now? ' 
but not be able to solve example 1 cited above because, as yet, 
the learner's understanding can only be applied to small 
numbers (Flavell, 1971; Gelman & Gallistel, 1978; Hughes, 
1986). This raises the possibility that the learner cannot 
make the problem his/her 'own', cannot mentally represent the 
problem to him/her self, in which case he/she does not 
understand what is required and therefore cannot begin to 
proceed. In other words, what is being argued here is that 
textbook type mathematical problems may be too restrictive, so 
that instead of opening up possibilities for exploration and 
investigation the stimulus material 'blocks' the child. 
A third demand made of the learner is that he/she should be 
able to activate the appropriate algorithm and perform the 
necessary computation correctly. This is, after all, the 
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purpose of the textbook type mathematical problems - to 
identify what is required and do it! 
Textbook type mathematical problems are then of a different 
order altogether from PROCESS PROBLEMS. Textbook type 
mathematical problems require the child to identify and 
accurately effect the relevant algorithm(s). These problems are 
what Charles & Lester (1984) would describe as TRANSLATION 
PROBLEMS because they involve translating the given information 
into numerical notation. Additionally, these translation 
probleas can be thought of as simple (the familiar one step 
problem that can be solved by adding, subtracting, multiplying 
or dividing as in examples 1,2 and 4) or complex (multiple 
step problems requiring two or more operations to find the 
solution as in multiplying and then subtracting in example 3). 
Such translation problems as are typically found in mathematics 
texts, and are often referred to as problems, do not then 
involve problem solving in the sense of process problem solving 
described above. This study is not concerned with investigating 
the process problem. It is, however, very much concerned with 
the translation problem. This is not to say, however, that the 
process and translation problems are mutually exclusive. One 
way of describing the relationship is to use the analogy of 
Gagne's (1977) learning hierarchy. This is a system of 
increasingly more complex learning processes, in which lower 
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levels of learning are prerequisite to higher levels. From the 






Accordingly, what constitutes a translation problem is classed 
as being at the conceptual level. This is subordinate to, and a 
necessary precursor of, problem solving per se, "a process by 
which the learner combines previously learned elements of 
knowledge, rules, techniques, skills and concepts to provide a 
solution to a novel situation" (Orton, 1987). In other words, 
the process problem subsumes the translation problem. 
The translation problem is, in effect, the "application of 
mathematical skills" (Carpenter et al, 1980). The translation 
between a verbally described situation and the appropriate 
symbols is an important part of process problem solving. 
However, such translation is also an incomplete 
characterization of process problem solving. Nevertheless, the 
translation is of fundamental importance in the understanding 
of mathematical operations. Without the ability to make the 
translation, there is no conceptual understanding of the 
operation in question. As Vergnaud (1982) points out: 
Chapter 2 Page 39 
THE PROCESS PROBLEM AND THE TRANSLATION PROBLEM 
Concepts and symbols are two sides of the same coin and 
one should always take care to view students' use of 
symbols in the light of their use of concepts. In other 
words the ability to solve problems in natural language 
issued from ordinary social, technical or economic life is 
the best criterion of the acquisition of concepts. 
Reciprocally, it is essential to know how mathematical 
symbolization helps students. 
Typically, the failure to successfully perform a translation 
problem is attributed to reading deficiency. This reading 
deficiency may be a generalized, cross-curricular one or it may 
be one arising out of what Kane (1967) calls Mathematical 
English, "a hybrid language composed of ordinary English 
commingled with various brands of highly stylized formal symbol 
systems". Kane (1970) believes that: 
Mathematical English and ordinary English are sufficiently 
dissimilar that they. require different skills and 
knowledge on the part of the readers to achieve 
appropriate levels of reading comprehension. 
Because, for whatever reason, the child cannot 'read' the 
problem but can 'do' the arithmetic, he/she may be allowed as 
Glenn (1978) points out, to complete page after page of 'sums' 
omitting those parts which use number in a verbal context. The 
result is that the child "may never learn to relate the symbols 
effectively to situations involving number" (Glenn, 1978) and 
may therefore "not develop a sense of number" (Glenn, 1978). 
Unwittingly the teacher is widening the gap between numerical 
representation and its possible real world application when 
Chapter 2 Page 40 
THE PROCESS PROBLEM AND THE TRANSLATION PROBLEM 
conceptual understanding of an arithmetical operation requires 
that the two be closely linked if not intermeshed. 
" If, for example, a child can perform the computation, 9 divided 
by 3 when it is presented as 9: 3 but cannot find the answer 
when the same operation is presented as 'Mary shares 9 sweets 
among her three brothers. How many sweets does each boy get? ' 
then such a child does not even have the most rudimentary 
concept of division (although he/she may have some 
computational skill in the division process) because having a 
concept means being able to apply associated skills in new 
situations or, to put it another way, being able to generalize 
from the learned situation to new contexts. Leaving aside the 
issue of whether or not the child can read the translation 
problem, the child's ability to address the translation problem 
in any purposeful way seems' to be crucially dependent on 
his/her having the appropriate concept as part of his/her 
cognitive structure. The child who can 'do' the translation 
problem has some sort of conceptual understanding of the 
mathematical content, whilst the child who cannot (and there 
are many of these, as teachers know intuitively and research 
has substantiated) would appear to be being asked to do 
something for which he/she is not equipped. 
This failure to conceptualize the mathematical content is not 
restricted to very young children. Brown (1979) for example, 
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found that one third of a representative sample of 1089 
children aged 11 to 12 did not recognize that a multiplication 
algorithm was required in the problem, 'An oven tray for 
cooking little cakes will hold 56 cakes. A baker fills 28 
trays. How many cakes will he cook? ' She also found that when 
children were asked to interpret the notation in terms of a 
verbal context, less than one third of them could think of any 
practical problem they could solve by multiplying 56 and 28. 
Clearly, some type of teacher intervention is required to 
enable children to make the links between computation and its 
application. The lack of skill application is further evidenced 
in Hughes's (1986) work where he found that while small 
children can very ingeniously represent quantity, "few managed 
to represent addition and subtraction" and even then, the "few" 
made no effective use of conventional operator signs, in spite 
of the fact that "they were using the formal symbolism of 
arithmetic every day in their workbooks". For example, although 
children were experienced in completing operations such as 5-3- 
or 2+4s, when they were asked to show the 'dynamic' nature of 
addition and subtraction, to show that an initial state had 
been changed, as in 'First we had two bricks and then we added 
two more', the most common response was to show the final 
quantity alone without reference to the action that had been 
carried out. 
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It cannot be conceded, however, that all types of teacher 
intervention (whatever they may be) are enabling to the child. 
Carpenter et al (1981) argue that before children have had 
"formal instruction" in addition and subtraction they have a 
high rate of success in solving addition and subtraction verbal 
problems. They conclude: 
Very few of them used the wrong operations in their 
solutions. Since this error has been observed primarily 
with older children who have already experienced formal 
instruction in addition and subtraction, it may actually 
be a result of learning symbolic representations. Because 
the operations are initially learned outside the context 
of verbal problems, they have no basis for using their 
natural intuition to relate the problem structure to the 
operations they have learned. In other words, their 
natural analytic problem-solving skills are bypassed, and 
they too often resort to relying on superficial problem 
characteristics to identify the correct operations. This 
may result not only in a superficial concept of addition 
and subtraction but also a decline in general problem 
solving. 
Perhaps, however, teacher intervention could be based on what 
children are actually doing. Resnick & Ford (1984) suggest that 
if only teachers would "cultivate their own skills of observing 
and questioning" then they would ultimately "begin to note 
details of children's thinking that had not been apparent 
before and find themselves able to follow children's lines of 
reasoning more clearly". What to the adult may seem an obvious 
arithmetical algorithm couched in a verbal context, may be 
perceived differently by the children. For example, Brown 
(1979) found that although some children could not recall the 
'official' algorithm for subtraction they could nevertheless 
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solve practical problems quickly and efficiently using their 
own private procedures which resulted from "a good conceptual 
understanding of the operation involved". Similarly, Carpenter 
& Moser (1982) found that young children made far greater use 
of counting strategies than they did of number facts when 
addressing addition and subtraction translation problems. 
The phenomenon of the arithmetical translation problem, then, 
is well documented, and the general conclusion is that 
performance on translation problems is poor. Such a conclusion 
is worrying since the (arithmetical) translation problem is 
synonymous with (arithmetical) conceptual understanding: 
successful performance on the translation problem means that 
the concept(s) involved in the problem's solution is/are being 
established in the conceptual system. Even more worrying, 
however, is the possibility that poor performance on 
translation problems may have implications for conceptual 
development in general. Bryant (1985) argues that the 
distinction between knowing when and knowing how to perform an 
arithmetical operation "might be one instance of a rather 
general rule in children's cognitive development". He points 
out that many of the erstwhile conclusions about young 
children's apparent incapacities were drawn from inadequate 
evidence: just because the child does not display a particular 
behaviour does not mean that he/she cannot display that 
behaviour. It merely means that, for whatever reason(s), the 
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situation was not 'conducive' to the manifestation of the 
particular behaviour. If children are not using the 'cognitive 
tools' they possess when it would be beneficial to them to do 
so, their development is not, it would seem, being facilitated. 
Bryant (1985) argues that there is; 
incontrovertible evidence that children's performance on 
most cognitive tasks depends on two quite separable 
things. One is the possession of the skill needed to solve 
the task and the other is their recognition of when that 
skill is needed. 
This in turn raises questions as to where in the mathematical 
situation the child's difficulty lies: is it in the recognition 
of what calculation is needed? is it in actually carrying out 
the calculation? or is it in both? 
Thus it would appear that not only is it mathematically 
desirable, it is psychologically necessary (from the point of 
promoting cognitive development) that the child be able to 
perform the aathenatical translation probles successfully. 
This chapter has been at pains to give the translation problem, 
otherwise known as the application of mathematical skills, its 
due and proper place; while at the same time distinguishing it 
from the process problem. The mathematical translation problem 
is intimately bound up with mathematical conceptualization. The 
next chapter analyses what mathematical conceptualization 
means. 
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In summary: 
(i) it has been argued that the terms, problem and problem 
solving are, generally speaking, used with a lack of precision 
in meaning as they pertain to mathematics; 
(ii) more precisely, problem solving, according to Gagne (1977) 
and Burton (1980), requires what we casually call 'thinking', 
is dependent on a large store of knowledge and capabilities, 
and is not restricted to mathematical content alone; 
(iii) those tasks which require the identification and 
execution of an arithmetical representation in the context of a 
hypothetical, real world scenario are more appropriately 
referred to as mathematical translation problems according to 
Charles & Lester (1984); 
(iv) empirical evidence from Brown (1979); Carpenter et al 
(1981); Bryant (1985) suggests that the successful execution of 
the translation problem is a criterion of conceptual 
understanding of the arithmetical operations involved; 
(v) for Bryant (1985) successful performance on translation 
problems may be important for cognitive development per se. 
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The Abstract Nature of Mathematics 
All established areas of knowledge or forms of understanding 
(Dearden, 1968) have their own explanatory concepts and related 
means of verification. Mathematics is one such domain of 
knowledge. These concepts, the result of hard thinking on the 
part of previously successive generations of people, are 
available to subsequently new generations of people. The 
question is, how are such concepts made available to people? 
Clearly, all people do not (fully) avail themselves of 
mathematical concepts, otherwise there would not be the 
concern, as exists today, for the impoverished nature of 
mathematical learning. And true mathematical learning, it 
seems, is heavily dependent on learning concepts. Brown (1979) 
points out that "conceptual learning is obviously fundamental 
in mathematics". And Orton (1987) states that "mathematics 
learning consists very largely of building understanding of new 
concepts onto previously understood concepts". 
Beyond the claim that "the actual construction of a conceptual 
system is something which each individual has to do for 
himself" (Skemp, 1971), the process of conceptualization in 
general and mathematical conceptualization in particular 
appears not to be clearly understood. One explanation of the 
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conceptualization process (Bourne & Restle, 1959; Collins & 
Quillian, 1969; Meyer, 1970; Rips, 1975) is that the critical 
attributes of a concept (which in the case of the concept, 
insect, would be the number of body segments and legs) are 
abstracted from a variety of positive and negative exemplars of 
the concept and constitute a list of defining features against 
which new instances are compared. This explanation is, however, 
problematic. Firstly it is difficult to accept that feature 
comparison is always and necessarily involved in deciding 
whether class membership obtains. Intuitively, we class apples 
as fruit, cats as animals and daffodils as flowers 
holistically, without recourse to feature analysis and feature 
matching. Secondly, and following on from the first point, it 
is questionable to'suggest or imply that defining features can 
be supplied for all concepts. What are the defining features of 
a house, for example? 
Another explanation (Rosch, 1975; Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Rosch 
et al, 1976) is that we construct a prototype, or the best 
example of a category (which has most of the attributes that 
are common to most members of the category and fewest of the 
attributes of nonmembers of the category). By unconsciously 
calculating the frequency of feature representation we compare 
new instances of a category with the prototype and decide 
whether or not the instance is to be included in the category. 
Thus in British culture, robins and sparrows would be very 
prototypical of the concept, bird, while ostriches and penguins 
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would be non prototypical. But this explanation is not without 
its problems either. While the prototype model avoids the 
feature comparison paradox of classifying an instance according 
to a list of defining features which are unknown or unknowable, 
it nevertheless does not allow for clear specification in 
ambiguous cases. By class membership being decided on the 
criterion of 'best fit', it follows that when an instance falls 
into an area where boundary categories overlap, classification 
will be context dependent, with resulting possibilities of 
disagreement. A pistol, for example, might be an ornament in 
one context and a weapon in another. ' 
Yet another explanation (Brooks, 1978) is that instances of a 
category are collected on the basis of their overall, global 
similarity to an earlier, known instance. This explanation 
posits concept acquisition as being more intuitive, implicit 
and non analytical, with far less conscious hypothesizing or 
analysis; and, what is more, could account for the way in which 
children acquire concepts insofar as complex feature 
combination rules, the encountering of many instances, and a 
perfect memory of previous experience are not necessary 
conditions. 
The empirical evidence for each of the above explanations is 
considerable, so rather than posit one in favour of the other 
two it is perhaps wiser to consider each as a plausible model, 
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depending on the individual learner and other context 
variables. It would not then be unreasonable to conclude that 
these alternative explanations can co-exist. 
The process of conceptualization is perhaps not well understood 
because the concept of a concept is in itself elusive. A 
lexical definition of the term, concept, such as will be found 
in any reputable dictionary, indicates that a concept is a 
general notion. This is hardly illuminating. Furthermore, usage 
of the term, concept is not necessarily constant among those 
practitioners who might be credited with knowing what concepts 
are. For example, Rae & McPhillimy (1985) claim that "after 
teaching a concept, the teacher will wish to check that the 
child has indeed acquired the concept". This suggests that a 
concept is an item which can be directly imparted by the 
teacher and directly received by the learner; that it is a 
discrete, tidy, unambiguous entity. On the other hand, Babin 
(1980) claims that "the teacher does not 'give' a concept to 
the learner: students acquire concepts through appropriate 
learning materials and experience". This suggests that a 
concept is a node or 'building block' (in the knowledge system) 
which is dependent on other nodes or 'building blocks' for its 
existence and which is built up piece by piece out of whatever 
sense the learner makes of his learning environment. Moreover, 
Babin's view implies an active process of constructing meaning; 
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meaning which can be revised, updated and enlarged as a result 
of learning experiences. 
However, the apparently opposing views of Rae & McPhillimy 
(1985) and Babin (1980) may not be as mutually exclusive as a 
rapid perusal of them might suggest. From what has been said 
above, one can speculate that a concept is a mental structure. 
As such a concept has no physical basis in existence. It refers 
to some underlying competence. One can further speculate from 
what has been said above that the function of a concept is to 
quickly sort experiences. In turn this implies firstly some 
classification of experience and secondly the fitting of new 
experiences into one of the classes. Finally, one can speculate 
that this mental referencing, the bringing to bear of previous 
experience on a new situation, is a continuous and automatic 
process so much so that it is only really noticed when 
something slightly incongruous occurs, such as when -a small 
child addresses a strange, adult male as 'daddy' because the 
child has only experienced 'daddy' but not uncles, grandfathers 
or any other men. 
In their power to organize data, there are different types of 
concepts. There are artificial concepts and there are natural 
concepts. Artificial concepts have well defined, criterial 
features. Thus there is little or no dubiety as to whether or 
not class membership obtains. Artificial concepts have been 
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constructed by people in 'society to fulfil the technical-, 
scientific, religious or legal needs of that society. Natural 
concepts, on the other hand, are characteristically ill defined 
in terms of defining features 'and clear boundaries. Natural 
concepts are everyday objects and informal events, instances of 
which depend heavily on function and context to determine class 
membership. Natural concepts are acquired informally and/or 
spontaneously while artificial concepts depend, to a much 
greater extent, on formal and/or structured teaching insofar as 
considerable verbal exposition may be needed to clarify 
relationships and/or make explicit the substratum of ideas 
(subordinate concepts) on which the concept rests. 
The artificial/natural distinction draws attention to the fact 
that there are different levels of conceptualization. Those 
concepts which are derived from our sensory experiences of the 
environment are fairly low level. These are what Skemp (1971) 
describes as primary concepts. But these concepts which are 
derived from our intellectual abstractions from experiences in 
the outside world are of a higher order. These are what Skemp 
(1971) describes as secondary concepts. And herein lies a 
fundamental characteristic of mathematical knowledge. Its 
concepts are artificial and they are secondary. As Skemp (1971) 
points out: 
Much of our everyday knowledge is learnt directly from our 
environment, and the concepts involved are not very 
abstract. The -particular problem (but also the power) of 
mathematics lies in its great abstractness and generality, 
achieved by successive generations of particularly 
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intelligent individuals each of whom has been abstracting 
from, or generalizing, concepts of earlier generations. 
The present-day learner has to process not, raw data, but 
the processing systems of existing mathematics. This is 
not only an immeasurable advantage, in_ that an able 
student can acquire in years ideas which took centuries of 
past effort to develop: it also exposes. the learner to a 
particular hazard. Mathematics cannot be learnt directly 
from the everyday environment, but only indirectly from 
other mathematicians. At best, this makes him largely 
dependent on his teachers (including all those who write 
mathematical textbooks); and at worst, it exposes him to 
the possibility of a lifelong fear and dislike of 
mathematics. 
From what Skemp (1971) says it is clear that the mathematics 
teacher has a crucial role to play in helping the child to 
develop mathematical concepts. At one and the same time the 
teacher has to help the child form initial mathematical 
concepts from whatever everyday reality may exist for the 
learner and also to help the child relate previously 
assimilated higher order concepts to successively more complex 
concepts in the hierarchy. This abstract quality of mathematics 
is not lost on Resnick et al (1987) when they point out: 
There are not, strictly speaking, denotable objects in 
mathematics. For example, although one can point to a set 
of three things, and to the written numeral 3, those 
physical objects do not in themselves have the property of 
number. Number is a strictly cognitive activity. People 
construct this cognitive entity, the concept of number, 
without the benefit of any physical numbers to inspect or 
analyse. Yet number is the basic object of arithmetic. So 
we have in mathematics a domain in which, from the very 
beginning, people must reason about objects that exist 
only as mental abstractions. 
The conceptualization of addition or subtraction, or for that 
matter, any other mathematical topic is not then going to be an 
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abrupt metamorphosis from 'not having' to 'having' possession. 
In other words mathematical conceptualization for any given 
topic is not going to be an instantaneous once-and-for-all 
process which necessarily implies functional maturity. Since, 
according to Skemp (1971) all mathematical concepts are 
secondary concepts and since the formation of secondary 
concepts depends on being able to collect together lower order 
concepts which in turn have been detached from the 'sensory 
experiences from which they originated, it 'should' -not be 
surprising that mathematical conceptualization is a complex, 
lengthy business in which several years may lapse, according to 
Coon & Odom (1968), between "the emergence of a concept and its 
relative stability". 
Some language to describe the mysterious mechanisms of 
conceptualization. 
The term, conceptualization is respectable and useful as a 
short hand referent which alludes to learning and/or 
understanding in some comprehensive fashion.. It is less than 
helpful as it stands, however, for describing unobservable 
cognitive functioning. To suggest that conceptualization has or 
has not taken place requires further language to talk about the 
extent to which the individual has made sense of his/her 
environment. A number of psychologists (notably Flavell, 1971; 
Flavell & Wellman, 1977; Skemp, 1971; Brown & DeLoache, 1983) 
have indeed endeavoured to set up such language. But, as could 
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possibly be predicted, usage of terminology by leading 
proponents results in overlapping of meaning, synonymity of 
meaning and confusion of meaning which leaves the reader with 
feelings of frustration in understanding the nature of 
conceptualization. There follows then a consideration of some 
of the terms which can be found in the literature on 
conceptualization. There will firstly be some brief description 
of the terms evocability, utilizability, intuitive 
intelligence, reflective intelligence and 'etacognition with 
stipulative definitions where appropriate and secondly an 
attempt to integrate the meanings of these referents in terms 
of the significance of this research. 
(i) Evocability: While the term evocability may rightly be 
referred to as a bit of jargon (with all the contemptuous 
connotations of the referent 'jargon') the verbs, evoke, 
evocate, evocable and their associated adjectives are to be 
found in the lay person's lexicon. The essential meaning of 
these words is to arouse, to summon up or to call forth some 
memory, emotion or answer from the past. There -is also, in 
dictionary definitions, the suggestion that 'magical' or 
'spiritual' powers are at work when the memory, emotion or 
answer is being recalled. Although no such mysticism is 
intended here in the use of the term evocability, its meaning 
is nevertheless close to the general notion of 'evoking'. The 
evocability of a concept refers to the individual's ability to 
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trigger the concept into operation or, in perhaps simpler 
terms, to retrieve from long term memory pieces of knowledge 
which would or could help the individual to execute some task 
or other. For example, the car driver going on a long, 
previously untravelled'journey might know that an ability to 
read maps would or could help in'the plotting of the route. 
(The alternatives of would or could are used advisedly, for 
reasons which will hopefully become clearer later on). Another 
example might be that in order to have one's brand new 
electrical appliance function at all, the appliance needs to be 
fitted with a plug and so that one can connect the plug safely 
a knowledge of 'live', 'neutral' and 'earth' wires is needed. 
Perhaps another way of expressing what evocability means is in 
terms of knowledge of underlying principles. 
Flavell (1971) considers that conceptualization can be 
described in terms of degree of evocability: 
Low evocability would mean that only a very small 'easy' 
subset of the entire range of tasks or problems soluble by 
that concept will as yet stimulate the child to retrieve 
the concept from long-term memory and attempt to use it as 
a solution procedure; high evocability would mean that the 
concept is now readily retrieved for possible use with 
respect to most relevant problems, even when the concept- 
to-problem fit is partly camouflaged by task or other 
variables. 
In an arithmetical context then, the child who recognized that 
an addition operation was required when the numbers involved 
were integers less than ten but did not do so when they were of 
greater magnitude, could be described as being able to evoke 
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the concept of addition at a low level only. Equally, the child 
who recognized that an addition operation was required when the 
numbers were into thousands or included fractions of numbers 
could be described as being able to evoke the concept of 
addition at a high level. The foregoing scenario suggests that 
levels of evocability can be equated with the magnitude of the 
numbers and/or the complexity of the arithmetic. Such a 
suggestion is undoubtedly a restrictive exemplification of what 
Flavell was saying. There may well be other 'dimensions' on 
which levels of evocability can be differentiated, but which in 
this instance have not been explored. Nevertheless the critical 
point to be made is that some evidence for the presence of a 
concept does not of necessity mean that the concept is 
functionally mature. Whatever 'dimensions' there may be on 
which to differentiate levels of evocability, it 'would be 
reasonable to assume, in the light of Flavell's distinction 
between high and low evocability, that young children, in the 
early stages of schooling, would be able to evoke mathematical 
concepts at a low level only. 
According to Skemp (1971) there are two ways in which a concept 
can be evoked, or start functioning. The first is by 
experiencing an example of the concept in which case the the 
concept is evoked by classifying the particular example. For 
example, in order to describe similarities and differences 
between a Rolls-Royce and a Mini, the individual would have to 
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recognize that both are example of the concept, car. -Without 
the ability to activate the knowledge that cars are (usually) 
four wheeled vehicles which are powered by fuel, and which come 
in all shapes and sizes, and of which Minis and Rolls-Royces 
are but two examples, the task of making intelligent comment on 
Minis and Rolls-Royces would be impossible because the concept 
of car had never been activated. A second means of evoking a 
concept is, for Skemp (1971), by "hearing, reading or otherwise 
making conscious the name, or other symbol for the concept". 
This second means of evoking a concept is a specifically human 
phenomenon due, Skemp (1971) argues, to the human ability "to 
isolate concepts from any of the examples which give rise to 
them". Moreover, Skemp argues that this second means of 
activation is crucial in the process(es) of developing 
conceptualization because: - 
Only by being detachable from the sensory experiences from 
which they originated can concepts be 
, 
collected together 
as examples from which new concepts, of greater 
abstraction, can be formed. 
(ii) Utilizability: Just as for evocability, the derivation of 
utilizability has its place in common parlance. The verb, 
utilize is regularly understood as 'making use of'. In terms of 
conceptualization, utilizability then refers to the ability to 
make effective use of the 'knowledge' required to solve a 
particular problem or carry out a specific task. The 
utilizability of a concept refers to the tactical application 
of the 'knowledge' rather than to the executive management of 
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the 'knowledge' which is required in the evocability of a 
concept. The utilizability of addition and subtraction concepts 
would then be evidenced by the child knowing how to effect 
appropriate solutions to the operations of addition and 
subtraction when these operations were embedded in verbal 
contexts. 
(iii) The relationship between evocability and utilizability: 
Flavell (1971) believes that the evocability of a concept and 
the utilizability of a concept can operate independently. He 
also, however, implies that there is a relation between 
evocability and utilizability when he states that utilizability 
is effected once the individual has "sensed the concept-to- 
problem fit". This slight confusion as to how 
independent/dependent evocability and utilizability are, 
perhaps hinges on the means by which the concept is evoked. 
Returning briefly to Skemp's (1971) descriptions of how a 
concept can be evoked, there is firstly the evocability of a 
concept by classifying a particular example one encounters. In 
this simpler sense it follows that utilizability can be 
effected only after the concept has been evoked. One cannot 
apply a concept if one cannot recognize any instances or 
examples of the class. Being unable to recognize any instances 
of a particular class can only mean that the class, or concept, 
is not in one's cognitive repertoire. To this extent, 
utilizability and evocability would appear to be closely 
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related. However, for Skemp (1971) there is also the 
evocability of a concept by bringing into conscious awareness 
the referent for that concept. In this more complex sense it 
seems that one can entertain concepts without necessarily using 
them. For example, one might be fully aware that it is 
knowledge of electricity rather than some other knowledge which 
should be applied in fitting a plug to an electrical appliance, 
and yet be unable to utilize such knowledge because one has 
forgotten or never learned the electrical specifics involved. 
Equally, that one knows that map reading could help one in 
navigating a journey does not mean that one necessarily has the 
skill to use the map effectively. To this extent then, 
evocability and utilizability can be independent entities. 
What seems to be emerging from this exploration, in simple 
language, is that for the individual to really utilize a 
concept (and not merely to rely on routinized, algorithmic 
skill alone) he/she must be able to evoke the concept. However, 
evocability can be conscious or unconscious. If the evocability 
is conscious the individual is likely to experience success in 
the task solution because he/she can state, express, articulate 
or be aware of what is required. If, however, the evocability 
is at an unconscious level the utilizability may be 
appropriate. But it may instead be inappropriate, chance alone 
determining the individual's task solution since the individual 
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is not consciously aware of the principle(s) upon which the 
utilizability is structured. 
(iv) The overemphasis-on utilizability: Historically, in the 
field of education, those concerned with mathematical 
conceptualization (McIntosh, 1971; Brown, 1979; Riley et al, 
1983) have been concerned exclusively with the utilizability of 
concepts. This is implicit: 
in Vergnaud's (1982) view that "the ability to solve problems 
.. is the best criterion of the acquisition of concepts"; 
in Dickson et al's (1984) view that "there has been, and still 
is, much emphasis placed on children becoming skilled in the 
standard written procedures of computation regardless of 
whether or not they understand the basis of such techniques"; 
in Desforges & Cockburn's (1987) view that children's "capacity 
to use their skills appropriately to recognise, represent and 
solve problems" is limited. 
While of course, concern with the utilizability of concepts is 
desirable and even necessary, the emphasis, in the field of 
education, on utilizability to the exclusion of evocability may 
be hampering the child's growing conceptualizations in general 
and mathematical conceptualization in particular. Given Resnick 
et al's (1987) argument for number being a strictly cognitive 
entity and given Bryant's (1985) conclusion that performance in 
most cognitive tasks depends on both possessing the necessary 
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skill(s) and recognizing when the skill is needed, it seems 
that evocability of a concept (that is, being consciously aware 
that this particular concept is appropriate in this particular 
instance) has been neglected both in the study of mathematical 
conceptualization and in the development of mathematical 
conceptualization in children. 
Hitherto, the recognition of what is required on the part of 
the subject performing a cognitive task has been inferred by 
researchers. The presence or absence of a concept (in whole or 
in part) has been inferred from successful or unsuccessful 
overt performance on some behavioural index. To some extent 
this is perfectly correct since the field of cognitive 
psychology is exclusively concerned with mental functioning 
which of itself cannot be physically inspected. However, 
conclusions drawn from what abstractions are inferred to exist 
cannot really explain the evocability of concepts, if the 
distinction between evocability and utilizability is accepted. 
While such conclusions can account for the utilizability of 
concepts (which is essentially an exploration for/description 
of the behavioural manifestations of a concept's existence in 
the cognitive repertoire) evidence for the evocability of 
concepts - in Skemp's (1971) more complex interpretation of the 
process must come from the subject's direct expression of 
his/her awareness of the particular concept's availability to 
him/her. 
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(v) Intuitive and Reflective Intelligence: Conceptualization in 
its fullest sense, according to Donaldson (1976) involves more 
than being able to respond to new and increasingly more complex 
groupings of stimuli. For Donaldson, conceptualization also 
involves a conscious awareness "not only of objects and events 
in the real world but also of our own thinking about these 
things". The notion of conceptualization embracing both 
representations of the world and an awareness of the 
representations themselves finds a parallel in Skemp's (1971) 
notions of intuitive and reflective intelligence. Intuitive 
intelligence is operating when "we are aware through our 
receptors of data from the external environment". Any task 
solution in which the individual is successful "without any 
awareness of the intervening mental processes involved" 
requires intuitive intelligence and to this extent intuitive 
intelligence would seem to resemble utilizability. Reflective 
intelligence, on the other hand, is operating when "these 
intervening mental activities become the object of 
introspective awareness", and would seem to resemble the 
complex, conscious means of evocability. These 'apparent' 
resemblances should not, however, bethought of in terms of 
simple substitutions or alternative referents. Rather the 
parallel comes from the 'whole' and not the 'parts'. Together 
evocability and utilizability would seem to 'add up' to the 
same as intuitive intelligence plus reflective intelligence. 
Conversely, the (qualitative) difference between intuitive 
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intelligence and reflective intelligence would seem to be like 
the difference between utilizability and evocability. 
According to Skemp (1971) this second order functioning of 
intelligence, that is, reflective intelligence is extremely 
powerful as a facilitator of conceptualization because, once 
one can at least to some extent reflect on one's own thinking 
one can: 
firstly communicate one's concepts/schemata with another; 
secondly build refinements onto existing concepts/schemata; 
thirdly replace old concepts/schemata with new ones; 
fourthly correct errors in existing concepts /schemata which 
will allow subsequent, improved task solutions. 
Reflective intelligence would seem to involve a consideration 
of the form of task solution rather than the content, whilst 
intuitive intelligence seems tied to a consideration of the 
content of task solution rather than the form. In this 
distinction between intuitive and reflective intelligence we 
are again reminded of the relationship between the 
utilizability and evocability of concepts; utilizability being 
'intuitive' and evocability being 'reflective'. 
According to Skemp (1971), in any topic area, intuitive 
intelligence develops first and the development of reflective 
intelligence follows. However, the development of reflective 
Chapter 3 Page 64 
MATHEMATICAL CONCEPTUALIZATION 
intelligence is thought not to occur at all before adolescence. 
If this really is so then the young child is distinctly 
disadvantaged in that he/she cannot consciously communicate, 
refine, replace or update his/her thinking. The only progress 
that can be made has to be tied to content and context with the 
the resulting probability of success being a function of 
chance! 
In terms of the emergence of intuitive and reflective 
intelligence, a rule of thumb would have to be that intuitive 
intelligence emerges first. After all one cannot reflect on 
concepts which are not yet established or formed in the mind of 
the individual. Nevertheless it is arguably an abdication of 
responsibility on the part of the professionals if they do not 
attempt to find ways of encouraging reflective intelligence at 
an earlier age than Skemp claims is possible. It is not enough 
to say, as Skemp does, that reflective intelligence is 
"relatively late in arriving" given the earlier list of 'mental 
advantages' with which the person in possession of reflective 
intelligence is equipped. 
(vi) Metacognition: Being able to think about one's thinking or 
reflect on one's mental activities is now more commonly 
referred to as metacognition, a term coined by Flavell (1976). 
According to Flavell (1979), metacognitions are "not 
fundamentally different from other knowledge stored in long 
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term memory" and they can be activated "as a result of a 
deliberate conscious memory search" or "unintentionally and 
automatically by retrieval cues in the task situation". More 
importantly, however, Flavell (1979) claims that metacognitive 
knowledge "may and probably often does influence the course of 
the cognitive enterprise". 
It would seem from Flavell's (1971) notions of the 
utilizability and evocability of concepts, that metacognition 
does not have to involve utilizability, which is essentially 
the translation between a mental representation and an object 
or event in the real world, or as Skemp (1971) would put it, 
the use of intuitive intelligence. It would seem, however, 
that metacognition does involve evocability. Bringing into 
consciousness "the name or other symbol for the concept" 
(Skemp, 1971) either "as a result of deliberately conscious 
memory search" (Flavell, 1979) or "unintentionally and 
automatically" (Flavell, 1979) would seem to suggest that 
evocability is at least a part of metacognition. It hardly 
seems plausible that one can reflect on one's own mental 
processes without the essential tools of being able to detach 
concepts from the experiences which gave rise to them and 
being able to entertain such concepts in differing 
permutations. 
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Given Flavell's (1979) claim for the influence of metacognition 
on cognition, and given that evocability may well be a part of 
metacognition, it follows that the evocability of concepts, 
rather than just the utilizability of concepts should be given 
prominence in the study of conceptualization. The study of 
mathematical conceptualization is but one instance of this. 
Garofalo & Lester (1985) argue that "purely cognitive analyses 
of mathematical performance are inadequate because they 
overlook metacognitive actions". They maintain that the 
assumption that good tactical skill constitutes good 
mathematical performance is highly questionable; and believe 
that metacognition may account for a significant part of the 
"mental activity underlying the application of algorithms and 
heuristics". 
Not only now are there claims for the influence of 
metacognition on cognition, there is the further claim for the 
positive influence of metacognition on mathematical 
conceptualization. If, as was argued earlier, evocability is a 
part of metacognition, mathematical conceptualization requires 
both to be studied and developed in children in terms of 
utilizability (in which terms it is already well documented) 
and in terms of evocability. Turner (1984) makes a similar 
point when she states that in the education of the child, 
what is required . 
is a two-pronged attack, first by 
exposure to the forms of experience thought to give rise 
to the basic categories of human understanding, which are 
themselves a precondition for subsequent learning; and 
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secondly by alerting children to the nature 'of learning 
tasks in school. 
(vii) Metacognition and the young child: Although the term, 
metacognition, is, even in psychological parlance, relatively 
new, the idea itself is not. As Donaldson (1976) points out, 
"the ability to reflect on one's own reflections is placed by 
Piaget at the heart of his account of mature adult thought". 
Metacognition would not, in Piagetian theory, be available to 
the individual before the stage of formal operations. For 
example, Piaget (1928) found that children of seven years of 
age could correctly solve a translation problem such as '3 boys 
are given 9 apples, how many will each have? ' but could give no 
comprehensible, let alone coherent, account of how they had 
obtained their solutions. Subsequent research by others has 
demonstrated that primary school children are quite inept at 
monitoring their own cognitive performance. For example, 
Karabenick & Miller (1977) found that more than half of their 
5-, 6- and 7-year old subjects were unaware that they did not 
understand the message given to them. Reid (1966) found that 
some children did not understand what their parents were doing 
when they held a newspaper in front of them. Renwick (1984) 
found that some children expected to be able to read after 
their very first day at school. Garofalo & Lester (1985) cite 
considerable evidence all of which suggests that it is only 
r 
towards the end of primary education that the child begins to 
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become aware of his/her mental activity. Such findings present 
a somewhat pessimistic picture of children's metacognition. 
Brown & DeLoache (1983) however, are more optimistic. They 
discuss the phenomenon of metacognition in general and specific 
terms. Generally, there are basic metacognitive skills such as 
checking (did it work? ), monitoring (how am I doing? ) and 
reality testing (does this make sense? ), which although "basic 
characteristics of efficient thought" are nevertheless 
"transituational". Because the child has to learn the various 
metacognitive skills themselves and additionally learn that 
these skills are almost "universally applicable", it should not 
be surprising that the young child is overloaded in terms of 
processing. The metacognitive problem for the young child is 
not so much an executive one as a tactical one. Brown & 
DeLoache (1983) liken the young child to a novice in whom the 
lack of "intelligent self-regulation" is, they claim, a 
defining characteristic. 
In specific terms, Brown & DeLoache (1983) point out that tasks 
vary in the degree to which metacognitive control is required. 
They cite, for example, retrieval of objects from the 
environment as being easier than retrieval of information from 
memory. Brown (1978) and Brown & DeLoache (1983) do suggest, 
however, that it is possible to teach even young children some 
elementary metacognitive skills. Wolman et al (1975) found that 
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young children knowing that they would later have to recall the 
locus of an object, performed better than those not so 
instructed. Cosgrove & Patterson (1977) found that if children 
are shown how to ask questions they become adept at doing so 
when they need further information. 
Nisbet & Shucksmith (1984,1986) are also concerned that 
metacognitive skills should be considered an integral part of 
the teaching/learning activities of teachers and children in 
school. They do not indicate at what age, for the child (! ), 
this should start but they strongly suggest 'the sooner the 
better'. 
Because the area of metacognition is not, at the moment, well 
defined (Brown, 1978; Flavell, 1979; Nisbet & Shucksmith, 1984, 
1986; Garofalo & Lester, 1985), it is not at all clear quite 
how metacognition can be developed in and investigated in young 
children. However, given its suggested significance in 
conceptualization in general and in mathematical 
conceptualization in particular, and given the findings that 
even very young children can begin to learn to use 
metacognitive control, it would seem reasonable that a raw 
measure of metacognition could be gleaned from the individual's 
ability to evoke the concepts that are being/could be used in 
reflecting on a task. 
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The language for describing conceptualization seems, then, to 
fall into two distinct but not discrete groups. First there is 
the language which describes the form of conceptualization, 
language such as evocability, reflective intelligence and 
. etacognition. Then there is the language which describes the 
content of conceptualization, language such as utilizability, 








Conclusions on Conceptualization 
Grappling with a phenomenon which is not directly observable is 
no mean task. By inference and deduction one attempts to make 
claims for a competence which can only make itself evident 
through performance, and even then the performance may not 
truly reflect the competence. Such is the tentative status of 
conceptualization. And yet both of its strands, cognition and 
metacognition are the subjects of continuing investigation. The 
development of cognition has become a distinct and respectable 
area of psychology. The development of metacognition, hitherto 
referred to in somewhat oblique terms, is fast gaining 
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credence. Our knowledge of both owes much to the work of 
Piaget. 
While it is much debated that children between birth and 
adolescence progress through immutable stages of qualitatively 
different types of thinking, Piaget's central concepts of 
assimilation and accommodation nevertheless remain robust. The 
individual interprets events in his/her environment in terms of 
an existing frame of reference but if this is not altogether 
possible, the frame of reference itself can alter/change/adapt. 
These continual mechanisms of assimilation and accommodation 
constitute the expansion of the conceptual system, a system 
which has not only to construct complex representations of the 
world (cognition) but also has to take conscious control of 
such cognition and ultimately of itself (metacognition). 
In the development of cognition, Piaget and his followers 
claimed that appropriate experience was vital since only the 
child's active engagement with the environment 
(rather than 
inculcation by others) would promote real conceptual growth. In 
the development of metacognition (though nowhere near so 
clearly delineated) Piaget suggests (Donaldson, 1976), and 
others have substantiated, that talking about one's physical 
and mental activity is critical for progress. Further detail of 
Piaget's contribution to our understanding of children's 
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mathematical conceptualization will be the substance of the 
next chapter. 
In summary: 
(i) mathematical conceptualization is seen as extending over 
ontogenetic time and as being complex insofar as mathematical 
concepts are abstract; 
(ii) mathematical conceptualization, as one instance of 
conceptualization per se, is not a directly observable process; 
(iii) conceptualization can be described in terms of cognition 
and metacognition, the latter of which has not been delineated 
in any comprehensive way; 
(iv) the development of metacognition is, it seems, important 
for mature conceptualization but the early seeds of 
metacognition can be evidenced in very young children; 
(v) what is known about conceptualization is rooted in the work 
of Piaget. 
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classification, seriation and conservation 
The complexity of conceptualization has been touched upon in 
the previous chapter. Conceptualization is a phenomenon which 
is of interest to those who are involved in education, and can 
be explored from a variety of different perspectives: from the 
perspective of cognitive psychology with its interests in 
memory, perception, mental representation, language and 
artificial intelligence; from the perspective of social 
psychology with its interests in group dynamics, attitudes, 
self-concept and social constructions of reality; from the 
perspective of developmental psychology with its interests in 
learning, individual differences and qualitative change between 
birth and adolescence. This chapter is concerned to consider 
the implications of conceptualization for school mathematics 
and hence will take a predominantly 'developmental' 
perspective. 
Children, on entering the Scottish system of formal schooling 
at approximately 5 years of age, are typically introduced to a 
mathematics curriculum which embraces Shape, " Measurement and 
Number. Shape and Measurement are assigned relatively minor 
weightings, while Number is assigned a position of primacy. To 
begin to understand something of the rationale underlying the 
early mathematics curriculum it seems reasonable to begin with 
the work of Piaget, since as Hughes (1986) points out: 
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for some time now Jean Piaget has-been regarded as one of 
the leading authorities on the question of how children 
learn mathematics. 
For Piaget (1952), the child's understanding of number involves 
the simultaneous development of the ability to classify, the 
ability to seriate and the ability to conserve; and the 
superordinate ability to integrate these subordinate abilities 
to express relations. 
At its simplest level, the ability to classify refers to being 
able to abstract a common criterion from a variety of criteria 
available and to sort entities into a set according to the 
criterion. For example, to be able to classify according to 
colour requires the ability to recognize different colours and 
sort accordingly, whilst at the same time disregarding other 
attributes which the entities to be classified may or may not 
share. 
The ability to seriate is a refinement of - the ability to 
classify. Seriation demands a recognition of the relationship 
between and among members of the class. For example, a group of 
people may vary in height and can be arranged in order- from 
smallest to tallest. 
The ability to conserve is the recognition that attributes such 
as number, weight, -area and volume will remain invariant (that 
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is, remain constant) in the face of perceptual change, provided 
no real change has been made to the attribute in question. For 
example, 10 men are 10 men whether they are sitting close 
together or standing far apart from each other. 
In addition to possessing a competence in each of these three 
abilities, the child, in order to develop an understanding of 
number, must, according to Piaget, be able to unite these 
abilities. Thus the child needs to understand that a cardinal 
number represents a class of entities which: 
1. have an inherent relationship - that is the counting of the 
entities will indicate the total number; 
2. can both be broken down into sub classes, and combined with 
other classes to make a 'superordinate' class; 
3. can be enumerated with consistent accuracy however they be 
arranged. 
According to Piaget (1952), the child largely develops his 
understanding of number and other mathematical concepts by 
himself, "independently and spontaneously". 
Hughes (1983) suggests that Piaget's claims are widely accepted 
and supported: 
the idea that mathematical concepts are acquired through 
the child's mental growth - and in particular through 
activities involving concrete objects - is taken as 
virtually axiomatic by most nursery and infant school 
teachers. The majority of infant school mathematics 
schemes start off with very concrete activities, such as 
matching objects on a one-to-one basis, or sorting them 
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into sets. These activities are intended to develop the 
young child's general concept of number, as measured by a 
Piagetian conservation task. It is only when children seem 
to have grasped the idea of number conservation that they 
are considered ready to start on addition and subtraction. 
Hughes seems to describe the Piagetian influence as being 
interpreted by teachers in a linear fashion: concrete 
activities allow mental growth which in turn allows concept 
acquisition. But it seems impossible to distinguish between 
'mental growth' and 'concept acquisition' in terms of 
observable evidence. It further seems impossible to distinguish 
between 'mental growth' and 'achievement'. The child's 
achievement means what the child knows or can do now as a 
measure of progress from previous achievement. Thus, if a child 
knows more and can do more than previously, that is increased 
achievement. It is from such increases in achievement that we 
infer 'mental growth' and for many people, in casual usage 
especially within education, the notions of 'mental growth' and 
'increased achievement' may be regarded as broadly equivalent. 
The lack of specificity in Piagetian theory 
Piaget's conception of the child's intellectual development was 
never so specific as to indicate the precise age at which a 
given milestone was reached. Nor indeed could it be, since his 
primary concern was to understand how human knowledge is 
constructed. Crudely put, Piaget wanted to know, in the words 
of Lovell (1979): 
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if knowledge results from the accumulation of small bits 
of information or whether there must already be a mental 
structure or reference frame inside which some new piece 
of knowledge can be meaningful. 
To pursue this question, Piaget studied the cognitive 
development of the child through investigating the construction 
of the child's basic conceptualizations, rather than the build 
up of particular skills or the acquisition of specific pieces 
of information. To the extent that cognitive development is 
concerned to describe the intellectual changes which take place 
between birth and adolescence and, further, to try to explain 
how and why these changes occur, its frames of reference are 
not age specific. 
However, reference is frequently made as to the capabilities of 
the 'older' or 'younger' child: for example, "the youngest 
children were found to have no idea of class" (Turner, 1984); 
"young children generally fail and older children generally 
succeed with the traditional transitivity problems of the type 
administered by Piaget and by Smedslund" (Bryant, 1974); "young 
children might have very great difficulty with the invariance 
principle" (Bryant, 1974). Whilst it is accepted that 
chronological age and its correlation with any cognitive 
competence does not allow one to infer that age is an 
antecedent condition for increasing cognitive facility, it 
would nevertheless be more illuminating if one were to 
understand what is meant by the terms 'older' and 'younger' 
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children. It is, further, unclear, what is meant by the term, 
'capabilities'. Is this some undeveloped faculty which has the 
potential for manifestation? Or is it what the individual can 
actually de=onstrate? In other words, we are back at the age- 
old competence/performance argument which in turn, has 
implications for the behavioural indices that are to be taken 
as evidence and from which inferences are to be made concerning 
unobservable mental activity. 
The competence/performance can never be fully resolved because 
it is, in part, a function of differing predilections within 
the field of psychology: applied psychology is necessarily 
concerned with performance, while theoretical psychology is 
necessarily concerned with competence. Perhaps for the teacher 
who is wishing to make use of psychological findings there is a 
compromise. And that is, given that one cannot theorize about 
some unobservable mental functioning until one can 
comprehensively determine the specific situations in which 
performance reflects (albeit- impurely and imperfectly) the 
underlying competence, there has to be a strong emphasis on 
valid diagnosis of the performance(s). Smedslund 
(1969) 
expresses this idea neatly: 
The relationship between any set of behavioural indices 
and a mental process is an uncertain one, and a diagnosis 
will always have the status of a working hypothesis. 
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The ambiguity of age in relation to milestones in 
conceptualization is partially addressed by Flavell (1977). His 
commentary on the Piagetian system, suggests that children in 
early childhood (from approximately 2 to 6 years of age) show 
"some striking cognitive immaturities" when compared to 
children in middle childhood (from approximately 7 to 11 years 
of age). In other words, one is left to infer that the 
qualitative changes which occur in the child's thinking from 
about 7 years of age are what account for the differences 
between the younger and older child's ability to classify, 
seriate and conserve. The younger child appears not to have 
these abilities whilst the older child does. 
A further difficulty in understanding Piaget's precursors to 
mathematical understanding lies in the fact, as Hughes (1986) 
points out, that "Piaget never spelt out in detail how these 
ideas should be put into practice in the classroom". Hughes 
goes on to say that Piaget: 
has usually been interpreted as advocating a very late 
introduction to formal symbolism, with corresponding 
earlier emphasis on children's engaging in physical 
activities with materials such as sand, water, buttons, 
beads and bricks. It is assumed that pouring water from 
one container into another, or sorting objects into sets, 
will help develop children's mathematical concepts, and 
that they will proceed to formalisation only when they are 
conceptually ready. 
This is not to say there have not been attempts to apply 
Piagetian ideas in education. There have (Schwebel & Raph, 
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1973; Kamii & DeVries, 1976), where, the interest was not to 
have Piagetian schools in the way that there were and are 
'progressive schools' or 'alternative schools', but to have 
teachers who were 'innovative' and 'imaginative' and who were 
not 'constrained' by schemes-of-work, educational objectives 
and performance indicators. To this day it is still part of the 
educational rhetoric that Piagetian ideas are of central 
importance in the primary school. But how justified is this 
assertion? 
If it is the case that children must be able to classify, 
seriate and conserve before they can begin to develop an 
understanding of number and if it is the case that such 
precursors do not develop until approximately 7 years of age, 
then this author does not agree that belief in Piagetian theory 
is as widespread as exponents of the constructivist view would 
lead one to accept since, in Scotland at any rate, the typical 
Primary one child is expected to be able to add and subtract 
within 10, the typical Primary Two child to add and subtract 
within 20, and the typical Primary Three child to add and 
subtract within 100 (all with formal recording), by which time 
the typical Primary Three child may be barely 7 years of age! 
Perhaps regrettably, lip-service is paid to Piagetian ideas by 
using words such as 'readiness' or 'developmental'. These terms 
may suggest an adherence to Piagetian theory and therefore give 
a gloss or legitimacy to the curricular activities planned for 
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children without there being any real attempt to take account 
of the subtle differences among children and the qualitative 
differences between children and adults. But why should this 
be? Are the ideas poorly understood by those of us in 
education? Or are the ideas themselves not -really worth 
applying? 
In an attempt to reach a considered opinion as to the 
importance of classification, seriation and conservation in the 
child's understanding of number, it is worth examining how 
these abilities are empirically demonstrated. 
Classification 
There can be little, if any, doubt that classification is a 
basic, organizational strategy in human thinking. Studies have 
shown that people have strong spontaneous tendencies to 
organize stimulus items into categories and subcategories 
(Gregg, 1975; Baddeley, 1976). Nor is this phenomenon only 
observable in experimentally induced situations. Morton & Byrne 
(1975) found that housewives, when asked to list the items 
required to equip a house, systematically grouped the items 
either according to categories such as furniture, linen, china 
etc or according to the place in which the items would be put 
such as bedroom, kitchen etc. Intuitively this appears 
eminently reasonable. If as humans we made no effort to 
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categorize, then all new stimuli which were being attended to 
Would have to be regarded as completely novel phenomena, 
totally unrelated to what had been experienced previously. 
For Piaget, (Donaldson, 1978) the significance of 
classification for the understanding of number lay in the 
inference that if there are two or more sub-classes each of 
which contain at least one member, then the number of objects 
in the total class has to be greater than the number in any 
sub-class. It was Piaget's contention that children before the 
age of six or seven years could not compare a sub-class with a 
total class. The typical empirical test for this finding is to 
present the child with say 6 red flowers and 4 white flowers 
and then to ask the child, 'Are there more red flowers or more 
flowers? '. And typically, the young child answers that there 
are more red flowers because instead of comparing the sub-set 
of red flowers with the total set of flowers the child is 
comparing the subset of red flowers with the sub-set of white 
flowers. 
From a naive and pragmatic viewpoint, there would seem to be no 
useful purpose served in asking anyone to compare a sub-group 
with a total group, while it seems much more reasonable to 
compare two sub-groups. One might, for example, want to know 
whether there were more red or more white flowers in order to 
decide which vase(s) to put the flowers in, or in order to 
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decide where to site the flowers, or indeed in order to decide 
whether or not one should go and get more flowers of perhaps 
another colour. 
Donaldson (1978) points out that the young child's typical 
response to the standard class inclusion task "has provoked a 
great deal of controversy, and much research beyond that which 
initially produced it". She goes on to cite McGarrigle et al 
(1978) who found that the manipulation of the wording of the 
class inclusion question in such a way as to vary the emphasis 
placed on the total class, produced significantly different 
responses. Their conclusion is that the child's interpretation 
of the task is of paramount importance in determining their 
performance. In other words, a far higher percentage of 
children (below the age of six) than had hitherto been 
evidenced could successfully perform on a class inclusion task 
provided the context was a meaningful one for them. That the 
salience of the context will influence if not wholly determine 
the category into which one will classify an entity is a point 
made by Anderson & Ortony (1975) who state that "there are so 
many ways in which every object can be classified. .. there 
are cases in which only the context will help us to determine 
how to classify an object". 
The importance of classification then can be briefly 
summarized. The organizational strategy of classifying entities 
........ .......... .. 
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into categories is a central human activity. However, it is 
context dependent and failure on the standard class inclusion 
task does not mean that one cannot distinguish between 
subordinate and superordinate categories. Meaningful 
modifications of the task have demonstrated that children as 
young as three years of age can make the distinction 
(McGarrigle et al, 1978). 
Seriation 
The serial ordering, or seriation, of members of a class 
requires that the members be put into a sequence according to 
the property in question. For example different tins of beans 
could be sequenced according to weight (lightest -> heaviest), 
different strips of material could be sequenced according to 
length (shortest -> longest), different containers could be 
sequenced according to the volume of water or capacity of sand 
that they hold (holds least -> holds most). The significance of 
this ability is that it requires the recognition that Mary can, 
for example, be both shorter than Julie and taller than Susan: 
that is, that there is an ordinal relationship between the 
members of a set which allows one to co-ordinate separate 
judgements inferentially. Thus, in answer to the question, 'Who 
is the tallest girl? ' it is possible to infer, deductively, 
from the above that it is Julie. 
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As Bryant (1974) points out, it is rather important in 
educational terms that children should be able to infer 
transitively since the children who cannot, "clearly cannot 
understand even the most basic principles involved in measuring 
things". He goes on to say that: 
there will be little point, for example, in teaching such 
a child how to use a ruler, because he will have no 
conception that different things could be compared with 
each other through their common relations to it. 
The typical, Piagetian, transitive inference task is to compare 
two quantities (either different sizes or different weights) 
directly, A with B. Then one of these quantities, B, is 
directly compared to a third, B with C. Finally the child is 
asked about the relations between the two quantities which have 
not been directly compared, A with C. This last part is the 
point at which the child has to make the inference since in 
order to make a judgement about the AC relation the child must 
combine the information from the separate, direct comparisons 
between A and B and between B and C. 
Bryant (1974) points out that, typically, "children below the 
age of approximately seven or eight years of age were not able 
to answer the inferential AC question". And he also stated that 
amongst many other psychologists and across several different 
experiments there is the "same developmental trend from 
consistent failure to consistent success". 
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Bryant (1974), however, argues powerfully that young children's 
failure in the transitive inference task is principally due to 
their poorly developed memory systems and that their success in 
the task is possibly due in some measure to chance. In a 
modified version of the standard task, Bryant had the child 
make four initial direct comparisons, A and B, B and C, C and 
D, D and E; gave the child a lot of experience with these 
comparisons and made the BD relation the crucial test of the 
child's ability to make inferences. As a result, Bryant found 
that children as young as four were able to make transitive 
inferences. 
Nor does Bryant see any reason for thinking that children as 
young as four years' of age "could not also, make similar 
inferences about number". That the child does not cope with the 
ordinal relationships (which is essentially what being able to 
make a transitive inference involves) within number - that is 
understanding the necessity of the fact that if 4+2-6, then 6-4 
must equal 2- is, according to Bryant, due to memory failure 
rather than a competence lack. 
As in the case of classification then, it would appear that 
children can develop the ability to seriate (albeit with 
support) before they come to school. 
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Conservation 
For Piaget (Turner, 1984), conservation was the "centre of 
rationality": and according to Pinard (quoted in Turner) 
"extends beyond the few privileged domains to which it is 
customarily restricted". In the typical conservation experiment 
(in this instance to test the conservation of volume), the 
child is shown two identical containers, A and B, filled with 
identical quantities of liquid. The child is asked to confirm 
that both containers hold the same amount of liquid, and then 
watches while the liquid in container B is transferred to a 
third container, C, which is taller and thinner. On being asked 
which container now holds more, the young child tends to judge 
the quantities in A and C to be unequal and most often states 
that C, which has the highest level, contains more. For Piaget 
this failure in the conservation task is largely attributed to 
the child's inability to grasp the logical principle of 
invariance; that quantities remain unchanged over perceptual 
transformations. Piaget's interpretation has been variously 
challenged: 
1. Bruner, Olver & Greenfield (1966) do not believe that 
failure in the conservation task is due to a lack of 
understanding of the principle of invariance. According to 
them, from the different modes of mental representation 
(enactive, iconic and symbolic) available to people, the 
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enactive mode (which is based on internalized actions) and 
the iconic mode (which is based on internalized 
perceptions or images) predominate in the cognition of the 
younger child. When erroneous judgements in conservation 
tasks are made they are due to attention being focussed on 
the perceptual aspects of the task. The symbolic system 
'knows' that the liquid is the same after being poured 
into the new container but the iconic system insists that 
it is different and the iconic system dominates the 
response. Bruner et al demonstrated that if the perceptual 
differences were concealed from the child by a screen 
which allowed him/her to see the pouring take place, but 
not the resulting discrepant levels, he was more likely to 
judge correctly that the quantity of the liquid poured 
from one container to another remained the same. Thus it 
is Bruner et al's contention that correct conservation 
responses emerge only if the perceptual evidence is 
weakened, or later when the verbal system (symbolic mode) 
becomes stronger. 
2. Bryant (1974), from extensive study of the invariance 
principle, argues that young children seem to have two 
rules and use them in different situations. One rule is 
that if the child sees only one quantity (instead of two 
as in the traditional conservation task) which is then 
transformed, he/she applies the principle of invariance - 
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that is the child knows and asserts that since nothing has 
been added or taken away then nothing has changed. The 
other rule seems to be that if the child is required to 
compare two quantities he/she uses a perception-type cue 
(of 'looks' bigger, taller, longer, etc. ) Bryant maintains 
that the young child does not realize that these rules are 
inconsistent and so applies the first rule when he/she 
sees a quantity transformed and the second when he/she has 
to compare two quantities. 
3. Donaldson (1978), Donaldson & Balfour (1968) and Donaldson 
& Wales (1970) see linguistic confusion as being linked to 
nonconservation. Their research indicates that relative 
terms such as 'more' and 'less' do not have the same 
connotations for young children, as they do for adults. 
Clearly, then, if the child literally does not understand 
what the words 'more', 'less' and 'same' mean then he/she 
will not be able to carry out the task. Additionally, 
however, Donaldson and her colleagues argue that the 
conservation task (and for that matter the class inclusion 
task also) requires 'disembedded' thought - that is the 
child must think about the language used by the adult 
independently from the context in which it is being used. 
Prising the thought from its context such that the 
thinking becomes the "manipulation of meaningless symbols" 
is, as Donaldson (1978) points out, difficult even for 
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adults and yet, in our society, it is the type of thinking 
Which is highly prized in our educational system. The 
ability, to reason syllogistically is an obvious (albeit 
extreme) example. 
The importance of a salient context in which to demonstrate 
conservation is well exemplified in two studies. In Cohen's 
(1967) work a tea table experiment was carried out in which 
children of 4k years of age had to share out quantities fairly. 
They were extremely accurate in compensating for the 
differences in the shape of the containers provided. The 
correct nonverbal conservation responses were in contrast to 
the typical erroneous verbal responses given by a matched group 
of children who performed on the standard Piagetian version of 
the task. Similarly in Donaldson's (1978) work, with the 
transformation of the stimulus material carried out by 'Naughty 
Teddy' so as to suggest to children that the transformation had 
been accidental, the number of children successfully 
demonstrating the principle of invariance was markedly greater 
than in the traditional version. 
These two pieces of work illustrate the point alluded to at the 
beginning of this section - that the principle of invariance 
has application in everyday life. -It is not'so much a rule of 
logic which, once understood, will serve in any situation but, 
more, a convention which will have application in some contexts 
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but not in others. For example a heap of lego bricks is a tower 
when the child has built it up but not when he/she has knocked 
it down again. Similarly, each individual when described by 
his/her given name retains his/her identity in spite of changes 
in size and appearance through life, but when reference is made 
to the person's physical appearance as it changes from 
childhood through to middle age, then invariance is not 
preserved. The'notion of invariance is much 'bigger' than what 
can be encapsulated in a standard Piagetian conservation task. 
How the child performs'on such a `task will be influenced at 
least by the language used, the child's perceptions of the 
experimenter's intentions and the interaction between the two. 
In summary then, it would appear that while classification, 
seriation and conservation are in themselves robust concepts, 
their elicitation is context bound. Perhaps what should be 
remembered is that the types of experiments which have 
classically demonstrated classification, seriation and 
conservation are tasks in a social setting and therefore both 
the behaviour of the experimenter and, more importantly, the 
child's interpretation of the experimenter's behaviour must be 
taken into account. The traditional experiments assume that 
the task which the experimenter is setting is the same task 
that the child is doing. Subsequent studies (as cited above) 
cast doubt on that assumption. 
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The relevance of Piagetian theor 
The finding that children, even before school age can classify, 
seriate and conserve, ultimately leads one to question (in part 
at least) the relevance of Piagetian theory to early 
mathematical education. Certainly, Piagetian theory seems "to 
set limits on the kind of reasoning and understanding we can 
expect from children at any particular point in their 
development" (Resnick & Ford, 1984). This is all well and good 
as a general teaching principle, but it is altogether much too 
vague to allow one to draw from it teaching implications for 
specific mathematical tasks. And even those educationalists 
concerned to apply Piaget in the classroom are not sufficiently 
specific to enable practising teachers to see/understand what 
they should be doing in the name of Piagetian application. 
Ramii & DeVries (1976), for example, advocate a variety of 
musical, group and board games; describe some "situations 
particularly conducive to the construction of elementary 
number"; and expound half-a-dozen "principles of teaching"! 
Hughes (1986), however, draws attention to the nub of the 
matter. He points out not that Piaget's theory is incorrect 
"but that it lacks immediate relevance for those attempting to 
cope with, children's real difficulties in learning 
mathematics". Similarly, Groen & Kieran (1983) claim that there 
is a most serious gap "between Piaget's tasks and the tasks of 
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school mathematics". They argue that although there may be a 
connection between Piagetian tasks and school mathematics, "it 
is not an explicit one". The Piagetian tasks "lack the face 
validity or direct correspondence possessed by a task such as 
addition or solving equations" (Groen & Kieran, 1983). 
Groen & Kieran (1983) maintain that because Piagetian theory 
"provides no apparatus for bridging the gap" between empirical 
findings and school mathematics, and because Piagetian theory 
posits the notion that intelligence develops through a sequence 
of stages and substages, it is perfectly possible to infer a 
bridge between the two. They list this inference in terms of 
the following assumptions: 
1. Piaget's "intelligence" is the same as that required by 
school mathematics. 
2. Intelligence develops according to Piaget's "main 
sequence" of stages - sensorimotor, pre-operational, 
concrete and formal operations. 
3. The stages of this main sequence, together with their 
substages, define a particularly ordered set of slots into 
which the tasks of school mathematics can be inserted. 
This defines the level of intelligence necessary for 
successful performance on any given task. 
4. A given level is attainable only by going through all 
prior stages and substages. 
5. Performance in school mathematics can be improved by 
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explicitly teaching appropriate Piagetian tasks as 
generated by assumption 3- for example, improving 
addition by teaching conservation of number. 
Having, by inference, 'forced' a connection between Piaget's 
theory of how knowledge is structured and his theory of the 
sequence of any set of developmental events, it then becomes 
(relatively) easy to understand why assumptions 3,4 and 5 have 
become almost central tenets in what now can only be referred 
to as quasi-Piagetian approaches to school mathematics. This is 
not to say that Piagetian 'tasks might not be essential 
components of tasks in school mathematics. They may, somehow, 
very well define necessary conditions for success but it is 
becoming quite clear that traditional Piagetian tasks are not 
easily mapped onto conventional school mathematics. 
The appreciation that Piagetian measures of conceptualization 
in children do not have immediate application in the classroom 
is, however, a relatively recent phenomenon. Before Hughes 
(1986) and Groen & Kieran (1983), loyalty to the Piagetian 
framework would seem to have resulted in an almost 
unjustifiably reverent attribution of recommendations for good 
teaching practice to the findings of Piaget. For example, 
Lovell (1972) believes that the Piagetian, cognitive- 
developmental model does have something to say to teachers: 
firstly he suggests a move from the formal classroom, 
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whole-class teaching to small group and/or individual 
teaching; 
secondly he suggests that there be "opportunity for pupils 
to act on physical materials" - these being considered 
necessary for the abstraction of concepts; 
thirdly he suggests that classroom conditions allow 
teacher-child and child-child interactions - these being 
seen as important in helping the child to organize his/her 
thinking, and in eliciting "the strategies of thinking" 
available to the child; 
fourthly he suggests that "the initiative and the 
direction of the work must be the teacher's 
responsibility"; 
fifthly and finally he suggests that "alongside the 
abstraction of the mathematical idea from the physical 
situation, there must be the introduction of the relevant 
symbolization". 
Perusal of Lovell's (1972) implications may imbue the reader 
with feelings of deja-vu, and for good reason. As McIntosh 
(1977) points out, recommendations of this sort were being made 
"sixty to one hundred years ago" so however laudable they may 
be they cannot be said to derive exclusively from Piagetian 
theory. At best they are not inconsistent with it and what they 
really serve to tell us is that while Piaget's contribution to 
our understanding of children's conceptualization has been 
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enormous, any theory - including Piaget's theory - is merely a 
tentative statement that needs constant modification on the 
bases of evidence gained from the testing of its offspring 
hypotheses. Once a theory ceases to perform its function of 
incorporating new discoveries about human behaviour it can be 
set aside. 
Since Piaget's assessment of the cognitive abilities of young 
children was on the basis of tasks which have no obvious or 
direct application in the teaching of mathematics, there seems 
little point, in the context of this study, in pursuing his 
theory any further. Suffice to say that while what can be 
implied from his theory in respect of mathematical learning, as 
spelled out by Lovell (1972), is encouraging, it is not 
radically illuminating. It therefore now seems appropriate to 
consider the findings of those who have studied the 
mathematical achievements which young children have directly 
demonstrated. 
In summary: 
(i) the constructivist view of number conceptualization states 
that sound understanding of number involves the abilities of 
classification, seriation and conservation; 
(ii) research suggests that the ability to perform successfully 
in these tasks is a function of context, interpretation and 
memory; 
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(iii) the links between the concepts of class inclusion, 
transitive inference and invariance and the abilities to 
perform school mathematics may be tenuous, and are certainly 
not obvious; 
(iv) without in any way underestimating the importance of 
Piagetian theory in the development of mathematical 
conceptualization, it is fair to say that Piaget's findings are 
of little immediate relevance to the teacher of mathematics. 
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counting 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider the conceptual 
underpinnings of addition and subtraction from a perspective 
which is slightly different from that of- Piaget. This 
perspective is not opposed to the Piagetian view: rather it has 
grown out of the Piagetian view and as such can be referred to 
as neo-Piagetian. 
Gelman & Gallistel (1978), who have set about very thoroughly 
trying to establish what young children can do (as distinct 
from establishing what they cannot do), argue for the primacy 
of counting as the means whereby children begin to develop 
understanding of number. Moreover, they contend that children's 
early mathematical abilities develop in much the same way as we 
now understand early language development: by a system of self- 
generated rules. 
Starkey & Gelman (1982), react strongly against the Piagetian 
view that counting processes are "rote processes, the products 
of which have no numerical meaning or utility to the child" 
(Starkey & Gelman, 1982). Indeed Gelman & Gallistel (1978) go 
so far as to say that children cannot reason about number, that 
is think in the abstract, algebraic sense, until they have 
developed an understanding of how numerosities are obtained. 
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This understanding develops through counting which, in turn, is 
governed by five counting principles. For Gelman & Gallistel 
(1978), the developmental process in understanding number is 
one of: 
(a) learning the system of counting names; 
(b) perfecting the use of counting principles that constitute 
counting; 
(c) reasoning about number. 
Each-of these facets will now be explicated in turn, but in so 
doing it must be stressed that there is no implication that in 
actuality each follows the other in temporal sequence; in the 
sense of one being complete before another commences. 
(a) Learning the System of Counting Names 
According to Fuson & Hall (1983) number words have a variety of 
meanings and uses. The meaning of number words is determined by 
their uses in particular contexts. Fuson & Hall (1983) suggest 
the following contexts as ones in which young children acquire 
number words. 
(i) Sequence Context - The English language words, one, two, 
three, four, five, etc in their conventional sequence, are 
learned. In this context, sequence words are relatively 
meaningless in that there is no correspondence between the 
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words and the entities to be counted. Nevertheless sequence 
production activities are found to have a variety of (albeit 
low level) uses by children: spontaneously reciting a sequence 
to demonstrate to others the reciter's 'skill'; reciting a 
sequence to a pre-determined number in a game of Aide-and-Seek; 
reciting sequences in number rhymes - 1,2,3,4 Mary at the 
Cottage Door, or 1,2 Buckle my Shoe; reciting the sequence 
forward to find the number after 6, and backwards to find the 
number before 8. And even adults can be seen counting to 10 to 
control their temper! Fuson & Hall maintain that: 
each sequence production should contribute to the 
acquisition of the sequence and to its eventual fluent 
production but probably does not contribute substantially 
to any further knowledge regarding the number words. 
(ii) Counting Context - The sequence number words are 
successively assigned to countable items. In other words there 
is a one-to-one correspondence between number words and 
entities to be counted. In young children, counting can be 
accompanied by pointing which according to Fuson & Hall, 
connects the entity existing in space to the word existing in 
time; or counting may be accompanied by the physical act of 
moving the entities from the pile of uncounted to the pile of 
counted entities. Over ontogenetic time, the dependence on 
physically marking the items being counted, fades, if it was 
ever there at all, since some even very young children count 
without demonstrating overt indications of counting. 
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(iii) Cardinal Context - The number word describes the total 
numerosity'of the set of countable entities. Fuson & Hall cite 
evidence to show that children as young as two in western 
culture can use number words for small arrays in a cardinal 
context - for example, two shoes, two hands. However, as Fuson 
& Hall also point out, "the capacity to process numerosity 
information for small arrays does not mean that the child is 
aware that numerosity is a property of all sets". In other 
words the child may need help in generalizing from the 
different cardinal contexts he has experienced to abstract the 
concept of numerosity words as having context free meaning. 
(iv) Measure Context - The number word describes the numerosity 
of the units into which some continuous dimension of an entity 
has been divided - for example, two cups of flour, four 
footsteps, three litres of milk, five gallons of petrol. The 
measure context involves firstly an appreciation of non 
standard units and later an appreciation of standard scales. In 
using non standard units such as cupfuls, say, to measure a 
quantity of flour, the child must realize that each and every 
cupful be filled to the top with flour. Thereafter all the cups 
of flour can be counted or, if only one cup was available in 
the first place, a tally kept of the cupfuls so far counted. In 
using standard units, particular aspects of the use of each 
scale must be learned - for example, one's waist does not 
measure 26 inches if the tape has not been positioned correctly 
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all the way round the waist; one's body temperature is not 
constant in the face of differing environmental influences such 
as having a hot drink before a thermometer reading is taken and 
so on. Fuson & Hall argue that the measure context is so wide 
ranging in terms of the procedural and declarative knowledge 
required that: 
it seems likely that the measure concepts of children 
consist of a scattering of relatively isolated fragments, 
with little overall generality. 
(v) Ordinal Context - The number words, first, third, ninth etc 
describe the relative magnitude or the relative position of a 
discrete entity within a well-defined, totally ordered set of 
entities in which the ordering relation has a specified initial 
point as in the fist man to walk on the moon, the second police 
car to arrive at the scene of the accident, the third child in 
the line, the fourth child in the family and so on. Fuson & 
Hall maintain that ordinal words beyond first, second and third 
are probably learned by derivation from the standard word 
sequence rather than being learned in sequence as cardinal 
words are. 
(vi) Non Numerical Context - The number word is used as an 
identification. Post codes, telephone numbers, credit card 
numbers room numbers are but a few of the ubiquitous 
applications. 
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Given the variety of contexts in which the same number words 
are used, how then does the young child learn the system of 
counting names? According to Fuson & Hall: 
the child first learns the number word as several 
different context dependent words. Later these different 
meanings of the word become inter-related, resulting in a 
mature, closely connected set of meanings for that word. 
(b) Perfecting the use of the Counting Principles 
For Gelman & Gallistel (1978) it is the availability of certain 
principles as well as the ability to use the principles in 
concert which underpin the ability to count. 
The Principles 
(i) one-one principle 
(ii) stable order principle 
(iii) cardinal principle 
These first three principles are referred to as the how-to- 
count principles because they are procedural in that they 
specify the way to execute a count. 
(iv) abstraction principle 
This fourth principle is referred to as the what-to-count 
principle because it deals with the definition of what is 
countable. 
(v) order-irrelevance principle 
This fifth and final principle combines features of the other 
four principles. 
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The how-to-count principles 
Being able to count involves having an understanding of one-to- 
one correspondence in assigning a distinct counting word or tag 
to each of the entities in the countable array. There must be 
one and only one tag used for each item in the array. In the 
sophisticated counter in western culture this means using the 
traditional counting words in sequence. However the one-one 
principle is not dependent on the traditional naming sequence. 
Gelman & Gallistel found that very young children used their 
own idiosyncratic sequences such as counting a two-item array 
by saying "two, six" and a three-item array by saying "two, 
six, ten". What Gelman & Gallistel noticed was that children 
using idiosyncratic lists used them in a systematic fashion - 
that is, "the same sequence of tags occurred trial after 
trial". This consistency in assigning tags across a count is 
what is meant by the stable-order principle. Moreover, Gelman & 
Gallistel found that children who used idiosyncratic lists 
"were better able to apply the stable-order principle than were 
children who used conventional lists of number words": the 
explanation being that "the child remembers a list of his own 
making better than one imposed from outside". Nevertheless, in 
the interests of arithmetical communication it is essential 
that the child does learn to use the conventional sequence of 
number words. Gelman & Gallistel acknowledge that the child 
"probably will require considerable practice before he is 
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skilled in his use of the conventional list". The implication 
here is not that the child must be taught to count - he/she is 
already guided by the stable-order principle in counting - but 
that the child has to learn the conventions of counting. This 
will involve to some extent the rote learning of the sequence 
names although here again Gelman & Gallistel argue that after 
learning the sequence of the first twelve or thirteen 
conventional number words, subsequent number words are produced 
by generative rules. Fuson & Hall (1983) similarly mention that 
children seem to learn the one to nine pattern within the 
decade first and later produce the decades in conventional 
sequence. 
Being able to assign tags in a one to one fashion and being 
able to do so in a fixed order is not all that is involved in 
knowing how to count. A crucial component is the knowledge that 
numerosity is a property of all countable entities. For the 
child to indicate the numerosity of the set he/she must be able 
to state that the final tag applied to the last countable 
entity in the set represents the set's total numerosity. This 
is what Gelman & Gallistel mean by the cardinal principle which 
can be understood as having become established from any of the 
following behaviours: 
(i) being able to respond immediately with the correct 
cardinal or to a 'How many? ' question about a set; 
(ii) emphasis on the last word produced in counting by 
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louder and/or, slower pronunciation; 
(iii) repetition of the last word in counting; 
(iv) stating, without counting, the correct cardinal word 
after that same set has been counted on an earlier trial. 
Fuson & Hall (1983) point out that the actual response to a 
'How many? ' question has two successive stages (at least for 
sets too large to subitize), the first being enumeration and 
the second being the reporting of the final tag as a cardinal 
word. They go- on to say that the child who recounts to a 
repeated 'How many? ' question may be viewed as having mastered 
only the first of these two stages. According to the Gelman & 
Gallistel model this would be indicative of the one-one 
principle and the stable-order principle only having been 
acquired by the child. And indeed, Gelman & Gallistel do state 
that "the cardinal principle, which presupposes the other two, 
should develop later". 
Gelman & Gallistel believe that the how-to-count principles 
constitute a schema in the Piagetian sense: that children are 
intrinsically motivated to develop their counting abilities. 
The observed counting behaviour of children has shown that 
children count spontaneously in what to adults would seem 
purposeless counting activities, that they self correct, that 
they eventually learn to count accurately whether or not there 
has been planned and formal 'input to that end. Gelman & 
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Gallistel draw some parallels between the Piagetian model and 
their own. For example, Piaget's notion of children perfecting 
and practising newly developed schemata is seen as similar to 
spontaneous counting; Piaget's notion of the child's 
interpreting his/her world according to his/her existing frames 
of reference is seen as similar to the development of 
idiosyncratic counting lists; Piaget's notion of the 
environment impinging on the child and forcing change or 
'accommodation' is seen as similar to the child being forced to 
adopt the conventional counting list. 
This inherent need by young children to practise, consolidate, 
extend and apply their how-to-count schema is considered to be 
highly beneficial to the child and would seem to support the 
view that, historically we have underestimated children's 
mathematical abilities by failing to realize that the 
acquisition of early number concepts is, like the acquisition 
of early language, a process in which the child takes the 
initiative. 
The what-to-count-principle 
The abstraction principle is the understanding that the how-to- 
count principles can be applied to any array or collection of 
entities, be they physical or non physical, heterogeneous or 
homogeneous. Gelman & Gallistel's interest in the abstraction 
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principle stems from the fact that while for adults it is self 
evident that almost anything can be counted, some very eminent 
developmental theorists have argued that what the child sees as 
a collection to be counted is tied to his ability to classify 
objects and events into organized, - criterial groupings. 
Typically it has been postulated (Bruner et al, 1966; Piaget, 
1952) that children first classify according to the salient 
perceptual properties of objects, (such as colour and shape) 
and only later apply 'abstract' criteria (such as function, 
contextual association, logic etc) in their classification. 
Because Piaget, perhaps the chief protagonist, has emphasized 
the significance of classification in the development of number 
understanding, there has according to Gelman & Gallistel been 
"fostered the belief that children place restrictions on what 
can be counted". They do not argue that children do not place 
restrictions on what can be counted but they do argue that 
children do not restrict themselves to counting collections of 
identical objects. Gelman & Gallistel maintain that a complex 
classificatory schema need not necessarily mediate the ability 
to classify entities as 'things'. They state; 
It is possible to view the ability to classify the world 
into things and nonthings as a derivative of the ability 
to separate figures from grounds. In this case, the 
categorization of things as opposed to nonthings may well 
be among the earliest (most primitive? ) mental 
classifications. A differentiated and ordered hierarchy of 
subcategories of things may well be a later development. 
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What Gelman & Gallistel seem to be suggesting is that the 
earliest form of classification is the ability to get from the 
environment any information such that some discrimination can 
be made but that this discrimination may well not be at the 
relatively sophisticated level of shape, colour, function, 
association and so on. Thus, for Gelman & Gallistel, 
classification as a precursor to counting is at a very much 
cruder level than was suggested by Piaget. 
The order-irrelevance principle 
The order-irrelevance principle refers to the fact that the 
order of enumeration is irrelevant. In other words it does not 
matter how you count the collection of countables so long as 
you count them all and count each once only. Appreciating that 
the order of enumeration is irrelevant shows an awareness that 
firstly the number names, one, two, three and so on are not 
inherent properties of the countable items but merely arbitrary 
and temporary designations; and secondly the total cardinality 
of a set is not affected by the order in which the countables 
are processed. 
As well as demonstrating the ability to co-ordinate the how-to- 
count and what-to-count principles, the order-irrelevance 
principle demonstrates, according to Gelman & Gallistel, "an 
understanding of the fact that much about counting is 
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arbitrary". In their empirical work Gelman & Gallistel found 
that children of 4 and 5 years of age were "remarkably good" at 
modifying the order of enumeration when the experimenter 
designated a specific object (say 2nd or 3rd in a linear array) 
as 1. Moreover such children could "invoke the principle in 
their verbal account". In other words they would justify to the 
experimenter that the number word assigned to each object was 
dependent on the specific order of enumeration in any given 
count. This is not to say that the execution of the count was 
always perfect, but then neither is it with adults! 
It is Gelman & Gallistel's contention that in grasping the 
order-irrelevance principle the child knows what he/she is 
doing when counting. Furthermore Gelman & Gallistel believe 
that children possess this information by the time they come to 
school. 
(c) Reasoning about Number 
For Gelman & Gallistel, the child's ability to obtain 
representations of numerosity (which the child does by counting 
as outlined in parts (a) and (b) above) is a necessary 
prerequisite to his/her ability to reason arithmetically. 
Having grasped the how-to-count principles, the child 
routinizes his/her skill by increasingly applying the cardinal 
rule (that is counting aloud anything and everything in sight! ) 
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and later by increasingly stating the cardinal number name 
without having counted aloud. Gelman & Gallistel stress, 
however, that the counting process is not an intrinsic part of 
reasoning but that counting provides the representations of 
reality upon which the reasoning principles operate. They 
delineate the numerical reasoning principles as follows: 
(i) numerical relations; 
(ii) operations; 
(iii) solvability. 
(i) Numerical Relations refers to the child's ability to draw 
comparisons between two numerosities. Gelman &. Gallistel 
believe that young children can accurately compare two (small) 
numerosities and indicate whether or not the arrays are 
numerically equivalent. This occurs even if one of the arrays 
is made to 'look' larger as in having a 'long' line of 3 
counters to compare with a 'short' line of 3 counters. Gelman & 
Gallistel argue that the child's judgement of the 
equivalence/non equivalence in numerosity is mediated by 
representations of numerosity, which are in turn derived from 
counting. If the child does in fact count the members of each 
of the two arrays rather than construct a correspondence 
between the members of each set (which is the Piagetian view) 
then the concept of conservation as it applies to number seems 
somewhat redundant. Moreover, Gelman & Gallistel maintain that 
if a non equivalent relation holds between the two 
Chapter 5 Page 112 
THE NEO-PIAGETIAN VIEW 
numerosities, the child seems to recognize that an ordering 
relation holds. That is the child knows that one set holds more 
and another less - although the child rarely uses the 
nomenclature - by indicating the direction of inequivalence. 
That young children can, further, "use an ordering relation in 
an inferential manner" (Gelman & Gallistel) calls into 
question, once more, the significance attached to the results 
of the standard, Piagetian seriation task. 
(ii) Operations refers to the child's ability to manipulate 
numerosities and to know whether the manipulation has affected 
the numerosities. For example the child knows that spatial 
rearrangements, colour changes and item substitutions do not 
affect numerosity. This is what Gelman & Gallistel refer to as 
the operation of identity. Similarly when confronted with a 
transformation that has altered the numerosity the child knows 
that either something must have been added (in the case of an 
increase in numerosity) or that something must have been taken 
away (in the case of a decrease in numerosity). In every case 
the child makes his/her decision by counting. 
(iii) Solvability refers to the child's ability to repair the 
effects of the addition and subtraction operations. If the 
numerosity has been transformed by addition the child knows how 
to reverse its effects - by subtraction. Conversely if the 
numerosity has been transformed by subtraction the child knows 
Chapter 5 Page 113 
THE NEO-PIAGETIAN VIEW 
how to reverse its effects - by addition. Again however, the 
execution may be imperfect. The child knows how to solve the 
problem (that is by addition or subtraction) but he/she need 
not necessarily know exactly the number needed to make the 
reparation. 
The Piagetian and Neo-Piagetian Views 
Clearly there are differences between the Piagetian and neo- 
Piagetian views on how children develop an understanding of 
number. For proponents of the Piagetian view, children do not 
understand, can not understand what addition and subtraction 
mean until they can conserve, seriate and make inferences about 
number. And this seems to happen at about seven years of age. 
What is more, the Piagetian view claims that any 'counting' 
which a child does before then is meaningless and mechanistic. 
By way of contrast the neo-Piagetian view emphasizes the 
central importance of counting, believing it to be based on a 
number of principles all of which most children will have 
grasped, at least in part, by the time they go to school. Not 
only, for the neo-Piagetians, does counting start at an early 
age, it is the basis of understanding: 
that non numerical transformations do not affect 
numerosity; 
whether an addition or subtraction operation is required; 
that addition and subtraction are complementary functions. 
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The pivotal role of counting amongst pre-schoolers and early 
schoolers has, further, been evidenced by Ginsburg, 1977; 
Carpenter & Moser, 1982; Case, 1982; Fuson, 1982; Ginsburg, 
1982; Steffe et al, 1982; and Resnick, 1983. It is counting 
which allows young children to find solutions to various 
practical, addition and subtraction arithmetical problems. 
Within this realm of counting there are a number of strategies 
which children will use spontaneously: in addition there is 
'counting all' and 'counting on' (Fuson, 1982); in subtraction 
there is 'separating from/counting down from', 'adding on/ 
counting up from' and 'matching' to count the unmatched objects 
(Carpenter & Moser, 1982). 
Much of the counting behaviour observed by neo-Piagetians has 
included finger counting. Finger counting, though not always a 
reliable procedure, seems to be meaningful to young children 
(Hughes, 1986). Ginsburg (1977) maintains that young children 
are "likely to try to count on their fingers" and that teachers 
should facilitate this in their young pupils. Hughes (1986) 
specifically states that teachers should show children "how to 
use their fingers more effectively" and that the "different 
methods of different children" should be made "the focus of 
class discussion". 
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While the implications of the Piagetian view are difficult to 
understand in terms of classroom application, the implications 
of the neo-Piagetian view are much more direct. The child comes 
to school with some knowledge of and about counting. In this, 
then, there appears to be a form or structure on which teachers 
of young children can build. Obvious questions for the teacher 
might be: 
to what extent can each and every child in the class 
count? 
what is the range of counting skill amongst the class 
members? 
If, as the neo-Piagetian view argues, the ability to add and 
subtract has its origins in counting it is clearly important to 
investigate what children's counting performance is. The next 
chapter is given over to describing the present author's 
attempts to investigate the counting skills of the children in 
her primary one class. 
In summary: 
(i) the neo-Piagetian view sees counting as the basis of 
arithmetical understanding; 
(ii) counting begins to emerge in children as young as 2-, 3- 
years of age; 
(iii) counting skill is culturally transmitted - it is not the 
exclusive preserve of formal teaching - and is thought to 
Chapter 5 Page 116 
THE NEO-PIAGETIAN VIEW 
emerge is children in much the same way as language develops; 
(iv) the child's ability to count should be exploited when 
he/she begins to participate in formal schooling. 
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THE INITIAL STUDY 
If not in agreement in all respects, the literature cited in 
the previous chapters suggests that mathematics is ubiquitous. 
It has power and it has precision. Furthermore, mathematics is 
both a conceptual and computational tool with which children 
are keen to engage. The descriptions of incompetent functioning 
ascribed to pupils' learning would therefore seem less a 
function of mathematics per se and much more to do with how 
mathematical topics are taught in school. 
Given the enormous range of human intellectual accomplishment 
over phylogenetic time, it seems reasonable that by now we 
should have devised means to enable people (who in many other 
respects are autonomous learners) to become mathematically 
competent. The 'failure' would seem attributable to pedagogical 
practices. But pedagogical principles are derived from theories 
of learning, the preserve of psychologists. The superficially 
obvious conclusion to be drawn is that ineffective teaching has 
been perpetuated because psychological explanations of how 
learning occurs are inadequate. But this may be an invalid 
conclusion. 
While it is doubtless true that different theories of learning 
cannot, with equal comprehensiveness, account for all learning 
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phenomena, it is probably also true that different theories of 
learning do not have equal ease of applicability when they have 
to be translated into pedagogical principles and practice. Thus 
for all that the teacher wants the children in his/her care to 
be conceptually aware and mature in mathematical terms, the 
methodological route by which such understanding is achieved 
may not be practicable. How does the teacher fulfil parental 
and societal expectations of equipping tomorrow's adults with 
mathematical competence (in terms of a syllabus to be 
overtaken) and yet at the same time aspire to the ideal of 
supporting each individual child in a class of thirty or more 
through his/her individual rate of learning? 
On the one hand there is the tension which exists between the 
claims of society and the claims for the individual child -a 
philosophical question which is not central to this thesis. on 
the other hand there is, for the teacher, the dilemma of taking 
account of the differences- in performance of the children in 
the class given the pupil-teacher ratios, the minimal 
availability of resources and, in the specific case of 
mathematics, the competing demands of other curricular areas. 
All of these concerns, much evidenced in the researcher's 
twenty plus years of experience as a practising teacher, 
together with her reading, led the researcher to formulate the 
general research question: 
Chapter 6 Page 119 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE EMPIRICAL WORK 
Is it possible to improve pupil performance in primary 
school mathematics by methods which take specific account 
of children's existing mathematical understanding? 
Such a vast question needed clearer definition and much greater 
specificity both conceptually and methodologically: 
conceptually 
1. What was meant by 'improving pupil performance' and 
what was 'performance' anyway? 
2. What 'methods' were to be used? 
3. How was 'children's existing mathematical 
understanding' to be gauged? 
methodologically 
4. What aspect of primary school mathematics was to be 
dealt with? 
5. What age range of children was to be used? 
The generation of the above five questions, although slightly 
more specific than the original research question, did not 
permit easily available answers. They did, however, focus the 
researcher's thinking on how the research might proceed. In 
terms of contiguity an order began to emerge. 
Because the researcher was also a full time practising teacher 
in primary education, it was seen (by the researcher) as 
prudent and pragmatic that the research begin in her own class. 
r 
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It had also been decided (though not because of her research) 
that the researcher have a class of new entrants to the school. 
School policy dictated that for primary one children there be a 
heavy emphasis on number work. These 'constraints', in turn, 
had implications for how the rest of the research was to 
proceed. Thus the researcher decided that the focus of her 
research would be addition and subtraction. 
Children's 'understanding' of addition and subtraction was to 
be gauged by some form of testing. Such testing was to be of an 
oral nature and to be closely tied to the conceptual aspects, 
rather than the algorithmic aspects, of addition and 
subtraction. However, and additionally, in the light of the 
realization that the research was to be conducted with primary 
one children, an exploratory, initial study (see below) was 
decided upon to try to make some assessment of what number 
skills new entrants might bring to school. 
The 'methods' to be used for developing addition and 
subtraction in primary one children were to evolve out of 
theoretical positions discussed earlier: 
a) the significance of counting; 
b) the need to help the child to relate his/her informal 
knowledge with conventional symbolism and representation; 
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c) an openness and respect for children's existing skills 
and strategies. 
'Pupil performance' was to be taken as the behaviour displayed 
by the children in the arithmetical context. Such behaviour 
could be in the form of specific answers to test items or could 
be the spontaneous reactions of pupils during interaction with 
peers and/or the researcher. Claims for the improvement in 
pupil performance would be made in terms of the methods used 
for developing addition and subtraction in young children. 
THE INITIAL STUDY 
Since the age range of children participating in the research, 
and the focus of the research had been decided upon, the first 
research task was to mount the initial study. In attempting to 
gauge the current levels of attainment in number, amongst a 
small sample of primary one children, when there had been no 
formal teacher input, answers to the following questions were 
being sought: 
1. Within what number domain can the individual child 
(i) recall the number names in conventional sequence 
(ii) obtain the numerosity of a collection of countables 
(iii) represent a given numerosity 
(iv) represent an obtained numerosity? 
2. Is there any apparent pattern in children's performance on 
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such tasks? 
3. How do the children approach such tasks? 
4. Is there any apparent relationship between children's 
approach to and performance on the tasks? 
5. Is there any evidence of the children's skill in adding 
informally and if so, is this linked with obtaining 
numerosities? 
6. What implications can be drawn from the findings in terms of 
facilitating the development of formal addition and 
subtraction? 
Context 
In November, 1986, the initial study commenced. The researcher 
had a small class of new entrants (primary one) in a 
cosmopolitan school in Glasgow's west end. From August, 1986 
until mid way through October, 1986, the children attended 
school for mornings only. During that period the children were 
given no formal teaching in number work. Formal teaching in 
this context refers to any activity in which the children might 
be expected to: 
a) count to 10, and add and subtract within 10 and, 
further, 
b) represent his/her counting, addition and subtraction on 
paper using the conventional symbolism of numerals 0 to 9 
and the operator signs of +, -' and 
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However, the children had had lots of informal experience: 
a) playing with water, sand and plasticine; 
b) games to teach colour and shape; 
c) assembling jigsaws; 
d) construction activities with lego, bricks, construct-o- 
straws; 
e) colouring, painting, drawing, scribbling; 
f) group activities of 'chalk and chant' (in which the 
children chanted the number names to 10 and simultaneously 
scribed tally marks on to the blackboard); 
g) music and movement, dance, drama; 
h) craft activities using 'junk'; 
i) number rhymes, songs, nursery rhymes; 
j) dramatic play such as 'dressing up', 'in the house', 
'at the hairdressers', 'in the witch's cave', 'in the 
shop' and so on; 
all of which are fairly typical in a primary one class and are 
thought to afford opportunities for classification and 
seriation, which are the basic categories of human thought 
(Turner, 1984). 
Sub ects 
13 pupils out of a possible 20 were selected from the 
researcher's own class. The remaining 7 children had little or 
no control over the English language, thereby making it 
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impossible for the researcher to adequately communicate with 
them; and for this reason were excluded from the study. The 13 
selected subjects could be said to be representative of a wide 
spread of both ethnic and socio-economic backgrounds insofar 
as: 
a) Asian, African, West Indian and European ethnicity was 
represented in the school population as a whole and to a 
more diluted extent in each class; 
b) parental occupation included holding down prominent 
posts in education, the arts, industry, local politics; 
through working in the service areas in shops, in 
restaurants, driving buses and so on; to being unemployed 
and homeless thus needing state support in the form of 
finance, temporary hostel-type accommodation and social- 
work supervision. 
The age range of the subjects was as might be typically found 
in a primary one class. In November, 1986 the range was 5 years 
0 months to 5 years 7 months, with one exceptional subject who 
was only 4 years 2 months. The median age was 5 years 4 months 
and the mean age was 5 years 2 months. 
Procedure 
The initial study was concerned to find answers to questions 
(listed above) associated with counting tasks and the possible 
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relationship between such tasks. Each of these questions will 
now be considered in turn, in terms of description and 
analysis. 
1. WITHIN WHAT NUMBER DOMAIN CAN THE INDIVIDUAL CHILD: 
(i) RECALL THE NUMBER NAMES IN CONVENTIONAL SEQUENCE 
(ii) OBTAIN THE NUMEROSITY OF A COLLECTION OF COUNTABLES 
(iii) REPRESENT A GIVEN NUMEROSITY 
(iv) REPRESENT AN OBTAINED NUMEROSITY? 
Four criterion tasks were designed to elicit answers to this 
question. 
(i) Recalling the Number Names in Conventional Sequence 
In this task the subjects were required merely to demonstrate 
the extent to which they could recall the number names in 
conventional sequence (within twenty); that is how far they 
could chant one, two, three etc., since Gelman & Gallistel 
(1978) claim that very young children can have their own 
idiosyncratic naming sequences. Each subject was told: 
I want to hear how well you can count. 
It was anticipated that at least some subjects would not be 
able to sustain the sequences correctly to 20, in which case 
such subjects would not be pressed to continue beyond the point 
at which they became muddled. 
The cut-off number names of 5,10,15 and 20 were noted. 
(ii) Obtaining Total Numerosities 
Collections of 6,12 and 24 Logic People (see appendix 1for a 
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short description of Logic People) respectively were heaped in 
front of each subject who was each time instructed: 
Find out how many people are there. 
Again it was anticipated that not all subjects would 
comfortably manage all of the counts, in which case a 
subsequent presentation was not to be made by the researcher. 
The cut-off counts of 5,10,15 and 20 were noted. 
(iii) Representing Given Numerosities 
Each subject was given a card (see appendix 2 for the full list 
of cards) on which was written and drawn the instruction to 
draw a required number of pictures as in: 
rprJ 
64- 
This task was repeated 10 times over several successive days 
and a tally was kept by the researcher of the number of correct 
executions for each subject. 
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(iv) Representing Obtained Numerosities 
Subjects were given sheets of paper on which to represent 
obtained numerosities of pictorially represented quantities. 
There were 12 examples in the 0 to 5 range and 12 examples in 
the 6 to 10 range (see appendix 3). With the aid of felt pens 
the subjects were instructed to: 
Put something down to show how many things are in each 
set. 
The counting tasks were attempted by the subjects in the order 
in which they have been described. Over a period of days/weeks 
the researcher interviewed all 13 subjects individually, first 
for Recalling the Number Names, then for Obtaining Total 
Numerosities, later for Representing Given Numerosities and 
finally for Representing Obtained Numerosities. 
How the subjects performed on the four tasks 
Table 6.1 Recalling the Number Names 
Ss to 5 to 10 to 15 to 20 
1 yes yes yes yes 
2 yes yes yes yes 
3 yes yes yes yes 
4 yes yes yes yes 
5 yes yes yes yes 
6 yes yes yes yes 
7 yes yes yes yes 
8 yes yes yes yes 
9 yes yes yes yes 
10 yes yes yes yes 
11 yes yes yes yes 
12 yes yes yes yes 
13 yes yes - yes no 
r nrAi 13 13 13 12 
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Table 6.2 Obtaining Total Numerosities 
.......... ..... 
Ss to 5 to 10 to 15 to 20 
1 yes yes yes yes 
2 yes yes yes yes 
3 yes yes yes yes 
4 yes yes yes yes 
5 yes yes yes yes 
6 yes yes yes yes 
7 yes yes yes yes 
8 yes yes yes yes 
9 yes yes yes yes 
10 yes yes yes yes 
11 yes yes yes yes 
12 yes yes yes no 
13 yes yes no no 
total 13 13 12 11 
Table 6.3 Representing Given Numerosities 
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Table 6.4 Representing Obtained-Numerosities 
the number of correct executions out of 24 
Ss 0-5 6-10. total 
1 12 12 2 
2 12 11 23 
3 12 11 23 
4 12 11 23 
5 12 11 23 
6 11 11 22 
7 12 11 23 
8 12 11 23 
9 12 12 24 
10 12 10 22 
11 12 12 24 
12 12 10 22 
13 12 12 . 24 
total 155 145 300 
Table 6.5 Distribution of Tally Marks and Cipherised Numerals 




1 10 2 10 2 
2 9 3 1 11 
3 10 2 0 12 
4 2 10 6 6 
5 10 2 6 6 
6 10 2 12 0 
7 7 5 12 0 
8 10 2 12, 0 
9 10 2 12 0 
10 10 2 -12 0 
11 6 6 0 12 
12 6 6 11 1 
13 2 10 1 11 
total 102 54 95 61 
2. IS THERE ANY APPARENT PATTERN IN CHILDREN'S PERFORMANCE 
ON SUCH TASKS? 
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As perusal of tables 6.1 to 6.4 shows, the subjects performed 
to a high degree of accuracy. 
Twelve out of the thirteen subjects performed with complete 
efficiency in Recalling the Number Names in Conventional 
Sequence as far as 20, and the subject who did not quite 
achieve this standard could nevertheless accurately produce the 
sequence as far as 15. 
In Obtaining Total Numerosities the subjects were similarly 
efficient with all but two managing to count an array of 20 and 
one of these two getting muddled when counting an array of 15. 
Nor was Representing Given Numerosities troublesome to the 
subjects. Each demonstrated complete mastery. 
And finally, in Representing Obtained Numerosities the subjects 
were very accurate. No subject made more than two errors and 
the errors were + or -1 of the cardinal number. 
It is fully conceded that recalling number names in sequence 
tells us nothing about the ability to count, a point made by 
Fuson & Hall (1983). Accurately produced number sequences 
merely facilitate communication between persons when counting 
proper is involved. 
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Counting performance involves two complementary behaviours. 
Firstly there is the behaviour of obtaining a total numerosity 
and secondly there is the behaviour of representing a given 
numerosity. Real life examples of obtaining a numerosity would 
include finding out how many people are in the room, 
calculating the amount of money in one's wallet and reckoning 
the number of miles for a particular journey. Real life 
examples of representing a given numerosity would involve 
choosing six apples, serving four bowls of soup or writing two 
letters. 
In reality these behaviours frequently have to be co-ordinated: 
one has to obtain a numerosity and represent it, so one has to 
make one's preparation for a journey and then make the journey, 
or one has to estimate the number of guests being invited to 
the party and prepare food accordingly! 
It was this perceived analysis of what constitutes counting 
performance which underpinned the design of the tasks which 
were administered to the subjects. If these tasks were tapping 
the underlying competence of counting, it seems reasonable to 
conclude, at least, tentatively, that counting for these 
subjects was well established. 
In the absence of disparate results amongst the subjects, their 
attempts to represent obtained numerosities was perhaps the 
most interesting aspect of their counting performance. 
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3. HOW DO THE CHILDREN APPROACH SUCH TASKS? 
Generally speaking, the subjects tackled the tasks with 
confidence. There was no point at which any subject seemed 
perplexed or even unsure about what to do. From this one may 
conclude that the instructions to the subjects were specific 
and unambiguous. 
In Obtaining Numerosities different types of behaviour were 
observed amongst subjects. Some, of their own volition, brought 
a sense of order out of the heap of Logic People presented to 
them. They arranged the people in a line and either conducted 
the count after lining up the people, or lined up and counted 
the people simultaneously. Other subjects, however, tried to 
count the heap of Logic People as it was - in disarray - with 
the result that they could not distinguish between what had, 
and what had not, been counted. To these subjects the 
researcher suggested that it might help to make a line of Logic 
People. This the subjects did and then counted from one end of 
the line. 
Pointing to, and touching, the Logic People was much in 
evidence while the subjects were conducting their counts. 
Gelman & Gallistel (1978) suggest that "pointing behaviour 
seems to be central to the counting procedure". 
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Some subjects counted aloud while others counted silently (in 
which case the counting was deduced from the pointing/touching 
behaviours) and finally announced the cardinal number. Silent 
counting is regarded by Gelman & Gallistel (1978) as a 
developmental advance on counting aloud. 
These different, behaviours appeared to cluster in patterns: 
firstly, the subjects who needed the prompt from the researcher 
to line up the people invariably counted aloud; 
secondly, of the subjects who spontaneously lined up the people 
and then proceeded to count, some counted aloud whilst others 
counted silently; 
thirdly, the subjects who simultaneously lined up and counted, 
tended to count silently. 
These clusters of counting behaviour would seem to suggest a 
development in sophistication from the raw state, where the 
subject can deal with only one process at a time (that is, 
organizing the entities to be counted and then counting, aloud) 
to the more refined state where the subject can deal with more 
than one process at a time (that is, simultaneously organizing 
and counting, silently) with an intermediate state where the 
subject uses behaviours from each of the two extremes. 
In Representing Given Numerosities, the only comment to be made 
is about the meticulous way in which the subjects addressed 
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themselves to the task. For the larger numerosities (that is, 
beyond 4) subjects were frequently to be seen checking how many 
pictures they had drawn. For example, when required to draw 7 
cups the subjects could be seen counting when they had drawn 
only 5 cups and later when they had drawn 6 cups and finally 
when they had drawn 7 cups. The subjects had not been 
instructed to carry out such checks but since they all did so, 
the strategy was presumably, one of their own devising and one 
which had meaning for them. 
In Representing Obtained Numerosities there was variety in the 
subjects' approach. Some grappled with conventional notation. 
In her capacity as a teacher, the researcher had just begun 
teaching numeral formation. All of the subjects, however, used 
an amalgam of cipherised numerals and tally marks in 
representing their counting. Representations of zero ranged 
from the conventional nought to a dot, or sometimes the paper 
was deliberately left blank; the latter forms of representation 
being interpreted by the researcher as being part of the tally 
mark system. 
The researcher asked the subjects why they had used 'strokes' 
(the children's referent for tally marks). The typical answer 
was that "strokes are easier to make than numbers". Indeed some 
of the subjects were heard to complain, whilst executing this 
task, that they "couldn't make" particular numerical symbols; 
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three, five and eight being particularly problematic. The real 
explanation for this vacillation between the two systems is 
unclear. It may be, as the subjects themselves said, something 
to do with the manual problem of forming the numerals. On the 
other hand, the preference for tally marks may have had its 
roots in greater conceptual satisfaction for the subjects in 
making marks in one-to-one correspondence with the-items to be 
counted. Theoretical considerations of tally marks- will be 
discussed below. 
4. IS THERE ANY APPARENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHILDREN'S 
APPROACH TO AND PERFORMANCE ON THE TASKS? 
Counting performance, it will be recalled, was earlier 
delineated as comprising both the obtaining of numerosities and 
the representation of given numerosities in the co-ordinated 
activity of representing obtained numerosities. Mastery of 
both the subordinate skills and the superordinate skill was 
evidenced in all of the subjects. 
Counting competence, on the other hand, cannot be directly 
observed and is, according to Gelman & Gallistel (1978) an 
integrated, sophisticated system comprising five counting 
principles: 
a) the one-one-principle: attaching a different number name to 
one and only one of the entities to be counted; 
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b) the stable-order principle: applying the correct number 
names in sequence; 
c) the cardinal principle: asserting the numerosity of a set 
from the number name applied to the last member of the 
collection to be counted; 
d) the abstraction-principle: addressing the numerosity of a 
set and not being distracted by perceptual differences; 
e) the order-irrelevance principle: counting effectively even 
if the order of enumeration is altered. 
It is therefore. appropriate to consider the subjects' 
performance in the light of Gelman's counting principles to 
locate the descriptive, empirical data from this initial study 
in some sort of theoretical framework. 
In terms of the one-one principle, all subjects, within'the 
limits of the counting tasks were able to attach a different 
number name to one and only one of the Logic People; albeit 
that some subjects needed a prompt to line up the people for 
counting. 
In terms of the stable-order principle, all subjects were able 
to apply the correct number names in sequence. 
In terms of the cardinal principle, the subjects were able to 
assert the numerosity of the set from the number name applied 
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to the last member of the collection to be counted. They 
responded to the reminder question, 'So how many people are 
there? ', by simply repeating the name applied to the last 
countable. None demonstrated the phenomenon of responding to 
the reminder question by starting to count all over again 
which, in its manifestation, is, 'for Gelman & Gallistel (1978) 
an indicator that the child has not yet grasped the cardinal 
principle. 
In terms of the abstraction principle, all of the subjects 
addressed themselves to the numerosities of the collections and 
were not distracted by the perceptual differences of the Logic 
People: that is green, red, blue and yellow men, women, boys 
and girls who were walking, sitting or standing. 
In terms of the order-irrelevance principle, the subjects could 
count collections of 6 and 12 from any given point indicated by 
the researcher: such as from the middle, third from the right, 
fourth from the left and so on. That the subjects could 
remember the exact Logic Person from which they had started 
counting was perhaps facilitated by the variety of colours and 
shapes of the Logic People. This might not have held had the 
stimuli been all brown unifix Cubes, for example. When required 
to count collections of 24 from anywhere but one end of the 
collection, the subjects got somewhat muddled. While Gelman & 
Gallistel (1978) argue that a grasp of the order-irrelevance 
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principle subsumes a knowledge of the other four counting 
principles,, this distinction in performance between being able 
to count 12 and not being able to count 24 when the order of 
enumeration is altered would suggest that the counting 
principles develop in some concerted way and are applied to 
increasingly larger number domains, rather than developing in 
some discrete fashion. 
The strategy of repeatedly counting in Representing Given 
Numerosities would, further, seem indicative of Gelman & 
Gallistel's (1978) claim that children, having grasped the how- 
to-count principles (that is, the one-one principle, the 
stable-order principle and the cardinal principle), are 
motivated to routinize their counting in what Gelman & 
Gallistel regard as a truly Piagetian schema, a point of 
reference against which the individual checks his/her 
understanding of the world. 
In Piagetian parlance the schemata assimilate new 
situations/experiences and accommodate to them due to the basic 
need to reconcile imbalance between the cognitive structures 
and the environment. Translated into the neo-Piagetian terms 
and content of this thesis, the counting schema is an 
organizational framework which allows the child to evaluate and 
refine his/her counting behaviour. 
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The lining up of countables in Obtaining Numerosities seems 
indicative of both the abstraction principle and the order- 
irrelevance principle: 
of the abstraction principle because the 'lining up' took no 
account of the varying sizes, colours or shapes of the 
countables when the opportunity was (albeit implicitly) 
inherent in the task to firstly sort according to some 
criterion; 
of the order-irrelevance principle in that the subjects 
appreciated that each member of the array had to be counted, 
and counted only once - in this the subjects (many of them 
spontaneously but some with support from the researcher) 
demonstrated their knowledge that number names are temporary 
designations only. 
The task of Representing Obtained Numerosities was devised out 
of a desire to explore what Hughes (1986) sees as a "serious 
mismatch between the system of symbols which children are 
required to learn, and their own spontaneous 
conceptualizations". Hughes argues: 
that although they see written numerals around them all 
the time, children in most Western societies are not 
usually introduced to written arithmetic until they start 
school. The exact age at which this takes place varies 
from country to country but, whenever it happens, the 
basic problem is the same: children must learn to link the 
new written form of representation - with the concrete 
understanding of number which they already have when they 
start school. 
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Prior to carrying out the -task of Representing Obtained 
Numerosities, the subjects already knew something of "the 
system' of symbols" in that they could recognize some of the 
conventional numerical symbolism (when carrying out the 
Representing Given Numerosities task). However, they had had no 
opportunity to demonstrate "their own spontaneous 
conceptualizations" of how to represent a numerosity because in 
the earlier representational work, the subjects had been 
specifically instructed to make pictographic representations. 
In the event, the subjects seemed well aware of two systems for 
representing their counting, albeit that neither form of 
representation had been completely accessed by the subjects. 
Evidence for the subjects' awareness of conventional symbolism 
is to be found in the observations that: 
(i) all of the subjects had perfectly represented numerosities 
pictorially, when the stimulus for this had been supplied in 
conventional form (see Representing Given Numerosities task); 
(ii) none of the subjects made pictographic representations in 
the Representing Obtained Numerosities task. Although this 
would have been odd given that the stimuli for this task were 
in pictographic form, it would not have been unreasonable since 
the subjects had not been specifically directed as to how to 
make their representations. 
These observations would seem to suggest that the subjects knew 
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that their represented response had to be a translation from or 
to-a different level of abstraction. This would be in line with 
Hughes's (1986) view that young children do conceptualize some 
sort of representation of a stimulus which is at a different 
level of abstraction. 
The subjects' attempts to represent obtained numerosities in a 
conventional manner could be said to be "spontaneous" insofar 
as the subjects had not been instructed as to how the 
representation was to be made. The subjects' spontaneity, 
however, included the use of tally marks. Hughes (1986) refers 
to the phylogenetic origins of tally systems and raises the 
possibility that in using tally marks children are using a 
fundamental and universal method of representation. He points 
out that the physical action involved in making a downward 
stroke "is very close to the action of reaching out and 
touching objects when counting them: they are both ways of 
'marking off' which seems to be very fundamental". Moreover, 
Hughes (1986) found in his own work that in representing 
quantity "children themselves tend to use methods based on one 
to one correspondence". 
Given that the formation of cipherised numerals was problematic 
to many of the subjects, and given the relative ease with which 
tally marks are made, it is perhaps surprising that the 
subjects did not use the tally system to the exclusion of 
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conventional notation. And yet the subjects' use of the tally 
system was not necessarily perfect. In representing zero, for 
example, some subjects chose to make no mark; justifying this 
on the grounds that 'there was nothing there'. These subjects 
seemed not to see the need to 'acknowledge' that 'there was 
nothing there'. - 
A tentative explanation for the subjects' use of both 
conventional notation and the tally system (neither of which 
was used exclusively or perfectly) seems to be that while the 
subjects appreciate the existence of, and are keen to adopt, 
conventional notation for representing quantities they are 
nevertheless stymied by their own lack of manual dexterity in 
forming cipherised numerals; in which case they resolve their 
frustration by 'reverting' to the more secure, less abstract 
system of making tally marks. That the subjects are possibly 
conceptualizing not one but two imperfectly developed 
representational' systems and using both spontaneously is a 
strength rather than a weakness. 
5. IS THERE ANY EVIDENCE OF THE CHILDREN'S SKILL IN ADDING 
INFORMALLY AND IF SO, IS THIS LINKED WITH OBTAINING 
NIMEROSITIES? 
The Adding Bingo Game The subjects were in groups of not more 
than 5. Each subject was given one of the following cards. 
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Figure 6.1 
763237 3110112 61121: E 10 7 12 





Each card (measuring approximately 10cm by 5cm) had 6 cells, 
with each cell being represented by a number in conventional 
symbolism. Two conventional dice, the faces of each showing 
dots for numerosities 1 to 6, were shaken together. The dots 
thrown were summed and if the total matched a numerosity-on the 
card, a plastic counter was placed on top of the numeral. The 
first child to completely cover his/her card was the winner of 
the game. 
To begin with, the researcher prompted each subject after 
he/she had thrown the dice by asking: 
How many dots are there altogether? 
The context of the game, with its conventions of turn-taking 
and of there being a winner, was one with which the subjects 
were very familiar, and learning the particular rules of this 
game did not seem to present the subjects with too much 
difficulty. 
Initial reminders by the researcher to sum the dots were 
quickly dispensed with. Most of the time the subjects found the 
sum by counting, using the 'counting all' strategy. Finger 
pointing and head nodding showed this. A few of the subjects 
knew some of the smaller number bonds such as 1 and 1 are 2. 
One subject was able to derive a number fact from another known 
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fact. When asked how he knew that 5 and 5 are 10 he replied, 
"cause 4 and 4 are 8 and another 2 is 10". Yet another subject 
consistently and correctly knew all of the number bonds. When 
asked how he knew, his reply was, "cause I just know". 
Because counting/adding was an intrinsic part of the game, the 
subjects were constantly getting practice in the task without 
its seeming a chore or without its being imposed externally. 
Hughes (1986) makes a similar point when discussing the 
intrinsic motivation of games as a means by which number 
proficiency can be increased. 
There is, however, another advantage in using the games context 
which if it is not of immediate concern to the researcher it 
most certainly is to the teacher. And that is the advantage of 
keeping the children in the mathematical situation without the 
teacher necessarily having to be present. Floyd et al (1982) 
spell out this point when they say: 
many teachers reject the idea of producing practical 
learning experiences because of the worry that they will 
be tied down to being present throughout the time that the 
activity is going on, which is completely infeasible with 
any class of normal size. 
Floyd et al recommend that teachers "try and build the activity 
into a game where the winning strategy involves the very 
process you are trying to teach". 
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The Adding Bingo Game incorporated the advantages listed above 
and by providing additional cards, dice and plastic counters, 
became a game which many of the children in the researcher's 
class chose to play, thus freeing the researcher, in her 
capacity as a teacher, to attend to other groups of children. 
The purpose of the Adding Bingo Game was to explore the 
informal addition skills of children who had had no formal 
teaching in addition. As Gelman & Gallistel (1978) and others, 
have established, counting is a fundamental activity, from which 
informal addition appears to stem almost naturally; especially 
so when the counting involved employs the 'counting all' 
strategy. Nothing in the Adding Bingo Game denied that informal 
addition, when effected by the 'counting all' strategy, was a 
consequence of being able to obtain a numerosity. 
6. WHAT IMPLICATIONS CAN BE DRAWN FROM THE FINDINGS IN 
TERMS OF FACILITATING THE DEVELOPMENT OF FORMAL ADDITION 
AND SUBTRACTION? 
The purpose of this initial study had been to assess what 
number attainments primary one children had on entering school 
and to glean, from careful and controlled observation, factors 
which ought to be taken into account when formal number work 
commenced. So what was learned? 
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Children. are remarkably knowledgeable about our number system. 
They know it is a means through which one can make observations 
of one's environment. They also know that such observations can 
be recorded in different forms. They are nevertheless somewhat 
confused about the highly systematized nature of our number 
system. Through an inability (perhaps) to monitor their own 
cognitive behaviour they may not appreciate, for example, that 
it is prudent to spatially arrange the members of a 
disorganized array in some sort of order before executing a 
count. Similarly in their desire to be participating, 
functioning, 'doing' people, they do not yet appreciate the 
need for consistency in representing their observations; that 
in the real world adults do not usually vacillate between the 
tally system and conventional notation for representing their 
mathematical behaviour. 
Perhaps the most important implication to be drawn for early 
maths teaching is that we as teachers use as many intermediate 
steps as need be to help the child make links between his/her 
informal knowledge and regularized, conventional formalism. 
This means: 
1. helping the child to make explicit to self and others what 
knowledge he/she does have: if the child wants to use tally 
marks, fine, but this has to be recognized as a different 
system from conventional notation; 
2. building on what the child 'gives': if the child can 
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represent his/her counting pictorially then he/she can be 
assisted to represent addition and subtraction pictorially; 
3. removing unnecessary obstacles from the child's learning: if 
the formation of cipherised numerals is problematic, the 
learning of such a skill should be kept distinct from the 
teaching of number - plastic, magnetized numerals are readily 
available for children to manipulate instead; 
4. generally being 'open' to the child's contribution: as 
teachers we must believe that the child really is trying to 
make sense of his/her environment and not trying to sabotage 
our attempts to teach. 
Since formal symbolic notation is an intrinsic part of 
mathematical representation and since skill in such 
representation has not become routinized for the young child, 
it is essential that teachers make every effort to mesh their 
'expert' knowledge with the child's 'inexpert' knowledge. Not 
to do so and then claim that a child's number calculation is 
wrong is to make a judgement about the child's cognitive 
competence on the basis of psychomotor performance. That 
children come to school with a competence in counting is not in 
question. That they do, however, does not allow us to assume 
that they are conversant with all of its symbolism and 
conventions. 
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How generalizable are the findings likely to be? 
In carrying out research in the field of Social Science there 
is the desire on the part of the researcher to make generalized 
claims from his/her always limited experience to the wider 
social world. Indeed it can be argued that given the impossible 
logistics of describing, let alone explaining, the criterion 
behaviour(s) of the population at large, the whole point of 
carrying out research is to go beyond the information available 
from a small part and make inferences to the whole, in some 
cautious, precise and reliable fashion. 
To begin to make generalized claims for the results in this 
initial study firstly requires that the sample of subjects 
mirrors a population of primary one children. Was the sample 
truly representative of at least a Glasgow if not a Scottish 
population? Did each member of the population have an equal 
chance of appearing in the sample? 
It will be recalled that the sample used totalled 13 persons, a 
tiny number. However, given that the sample was drawn from a 
class which was one of three infant reception classes in one of 
the largest primary schools in Glasgow; given that children 
were assigned by the school to particular classes to 
counterbalance sex, age and ethnicity; and given that the 
school was commonly recognized by both politicians and 
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educationalists as being a microcosm of society in its ethnic 
and socio-economic make up, it is possible to claim that the 
sample is not obviously unrepresentative. 
But even if the sample is representative, the importance of the 
data gathered depends on how safely one can generalize from 
them, on the extent to which one can claim that the scoring by 
the subjects would truly describe the population. The 
quantification of the probability of error in such estimating 
is a matter for statistical analyses. 
But perusal of the data in tables 6.1,6.2,6.3,6.4 and 6.5 
shows the distribution of scores to be very skewed. Since the 
absence of a normal distribution in subjects' scores violates 
one of the assumptions for using parametric tests, it is 
clearly inappropriate to do so. This then leaves the question 
of whether there is anything to be learned from using non 
parametric tests. Non parametric tests mostly depend on the 
rank ordering of data to highlight significant differences or 
correlations. But since the differences between scores in this 
initial study are almost non existent it seems inappropriate to 
use non parametric tests. Statistical analyses seem irrelevant 
when it is recalled that: 
in Obtaining Total Numerosities all thirteen subjects could 
count to 10, twelve subjects could count to 15 and eleven 
subjects could count to 20; 
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in Representing Given Numerosities all thirteen subjects 
achieved 100% accuracy; 
in Representing Obtained Numerosities all subjects scored at 
least 22 out of 24 items correctly. 
Admittedly, however, more subjects made errors in Representing 
Obtained Numerosities. Only four subjects scored all 24 items 
correctly while the remaining nine subjects made one or two 
errors. It is interesting to speculate on why the majority of 
subjects in the Representing`Obtained Numerosities task should 
have made errors, as this contrasts with their respective 
performances on the other tasks. 
There may be an explanation in that in Representing Obtained 
Numerosities the subjects had to 'cope with a number of 
variables: 
a) remembering the obtained numerosity 
b) deciding whether to represent the numerosity by tally marks 
or cipherised numerals 
c) struggling with the mechanics of forming numerals when using 
conventional symbolism. 
By way of contrast, when being required only to Obtain 
Numerosities, the subject could announce the cardinal number as 
soon as he/she had finished counting. Similarly, when being 
required to Represent Given Numerosities, the subject had a 
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point of reference. The subjects had the card with specific 
instructions as to how to make the representation in front of 
him/her for as long as it was needed. In both of these tasks 
the subject's attention was focussed on only one facet of 
counting. But in Representing Obtained Numerosities, the 
subject's attention had to be given to both facets and to 
making a decision as to what form the representation should 
take. Given that the subject's short term memory trace of the 
obtained numerosity would fade in seconds (Baddeley, 1976; 
Gregg, 1975) which could mean that the subject had to obtain 
the numerosity several times (in other words recount, perhaps 
more than once) in the execution of one example; and given that 
the subject had choice in how to make his/her representation; 
and given that the formation of cipherised numerals was not yet 
routinized for the subject; it is reasonable to deduce (even if 
in an understated way! ) that the subject's processing capacity 
was heavily loaded. 
And yet representing an obtained numerosity is at the very 
heart of all we require children to do in formal number work. 
Children are expected to count, add, subtract, multiply and to 
divide, and to record this activity not only once a day in the 
course of school mathematics, but for as many times as there 
are examples provided for the children to work through. 
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As has been suggested already in this chapter, the most 
interesting aspect of the subjects' counting behaviour seems to 
have been revealed in Representing Obtained Numerosities 
insofar as it was on this task that subjects manifested 
greatest variability in execution. Are the differences, then, 
in any way real? Specifically, did the subjects have a personal 
preference in using the tally system or conventional notation? 
Furthermore did the magnitude of the numerosity affect the form 
of representation used? Wilcoxon tests were run on the 
distribution of tally marks and cipherised numerals in both the 
0-5 range and the 6-10 range. Subjects used tally marks 
significantly more often in the 0-5 range (p. <. l, two tailed) 
than they did cipherised numerals. For larger numbers, however, 
differences were such that they could be due to chance alone. 
Given the weak level of significance in preference for tally 
marks in the lower magnitude; - and given the lack of 
significance in difference between tally marks and cipherised 
numerals in the higher number magnitude, it cannot be claimed 
that the distributions of representation would be found either 
in another sample or in a parent population. 
Even if, however, the findings are not generalizable, the 
evidence from this small sample is probably as clear as it can 
be: that the subjects are sufficiently proficient in counting 
to be able to proceed to formal addition and subtraction. The 
issue now is whether or not a means for teaching formal 
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addition and subtraction can be found such that both processes 
are meaningful to the children. The next chapter describes this 
researcher's attempts to do just that. 
In summary: 
(i) young children, on entering the formal school system, are 
able to obtain numerosities and represent given numerosities 
very competently; 
(ii) the same children find it more difficult to combine these 
tasks into representing obtained numerosities, a task which is 
very characteristic of school mathematics; 
(iii) informal addition is an extension of being able to obtain 
a numerosity; 
(iv) the facility to represent obtained numerosities is more 
problematic: this may be due to the psychomotor 'newness' of 
using conventional notation or it may be due to the conceptual 
confusion of not knowing what form of representation to adopt; 
(v) as teachers we need to be aware of the previous point and 
be prepared to support children through their transitions from 
informal to formal characterization of the task in hand. 
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During the intervening months between November 1986 and March 
1987, excluding an extended Christmas holiday on account of 
inclement weather, the subjects had practised their counting 
skill on a 'daily basis: they had obtained numerosities, they 
had represented given numerosities and they had represented 
obtained numerosities. Many had learned to play number games 
such as Snakes and Ladders, Ludo and Dominoes; and they had 
continued to practise and improve their skills in the writing 
of cipherised numerals. 
The children's attainment in Recalling the Number Names in 
Conventional Sequence was also considerable. In March 1987 they 
demonstrated their chanting skills thus: 
Table 6.7 Recalling the Number Names 














Subjects 2,3,5 and 6 were stopped by the researcher. They 
could probably have gone on for longer but they were clearly 
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tired by. their efforts. Perusal, of the last number name stated, 
in table 6.7, shows that 8 out of 13 of the subjects stopped 
their chanting on a '9', the last number name before a new 
decade. When prompted by the researcher with the new decade 
nameýthe subjects were able to continue .. 1, .. 2, .. 3, until 
.. 9, when they became unstuck at the subsequent decade name. 
This phenomenon is noted also by Fuson & Hall (1983) who 
maintain that: 
word sequences produced by children aged 4k-6 years of age 
indicated that they knew the repeating one to nine pattern 
in the decades (eg thirty, thirty-one ...., thirty- 
nine) but that they had not yet solved the 'decade 
problem' (that is they did not, produce the decades in the 
right order). 
The subjects in this study would appear to have considerable 
control over the conventional number naming sequence. Fuson & 
Hall (1983) maintain that "the age at which the whole sequence 
to 100 is acquired seem heavily dependent upon the practices of 
individual teachers as well as on subject variables". They go 
on to claim that their observations in suburban schools suggest 
that "this can be accomplished by the end of kindergarten for 
most middle-class children if teachers provide moderate amounts 
of sequence production activities". 
If it is remembered that American children start formal 
schooling at 6 years of age, a year later than their Scottish 
counterparts, :, then kindergarten children will be the same age 
as primary one children in the Scottish system. 
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In this study the amount of teacher input into the generation 
of the cardinal number names had been very little. The teacher 
counted out loud the number of children present in the morning 
and afternoon but this certainly could not account for the 
chanting skills of the subjects. 
Gelman & Gallistel (1978) argue, however, that it is "the 
development of the child's ability to perceive underlying 
generative rules" which "leads to the mastery of a count 
sequence that requires a limited amount of rote learning but is 
capable of being extended indefinitely". In other words the 
child learns by rote the one to nine pattern and probably also 
the ten to fifteen pattern, although "fourteen is the first 
English count word whose derivation from an earlier member of 
the rote sequence is completely transparent" (Gelman & 
Gallistel, 1978). Thereafter the child learns the decade names: 
twenty, thirty, forty (and here again perception of their 
derivatives may enable the child to master the subsequent 
decade names of fifty, sixty, seventy, etc); at which point 
"all other count words can be derived from the application of 
the generative rules embodied in the already mastered count 
words" (Gelman & Gallistel, 1978). 
The subjects' intrinsic motivation to chant the number names 
and to apply their counting abilities in their daily living 
experiences was evidenced in the following types of informal, 
social interaction which the subjects themselves initiated. 
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Example 1 At lunch time when about half the class departs to 
the dining room for school lunch, the remainder gets ready to 
go home for lunch. Any one of the remaining children can 
announce how many people are left in the room. Sometimes the 
teacher is included as a countable, sometimes not; although she 
is usually told if she has been included. The count is usually 
correct, give or take one. 
Example 2 The children are beginning to gather round the 
teacher for a general instruction or a whole class activity 
such as a story or singing. Those who arrive early do one or 
both of the following: 
a) announce who has arrived first, second, third and so on as 
in 'I'm the first, Jean was second, Bob was third', although by 
the time the sixth or seventh person has arrived he/she is 
referred to by the cardinal rather than the ordinal number as 
in 'Andrew was number six and Peter was number seven'; 
b) count, in a cardinal context, the number of children who 
have arrived beside the teacher. 
Example 3 The teacher claims that she does not know how many 
people are in the class. A child offers to help by counting the 
people present. The offer is gratefully accepted and the child 
counts the- children who are sitting as a group round the 
teacher. After a first count the child is requested, by the 
teacher, to count again to check. Usually a second count 
produces a different answer. The discrepancy in the count is 
pointed out to the child who is then asked what he/she is going 
to do about it. The less efficient counters proceed to try to 
count yet again the muddled mass of bodies sitting on the 
floor. More efficient counters, however, suggest that everybody 
should sit in their own seat or that everybody should stand up 
in a straight line. The assembled body invariably acquiesces to 
the counter's request, amid reminders of 'Remember to count 
yourself'. Such an organizational strategy enables the counter 
to produce the correct count. 
Example 4 At milktime two children are give joint 
responsibility for giving out the cartons of milk and straws. 
They are asked by the teacher, 'Will there be enough cartons of 
milk? ' The milk cartons and all of the children are then 
counted by the helpers whereupon the teacher is reassured that 
because there are more cartons of milk than people in the 
class, there will be enough milk. Sometimes the teacher is even 
told that there will be two or three or four cartons left over 
because there are not enough children for all of the cartons of 
milk. When the helpers are asked by the teacher, 'Will there be 
enough straws? ' a similar counting procedure is effected by the 
helpers who sometimes have to tell the teacher that there are 
not enough straws. Again she may be specifically told how many 
more straws are needed. 
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Example 5 The children are lining up at the classroom door to 
leave. Those at the head of the queue start chanting a rhyme 
which has subsequently been learned by many others in the 
class, and by the teacher. The rhyme is as follows: 
first the worst, second the best, 
third the royal princess; , fourth the ghost, eating toast, 
halfway up a, lamp post. 
The rhyme had been introduced by one little girl who had 
learned it from her mother. Another little boy_ had learned a 
similar rhyme from his older sister. This rhyme makes greater 
use of ordinal number: 
first the worst, second the best, 
third the dirty donkey; 
fourth the king, 
fifth the queen, 
sixth the royal jelly bean. 
These informal observations exemplify some of the empirical 
findings noted by eminent researchers in the neo-Piagetian 
mould: 
firstly, that children learn number words in a variety of 
different social/linguistic contexts (Fuson & Hall, 1983); 
secondly, that children do want to apply their counting 
abilities to many situations (Gelman & Gallistel, 1978); 
thirdly, and perhaps most controversially, that the child's 
knowledge of numerical equivalence comes from obtaining a 
numerosity as distinct from constructing a physical 
correspondence (Gelman & Gallistel, 1978). 
This last point needs some explanation. 
The researcher was, quite understandably, excited by the 
counting accomplishments of her young subjects who were also 
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the pupils in her class. As is normal practice in schools, the 
researcher in her capacity as a teacher would discuss with 
colleagues the children's progress. During such discussion it 
was pointed out time and again to the researcher by her 
teaching colleagues that 'before children can count properly 
they must have one-to-one correspondence so before you teach 
children to count you must do all the pre-number work of 
matching, sorting, ordering and pairing'!!. This teacher had 
not, at least in any conscious or structured way, dealt with 
the 'pre-number work' and yet the children in her class 
appeared to be counting well. 
The strength of belief in others, of one-to-one correspondence 
being a necessary condition for counting forced the researcher 
to return to the literature. 
The literature on children's number accomplishments uses the 
term, one-to-one correspondence freely but rarely in any 
precise way, with the result that the reader may construe from 
the term a meaning not intended by the writer. One-to-one 
correspondence, for example, 
"means there is an 'exact match' between two sets" and the 
"practical experience of matching is a preparation for 
counting" (Deboys & Pitt, 1979); 
"is basic to the concept of number and it is much simpler 
than counting" (Liebeck, 1984); 
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"is a foundational concept of mathematics" (Klein & 
Starkey, 1987). 
What does all this mean? 
The following attempt to clarify what is meant by one-to-one 
correspondence owes much to Klein & Starkey (1987). 
One-to-one correspondence is, essentially, abstract knowledge. 
One-to-one correspondence is a hypothetical construct, the 
existence of which is inferred from certain types of behaviours 
in the real, ' physical world. One-to-one correspondence is not 
of itself a directly observable activity. There are, however, 
two classes of behaviour (in the context of number performance) 
which allow one to deduce that the person or persons involved 
in the behaviour is/are in possession of the knowledge of one- 
to-one correspondence. 
Class 1 Correspondence Construction 
Correspondence construction is the pairing or mapping of 
every member of a set with or onto one and only one member 
of a second set. If this pairing is 'perfect' the sets are 
equivalent but if the pairing is not 'perfect' (though 
accurately executed), the sets are non equivalent. 
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Class 2 Counting 
Counting is- the mapping of a consistent list of number 
names onto a- set of objects. The sequence of the number 
names may be conventional or idiosyncratic. A unique 
number name is assigned to each object in the set and the 
final number name that is used represents the cardinal 
value or numerosity of the set. 
Largely because children of less than 7 years of age typically 
fail the classic, Piagetian conservation of number test (the 
reason for this, it is argued, being principally because of a 
failure to grasp the principle of one-to-one correspondence) it 
is reasoned that an understanding of the principle of one-to- 
one correspondence is a necessary prerequisite to counting. In 
Piagetian theory, one-to-one correspondence "is the 
psychologically primitive basis for a judgement of numerical 
equality" (Gelman & Gallistel, 1978). 
Here again, however, what is meant by one-to-one correspondence 
is not made clear. Yes, of course, a knowledge of one-to-one 
correspondence in the counting sense (as referred to in class 
2, above) is required if one is going to count, but it does not 
follow that in order to count effectively one must necessarily 
be able to effect a correspondence construction (as referred to 
in class 1, above). 
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The research, in fact, (Gelman & Gallistel, 1978; Langer, 1980 
and 1986; Gopnik, 1981; Sugarman, 1983) indicates that the 
behaviours of constructing a correspondence and counting both 
begin to develop in the infant's second year of life. It does 
not therfore seem that one 'grows' out of the other. 
Furthermore Klein & Starkey (1987) have found that in young 
(between 4 and 6 years of age) children's arithmetical 
reasoning, the children's explanations for the outcome of the 
operations of addition and subtraction were heavily influenced 
by the type of behavioural scenario to which they had been 
exposed. When asked to make a judgement on the basis of 
counting the members of sets, the subjects referred to the 
cardinal values of the collections but when asked to make 
judgements on the basis of constructing correspondences between 
sets the subjects referred to the relationship between the 
members in the two sets. 
The concept of one-to-one correspondence must not therefore be 
conflated with correspondence construction. While 
correspondence construction implies a knowledge of one-to-one 
correspondence, so also does counting. The two behaviours of 
counting and correspondence construction are manifestly 
different even if they do grow from the one root of one-to-one 
correspondence. 
Chapter 6 Page 163 
ADDENDUM 
Gelman & Gallistel (1978) argue that while "at some point in 
the individual's development he recognizes that sets that can 
be placed in one-to-one correspondence are equal", this is "a 
later stage in the use of reasoning principles". The very 
young child's criterion for deciding whether two sets are 
numerically equal is to count them and see, and on the basis of 
obtaining the same/different cardinal number for each set 
he/she will agree that the two sets are/are not equivalent. 
In summary: 
(i) children's counting performances develop when situations 
are provided which allow them to obtain and represent 
numerosities; 
(ii) this will occur when contexts are planned or exploited; it 
does not have to be formal and 'heavy handed'; it can be fun 
and appear to be spontaneous; 
(iii) one-to-one correspondence is a concept not an activity in 
the sense of a behavioural manifestation; 
(iv) counting and constructing correspondences are two classes 
of manifestation of one-to-one correspondence. 
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THE MAIN STUDY 
The Traditional Approach to Addition and Subtraction 
Traditionally, the teaching of addition and subtraction (and 
for that matter, multiplication and division) has been 
conceived of as being relatively straightforward. After minimal 
attention has been given to orienting the learners to the 
operation under consideration, the concentration of time and 
energy (both by learners and teachers) has been on the 
execution of routines which will achieve a correct answer. 
Practice in such routines has been considered very important, 
is usually provided in graded form, from 'simple' to 
'difficult', and is regarded by many teachers and learners as 
an end in itself. During the practising of such routines some 
children need the 'support' of using 'concrete materials'. But 
there is the suggestion of there being a certain stigma 
attached to the use of same. (It has been the researcher's 
observation that teachers consider that learners should be 
weaned away from such 'crutches' as quickly and as soon as 
possible, because these 'crutches' are 'unacceptable' in the 
real world! By the time the children are in the middle of their 
primary education, this rhetoric would seem to have been 
communicated to the children who, in turn, either boast about 
their 'superior' skills in not needing concrete materials, or 
try to conceal their alleged lack by surreptitious finger 
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counting. ) A small proportion of those children who succeed in 
executing these operational routines are deemed fit to proceed 
to 'problems' - contextualized versions of the operations 
learned. Such 'problems', which are regarded as extensions of 
algorithmic practice, cannot be 'taught' and must therefore 
remain the mystical preserve of that small minority who can 
divine their nebulous meaning! 
The reader can be forgiven for regarding the above diatribe as 
cynical. Such a conception of arithmetical operations which 
restricts learning to 'doing sums' and reduces teaching to 
demonstrating (usually on the blackboard to every member of the 
class simultaneously) how to 'do' subtraction by the 
decomposition method or how to 'do' long division by the DAMSON 
method is totally inadequate. And yet it has been the 
researcher's experience that this delineation of arithmetic as 
a series of formal algorithms is a reality. The literature 
(Skemp, 1971; Ginsburg, 1977; McIntosh, 1977; Glen, 1978; 
Dickson et al, 1984; Liebeck, 1984; Hughes, 1986; Desforges & 
Cockburn, 1987) too, argues against what is seen as an almost 
exclusive concentration on the formalism of arithmetic on the 
grounds that symbol manipulation becomes an end in itself; is 
meaningless to most children; and lays very shaky foundations 
for all subsequent mathematical development. 
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The Justification for an Alternative Approach 
Essentially put, the problem with traditional approaches to the 
teaching of number operations is that they allow little if any 
room for the conceptual underpinnings of the arithmetical skill 
a) to be made explicit 
or 
b) to develop in any way which allows the execution of the 
algorithm to have meaning or reality for the learner. 
If as teachers we want our pupils to be thinking people, 
growing towards intellectual autonomy; even if we just want our 
pupils to be good at mathematics, we must enable learners to 
develop the tools of thinking - concepts. Aid if conceptual 
development is to be at the forefront of our teaching we cannot 
hope that, by chance, concepts will develop. While on the one 
hand we cannot 'insert' concepts in another's mind as one would 
give another a pill or tablet, we can at least try to provide 
situations where concepts can begin to flower and grow. As 
Skemp (1971) points out, "the teacher must look far beyond the 
present task of the learner, and wherever possible communicate 
new ideas in such a way that appropriate long term schemas are 
formed". 
In attempting to address the problem of how we can better 
facilitate conceptual awareness in number, there is, however, 
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no point in throwing the baby out with the bath water. There is 
no suggestion intended that the formalisms of number be 
dispensed with: just that of themselves they are not enough. 
Hughes (1986) develops such a point when he says: 
What seems to be clear is that both the formal and 
the concrete are important, and the child who has one 
without the other is at a serious disadvantage. 
Children need help in freeing their thinking from the 
concrete, and formalization is essential in this 
process. At the same time, there is little virtue in 
children mastering the formal symbolism if the 
concrete understanding is lacking. The crucial new 
element introduced here is the emphasis on the links 
between the concrete and the formal. 
This is not to suggest that making the links requires a 
unidirectional progression from learning the algorithms to 
their applications in the real world. Indeed, as has been 
argued elsewhere in this thesis, such an approach is not 
particularly beneficial to children. What is being suggested, 
however, is that making the links requires bidirectional 
translation between the conceptual and formal representational 
facets of addition and subtraction. While it is necessary for 
the child to be able to extract the symbolic notation from the 
practical task, it is not sufficient. The child must also be 
able to interpret the notation in terms of a real life 
mathematical task. Only then can the child be said to have 
conceptual understanding of the operation involved. 
It was this abiding concern of the researcher's to find some 
means whereby addition and subtraction could be meaningfully 
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taught (in the sense of what has been said above) which led to 
the development of a somewhat novel but essentially simple 
methodology, entitled Bidirectional Translation. It was novel 
in the sense that it was devised out of necessity since most 
teacher's handbooks are (perhaps surprisingly) particularly 
vague in the pedagogical support they give to teachers; and the 
researcher was unaware of any other teacher or researcher using 
this approach. It was essentially simple insofar as it was 
based on two teaching principles: 
firstly, start from a point already identified as being one 
with which the learners are familiar and progress to greater 
complexity; 
secondly, explicitly model desirable/acceptable performance 
thereby providing opportunities for others to observe 'correct' 
responses. 
The Method of Bidirectional Translation 
Bidirectional Translation is a means by which addition and 
subtraction (and possibly the other operations) can be taught. 
Key features of this methodology include: 
(i) very finely graded steps of progression incorporating what 
the subjects themselves could bring to the learning situation; 
(ii) alternative strategies for dealing with a given situation; 
for example the choice of using fingers, Unifix Cubes (concrete 
materials) or tally marks for finding out an answer if the 
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number fact can not be recalled from long term memory; 
(iii) verbalization of operations; 
(iv) repeated translation from and to the numerical 
representation/hypothetical real world scenarios. 
On the following pages there follows a step-by-step, serial 
description of the methodology both for addition and 
subtraction. It reads as a series of notes and aides-memoire to 
the teacher, which is how it was written. 
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Series of steps for teaching addition 
Step 1 Setting the scene. 
The group of children is seated round the table, each child 
having a stack of 10 Unifix Cubes. The children are asked to 
take two cubes from their stacks. A magnetic numeral '2' is 
displayed on the magnet board. 
2 
MAGNET BOARD 
Attention is drawn to the two cubes in front of each child and 
to the numeral '2' on the board. The children are told that 
they are to take more cubes from their stacks and that to show 
on the board that they are taking more cubes, a sign is used. 
The children are told that the sign says 'plus' or 'add on'. 
The magnetic '+' is affixed to the board. 
2+ 
MAGNET BOARD 
The children are now asked to take a further three cubes from 
their stacks and to sit them beside the two cubes: 
A magnetic '3' is displayed on the board. 
2+3 
MAGNET BOARD 
Attention is drawn to the cubes in front of the children and to 
the display on the board. The children are asked to find out 
how many cubes they took from the stack altogether. After the 
total has been ascertained, the teacher explains that another 
sign is needed to show that something has been found out about 
2+3. The children are told that the sign says 'equals' or 
'makes' or 'is the same as'. The magnetic '_' is affixed to the 
board as is the magnetic 151. 
2+3-5 
MAGNET BOARD 
Chapter 7 Page 171 
THE CONTINUATION OF THE EMPIRICAL WORK 
Attention is drawn to the cubes in front of the children and to 
the 'number story' on the board (two. plus three equals five). 
The children are invited to 'read' the number story aloud. This 
entire procedure is repeated many more times over successive 
days using different number combinations within 10. Zero is 
introduced by instructing the children to take out 4 cubes and 
then take out no cubes. 
Step 2 Let's Pretend. 
The children are introduced to the notion that cubes can be 
used to represent just about anything in the real world. The 
teacher says to the children, "Let's pretend the cubes are 
bananas" or "cars" or whatever. The children are instructed to 
take out three bananas and then another three bananas and to 
find out how many bananas they have in front of them. As above, 
considerable practice is given, and every addition activity is 
accompanied by its representation in magnetic numeral form. 
Step 3 Silly Stories. 
The children are told to listen to a 'silly story'. While they 
are listening they have to take from their stack of cubes the 
numbers mentioned in the 'silly story' 
"Mummy gave me three lollipops and four sweets". 
The children are asked to show their three lollipops (whereupon 
each child holds up the three Unifix Cubes) and their four 
sweets (whereupon each child holds up the four Unifix Cubes). 
The teacher asks, "How many things did Mummy give me 
altogether? " When the total has been identified the teacher 
asks, "How did you find out the answer? " 
Step 4 Silly Stories and Number Stories. 
The teacher provides a complete 'silly story': 
"There are four blue sweets and two red sweets in the bag 
so that makes six sweets altogether". 
The children are invited to use the magnetic numerals and signs 
to represent the 'silly story' as a 'number story' (4+2-6). The 
children 'read' the 'number story' (four plus two equals six) 
and are required to indicate which number represents the blue 
sweets, which number represents the red sweets, which sign 
represents the operation of addition and which sign represents 
the outcome of the operation. Again, much practice is given in 
this activity. 
Step 5 Number Stories and Silly Stories. 
The teacher provides a complete 'number story' on the magnet 
board (for example 1+3=4) and the children are invited to 
provide a corresponding 'silly story'. Allow as many children 
as time allows, to provide verbal contexts for any given 
numerical representation. 
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Step 6 Drawing a story - first version. 
The children are instructed that instead of telling a 'silly 
story' they have to draw a 'silly story' for a bit of a number 
story which will be provided. The instruction 'draw 2+3' is 
given orally and is also put on the magnet board for the 
children to see. Provide paper and pencils/pens/ crayons and 
observe what happens. When each child has pictorially 
represented his/her 'silly story' ask the child to explain 
his/her story and scribe the story in front of the child. This 
procedure of drawing a 'number story' is repeated regularly 
over successive teaching sessions. 
Step 7 Drawing a story - second version. 
The children are invited to draw their own 'silly story' with 
no numerical stimulus being provided. In other words the 
children are not told of how many of each sub set to draw. 
There is now greater need than before for the children to 
describe/ explain their stories to the teacher (since both the 
numerical components and the verbal contexts are the children's 
own with no constraints imposed by the teacher) who again 
scribes at the child's dictation. 
Step 8 Strategies for finding the answer. 
The children are told that they will be given a bit of a 
'number story' (for example 3+4=) and that they will have to 
find the answer. The teacher asks the children how they will 
find out the answer if they do not already know. The children 
make various suggestions: 
a) count on their fingers 
b) count with cubes 
c) draw pictures 
each of which is positively received by the teacher who then 
points out that:, 
a) sometimes we might not have enough fingers (as when 
summing any numbers the total of which is greater than 
10) 
b) cubes are not always available 
c) pictures can take a long time to draw. 
The teacher the demonstrates a 'method which she sometimes 
uses'. Whereupon she writes 3+4= on the blackboard and sets out 
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The results are compared 
fingers, cubes and tally u 
in setting down 'number 
(referred to as strokes) 
methods is valid and that 
use) is to be theirs. 
using each of the three methods - 
arks. The children are given practice 
stories' and in using tally marks 
but are reassured that each of the 
the final choice (of which method to 
Step 9 Does it work? 
Only now are the children considered ready to undertake the 
conventional addition exercises of adding two numbers the total 
of which is within 10. The children undertake this activity 
outwith the direct supervision of the teacher - that is when 
she is working with other groups of children in the class. 
However, to check that the earlier steps in the series have 
been of use to the children, random, one-to-one interviews are 
held between the teacher and the child when the teacher in the 
light of a completed exercise: 
a) asks the child how he/she found the answer to a particular 
operation, say 6+2; 
b) invites the children to provide a 'silly story' for a 
particular addition operation, say. 5+0; 
c) requests the child to peruse all the examples in the 
exercise and identify which 'number story' is being referred to 
when the teacher provides a 'silly story'. 
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Series of steps for teaching subtraction 
Step 1 Setting the scene. 
The group of children is seated round the table, each child 
having a stack of 10 Unifix Cubes. The children are asked to 
take 6 cubes from their stacks. A magnetic numeral '6' is 
displayed on the magnet board. 
6 
MAGNET BOARD 
Attention is drawn to the six cubes in front of each child and 
to the numeral '6' on the board. The children are told that 
they are to take some cubes away from their set of six and that 
to show on the board that they are taking cubes away a sign is 
used. The children are told that the sign says 'minus' or 




The children are now asked to take two cubes away from their 
stack of six and to return them to the 'bank'. A magnetic '2' 
is placed on the board. 
6-2 
MAGNET BOARD 
Attention is again drawn to the board which now displays 6-2. 
The children are asked to find out how many cubes they have 
left. After the answer has been ascertained the teacher reminds 
the children that a sign is needed to show that something has 
been found out about 6-2. The magnetic '-' is affixed to the 
board as is a magnetic '4'. 
6-2-4 
MAGNET BOARD 
The children are reminded that they started off with six cubes 
and that they took away two of them. They. are now left with 
four cubes in front of them. Attention is drawn to the 'number 
story' on the board (6-2-4) and the children are invited to 
'read' the 'number story' (six minus two equals four) aloud. 
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The entire procedure is repeated many more times over 
successive days using different number combinations within ten. 
Zero is used by instructing the children to take out eight 
cubes and then take away no cubes. 
Step 2 Let's Pretend. 
The children are reminded that cubes can be used to represent 
anything in the real world. The teacher tells the children, 
"let's pretend the cubes are dogs" or "houses" or whatever. The 
children are, instructed to take out five dogs and then to take 
three dogs away and to find out how many dogs are left. As 
before, considerable practice is given and every subtraction 
activity is accompanied by its representation in numerical 
form. 
Step 3 Silly Stories. 
The children are told to . 
listen to the 'silly story' and to 
operate with the cubes accordingly: 
"Mummy had four apples but she gave me one to eat". 
The children are asked to show their four apples (whereupon 
each child holds up his/her four Unifix Cubes) and to show that 
one was eaten (whereupon each child demonstrates the 
subtraction). When the children correctly identify how many 
apples are left, they are asked by the teacher how they found 
out the answer. 
Step 4 Silly Stories and Number Stories. 
The teacher provides_a complete 'silly story':. 
"Three cups were on the shelf. One of them got knocked on 
to the floor so that left only two cups". 
The children are invited to use the magnetic numerals and signs 
to represent the 'silly story' as a 'number story' (3-1-2). The 
children 'read' the 'number story' (three minus one equals two) 
and are required to indicate which number represents the cups 
at the beginning of the story, which number represents the cup 
that met with the accident, which number represents the cups at 
the end of the story, which sign represents the operation of 
subtraction and which sign represents the outcome of the 
operation. Many such verbal contexts are provided by the 
teacher. 
Step 5 Number Stories and Silly Stories. 
The teacher provides a complete 'number story' on the magnet 
board (for example 7-4-3), and the children are invited to 
provide a corresponding 'silly story'. Allow as many children, 
as time allows, to provide verbal contexts for any given 
numerical representation. 
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Step 6 Drawing a story - first version. 
The children are instructed that instead of telling a 'silly 
story' they will have to draw a 'silly story' for a bit of a 
'number story' which will be provided. The instruction 'draw 5- 
3' is given orally and is also put on the magnet board for the 
children to see. Provide paper and pencils/pens/crayons and 
observe what happens. Some teacher intervention may be required 
because the children may pictorially represent the five and 
also the three and proceed to add rather than subtract. If this 
happens, still request the child to explain/describe his/her 
'silly story'. If required to reflect on their own story the 
children may not be too happy with a story in which they have 
five sweets, eat three of them and then be left with eight! Ask 
the children how they can show on paper the initial quantity, 
the operation and the result. Some may suggest rubbing out the 
subtrahend. This is perfectly reasonable but in so doing: 
a) nobody will be able to see how many things were present at 
the beginning of the story; 
b) nobody will be able to see how many things were taken away. 
By emphasizing that the minuend and the subtrahend both be 
visually evident, hopefully some child or children will suggest 
that, the minuend is drawn and that the, subtrahend is 
represented by crossing out. Considerable practice is again 
required. 
Step 7 Drawing a story - second version. 
The children are invited to draw their own 'silly story' with 
no numerical stimulus being provided. In other words the 
children are not told how many things to draw initially or how 
many to score out. They must, however, verbally report the 
context in order that it can be written down by the teacher. 
Step 8 Strategies for finding the answer. 
The children are told that they 
'number story' (for example 7-2-) 
find the answer. The teacher asks 
answer if they do not already know. 
suggest one/all of the following: 
a) use their fingers 
b) use cubes 
c) use strokes 
will be given a bit of a 
and that they will have to 
how they will find out the 
Hopefully the children will 
The teacher checks that the children are able to use all of 
these strategies. 
Step 9 Does it work? 
Only now are the children considered ready to undertake 
conventional subtraction exercises, within ten. The children 
undertake this activity outwith the direct supervision of the 
teacher, who is meanwhile working with other groups of 
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children. However, as with addition, random, one-to-one 
interviews are held between the teacher and the individual 
child to check if the earlier steps in the series have been of 
use to the child. In each interview, and in the light of a 
completed subtraction exercise, the teacher: 
a) asks the child how he/she found the answer to a particular 
subtraction operation, say 8-3; 
b) invites the child to provide a 'silly story' for a 
particular subtraction operation say 2-2; 
c) requests the child to peruse all the examples in_ the 
exercise and identify which 'number story' is being referred to 
when the teacher provides a 'silly story'. 
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The-Context and Subjects of The Study 
By March 1987 it was evident that all of the children in the 
class were able to count, even those whose behaviour has not 
been recorded in this research. Admittedly not all could count 
to the same level of sophistication but a wide range of 
performance is to be expected amongst any collection of 
children who are assigned to a class on the bases of sex, 
social and racial mix, and age alone. The time was now 
considered appropriate to begin to introduce at least some of 
the children to addition, subtraction and their 
representations. 
16 children were selected as subjects for this study. They were 
all from the researcher's own class and included these from the 
initial study together with another 3 children who had joined 
that class at different times after the official intake in 
August 1986. These children were selected for study because 
their counting performance suggested that the transition to 
formal addition and subtraction would be stimulating and 
challenging to them. 
It must be said at this point that the researcher was in a 
particularly enviable position in respect of researcher-subject 
relationships. She was advantaged to a point beyond that which 
typically pertains in psychological, experimental 
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investigations. The researcher had had plenty of time (more 
than six months) to build a relationship with the subjects, a 
relationship which was warm and open. 
It, 
Moreover, the subjects were children who had gradually been 
acclimatized to this particular teacher's classroom ethos. It 
was an integral part of all teaching/learning that the children 
were expected to explain and justify themselves. Correct or 
socially acceptable responses were not merely accepted. They 
were followed up with open questions which forced the children 
to express their views and make their own reasoning explicit. 
one example of this was that after being involved in group 
activities at which the teacher could not be present (as is the 
case in any class where a differentiated programme of learning 
activities is operating) the children participated in 
debriefing discussion to reflect on their experiences and to 
make their individual or corporate evaluations of them. 
Another example was to be found when the children came to the 
teacher with a problem such as 'I don't know how to do such and 
such'/'the glue won't stick my model together' /'there's no 
purple paint', and the teacher did not offer ready solutions. 
The problems were left with the children with teacher responses 
like 'what are you going to do about such and auch? '/'go and 
talk to your friend about your model and see what you can do 
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about it'/'see if you can make purple paint from the colours 
you do have'. 
Finally, the children were very used to other adults in the 
room: 
a) parents of prospective pupils would come to see if they 
considered the teaching approaches suitable; 
b) teachers from within and outwith the school who were 
unfamiliar in the ways of working with first infants would come 
in to the class to observe and participate; 
c) a professional film recording unit spent nine weeks filming 
teacher techniques and child development in the teaching and 
learning of drama skills. 
In all of this the onus was on the children to explain to 
visitors the class routine, the purpose of what they were 
doing, the lines of demarcation and so on. Constantly the 
children were pushed to rely on their own resources, in the 
process of learning new skills. 
It is fair then to say that in a professional context the 
researcher and the subjects were comfortable and easy with each 
other. 
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The focus of The Research 
Given the sample of subjects and the rationale outlined above, 
the general research question derived was one of whether the 
method of Bidirectional Translation would enable primary one 
children to develop the concepts of addition and subtraction. 
In 'operationalized' terms, answers to the following questions 
were sought: 
1. about Bidirectional Translation 
(a) in executing addition and subtraction operations, what 
use is made of fingers, cubes, and tally marks and is this 
'suspended reality' of counting aids easily translatable 
to and from a realistic, everyday addition or subtraction 
context? 
(b) can the verbal contexts supplied by the subjects be 
categorized according to some criterion? 
(c) does the use of operator signs easily become 
incorporated into the numerical representation? 
2. about performance 
Within the number domain of 10 
(a) can the children translate from a verbal context to 
obtain the solution to an addition or subtraction 
operation? (This is subsequently referred to as the 
utlizability of the concept. ) 
(b) can the children translate from a verbal context to 
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identify an addition or subtraction operation? (This is 
subsequently referred to as the evocability of the 
concept. ) 
(c) is there any apparent relationship between being able 
to utilize and being able to evoke addition or subtraction 
concepts? 
3. about the effects of Bidirectional Translation 
(a) can the children, if required to do so, articulate how 
they obtained a solution when they had to utilize a 
concept in test performance? 
(b) given a predetermined selection of classes of verbal 
context with which to test children's conceptualizations, 
is there any apparent relationship between test 
performance in translating from a context and earlier pre- 
test performance of translating to a context? 
(c) what claims can be made for the methodology? 
The means by which answers to the above questions were to be 
found 
1. Answers to questions about the methodology itself were to be 
got from natural observations of the subjects' behaviours 
whilst they were being exposed to this method of teaching. 
2. Answers to questions about performance were to be got from 
testing. 
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3. Answers to questions about the effects of Bidirectional 
Translation were to be got from theoretical analysis. 
Description of The Testing 
The test items required the subjects to translate from a verbal 
context, thereby indicating whether the subjects could utilize 
and evoke the concepts of addition and subtraction. Subjects 
were to be tested individually on two different days. On one of 
the days the subjects were to be tested for the evocability of 
addition and subtraction. On the other day the subjects were to 
be tested for the utilizability of addition and subtraction. 
The total interview time was predicted as being just under two 
weeks, since testing was only to be done between 11 o'clock and 
mid-day and it was anticipated that the researcher could 
comfortably test four subjects per day. 
For evoking concepts the following instruction was to be given: 
I'm going to read you a silly story. Listen carefully and 
tell me if you should add or subtract to find the answer 
.. Well done, now let's try some more. 
For utilizing concepts the following instruction was to be 
given: 
I'm going to read you a silly story. You see if you can 
find out the answer and tell me what it is ... Well 
done, now let's try some more. 
The verbal contexts were to be read and reread to the subject. 
Any subsequent lapse of memory on the part of the subject was 
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to be remedied by the researcher's reading the verbal context 
yet again. 
To counterbalance for order effects, half of the subjects were 
to be tested first for evocability and the other half were to 
be tested first for utilizability. 
The number domain used was to be within 10. In other words for 
addition operations, the sum of the addends was not to be 
greater than 10, and for subtraction operations the minuend was 
not to be greater than 10. Zero quantities and doubles were not 
to be included because they frequently cause the verbal context 
to come across as 'strained' and unrealistic. The number 
triples generated according to these criteria were thus: 
(1,2,3) (1,3,4) (1,4,5) (1,5,6) (1,6,7) 
(1,7,8) (1,8,9) (1,9,10) (2,3,5) (2,4,6) 
(2,5,7) (2,6,8) (2,7,9) (2,8,10) (3,4,7) 
(3,5,8) (3,6,9) (3,7,10) (4,5,9) (4,6,10) 
Each subject would receive each number triple only once within 
the total of twenty verbal contexts to be presented to him/her. 
Number triples were to be matched to verbal contexts randomly, 
so that the particular combination of number triple and verbal 
context would be arbitrary. 
In all, twenty verbal contexts were generated by the researcher 
as test items. They were generated according to a taxonomy 
devised by Carpenter & Moser (1982) which will be discussed 
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later. Meanwhile the complete list of test items follows 
immediately. 
Figure 7.1 Items to test -conceptualization - of Addition and 
Subtraction 
The Utilizability of Addition 
Joinin : Betty has (x) dollies. Granny gave her (y) more 
dollies. 
_How 
many dollies has Betty got now? 
Separating: Fiona had some carrots. She gave (x) carrots to the 
rabbit and now she has (y) carrots left. How many did she have 
to start with? 
Part-Part-Whole: (x) girls and (y) boys went out to play in the 
playground. How many children went out to play? 
Comparison: Susan has (x) hats. Mummy has (y) more hats than 
Susan. How many hats has Mummy got? 
Equalizing: There were (x) red cars in the car park. (y) more 
red cars came in. Now there are the same number of red and blue 
cars in the car park. How many blue cars are there? 
The IItilizability of Subtraction 
Joinin : Mr Brown has (x) shirts. How many more shirts does he 
need to have (z) shirts altogether? 
Separating: John had (z) pencils. He .. gave(x) 
to his big 
brother. How many pencils does John have now? 
Part-Part-Whole: Daddy has (z) saws. (x) of them are very blunt 
and the rest are very sharp. How many very sharp saws does he 
have? 
Comparison: There are (z) men and (x) women standing at the bus 
stop. How many more men are at the bus stop? 
Equalizing: There are (z) forks and (x) knives in the drawer. 
How many forks should I_ take out, so that there are the same 
number of forks and knives in the drawer? 
The Evocability of Addition 
Joinin : Tom has (x) bananas. Susan gave him (y) more bananas. 
How many bananas has Tom got now? 
Separating: Neil had some toys. He gave (x) toys to his little 
brother and now he has (y) toys left. How many did he have to 
start with? 
Part-Part-Whole: There are (x). girls and (y) boys in the room. 
How many children are in the room altogether? 
Comparison: Mary has (x) cats. Christine has (y) more cats than 
Mary. How many cats does Christine have? 
Equalizing: There were (x) boys in the playground. (y) more 
went out. Now there are the same number of boys and girls in 
the playground. How many girls are in the playground? 
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The Evocability of Subtraction 
Joinin : Karen has (x) lollipops. How many more lollipops does 
she need to have (z) lollipops altogether? 
Separating: Imran had (z) sweets. He gave (x) to Linda. How 
many sweets does Imran have now? 
Part-Part-Whole: Eva has (z) pens for colouring with. (x) of 
them are blue and the rest are red. How many red pens has Eva 
got? 
Comparison: There are (z) girls and (x) boys in the cloakroom. 
How many more girls are in the cloakroom? 
Equalizing: There are (z) cups and (x) saucers on the table. 
How many saucers should I take away so that there are the same 
number of cups and saucers on the table? 
The order of presentation of verbal contexts was to be 
randomized (within conditions) for each subject. Unifix Cubes 
were to be available for the subjects' use when being tested 
for the utilizability of the concept. 
It is important to acknowledge at this point that the lexical 
complexity of the verbal contexts was not considered. Contexts 
were generated according to the Carpenter & Moser (1982) format 
which was concerned with the underlying logical structure of 
"word problems". This is not to say that the semantic 
characteristics can be divorced from the logical structure of 
the context. They probably cannot be. However, Carpenter & 
Moser (1982) were concerned to identify the type of action or 
relationship which is represented in most addition and 
subtraction contexts which are simple enough for primary-aged 
children to handle. This researcher modelled her selection of 
contexts on the Carpenter & Moser taxonomy (which will be 
discussed later), and although she did not analyse their 
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semantic characteristics, such an analysis might possibly be 
worthy of consideration by other researchers. 
THE FINDINGS 
The findings will be described and discussed in terms of the 
questions posed earlier. 
la IN EXECUTING ADDITION AND SUBTRACTION OPERATIONS, WHAT 
USE IS MADE OF FINGERS, CUBES AND TALLY MARKS AND IS THIS 
'SUSPENDED REALITY' OF COUNTING AIDS EASILY TRANSLATABLE 
TO AND FROM A REALISTIC, EVERYDAY ADDITION OR SUBTRACTION 
CONTEXT? 
In teaching the children to formally add and subtract using the 
method of Bidirectional Translation, addition was taught first, 
and then subtraction. Some teachers argue for teaching the 
skills 'together' in the name of trying to establish the 
complementary nature of the skills. However, Fehr & Phillips 
(1967) argue that: 
it is not good practice to introduce addition and 
subtraction at the same time. They are at first two 
distinct and different operations. After 
, 
the addition 
concept has been thoroughly developed, we can develop a 
new concept called subtraction. When the latter concept is 
well understood, then we can relate the two operations. 
In the early part of the protocol for addition (steps 1,2 and 
3) some subjects counted the cubes, others counted 
correspondingly on their fingers, while others still, used 
their knowledge of number facts and made no reference to 
fingers or cubes. That some subjects were observed counting on 
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their fingers when the sub sets to be totalled were already 
modelled in front of them in the form of Unifix Cubes, the 
researcher found surprising. On the face of it, this seemed a 
senseless performance: the countables were present in concrete 
form so why model further on the fingers? On reflection, and 
after subsequent discussion with those subjects on the use of 
fingers for counting, however, the strategy is both reasonable, 
and helpful to the children themselves. It is reasonable from 
the point of view that we always have fingers available in the 
way that we do not always have other concrete aids such as 
Unifix Cubes. More interesting to the researcher, however, were 
the subjects' comments when they were questioned about using 
their fingers for totals greater than ten, as say, in five plus 
seven. The responses were of three main types. An example of 
each is listed below. 
Type 1 You can use bits of your body to help, like your 
eyes; or you can use your elbows. 
This certainly seems to reflect ingenuity in that the subjects 
were not prepared to become 'stuck' or be put off. 
Type 2 Well then, I've got five fingers on this hand so 
that's five. On the, other hand I've got five fingers and 
I'll put two magic fingers on to make the seven. 
This second type of response seems more sophisticated than the 
first. Here seems to be the beginning of mental representation 
without concretization. The subject does not have to see the 
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two objects (or models of them) to accept that they are there 
for the purpose of being included in the addition operation. It 
is almost as if the subject can 'concretize in the mind' (if 
one can forgive the contradiction in terms! ). 
Type 3I don't use my fingers for all of the numbers. I 
just say, "There's five", and then I count out seven 
fingers. Then I say, "five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, 
eleven, twelve". 
This third type of response seems the most sophisticated of the 
three. In essence the subject is demonstrating the transition 
to the 'counting on' strategy which is said to evolve out of 
the 'counting all' strategy (Carpenter & Moser, 1982; Fuson, 
1982). 
By way of contrast, subjects did not initially model 
subtraction operations on their fingers. They were quite 
prepared to use the Unifix Cubes provided. However, on 
observing this, and remembering how some of the same subjects 
had spontaneously used fingers to model addition, the 
researcher at one point early in the protocol for subtraction, 
removed the cubes, leaving the subjects with only their own 
resources. Those subjects who had a repertoire of number facts 
appeared to make use of them in that there was no overt 
indication of counting behaviour. All subjects were, however, 
encouraged to model the subtraction operation on their fingers: 
displaying the minuend, folding down the subtrahend and 
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counting the number of fingers still displayed. The use of 
fingers for subtracting was quickly and easily assimilated by 
the subjects. 
Hughes (1986) would seem to be right when he says that we 
should show children "how to use their fingers more 
effectively" when carrying out number operations. 
The subjects enjoyed the Let's Pretend features (step 2) of 
having-the Unifix Cubes represent objects in the real world. 
Their laughter was evidence of this. If the cubes were serving 
as sweets some of the subjects would pretend to eat them, or if 
they were cars the subjects would provide accompanying sound 
effects. This again suggests that we should not underestimate 
the importance of modelling procedures explicitly. 
Now and again, some of the subjects made unprovoked (by the 
researcher) statements such as "this is just like sums" or 
"we're doing real sums now" when they were required to 
translate verbal contexts into arithmetical notation (step 4). 
These remarks suggest that the subjects did have an awareness 
of arithmetical operations. Whether this was because these 
subjects had seen others 'doing sums' or were perhaps 
themselves 'doing sums' at home, is not clear, and was not 
pursued by the researcher. 
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Many of the subjects perceived the parallels between the 
addition and subtraction protocols because, frequently, they 
made comments such as, "we've done this before" and, "this is 
just like adding only we're taking away". Very informally, the 
researcher reacted to these comments by asking the subjects how 
they could reverse the effects of the subtraction operation and 
they were able to suggest that an addition operation was 
needed. 
There was a lot of enthusiasm to provide 'silly stories' (step 
5). This was clearly a meaningful activity. The subjects 
frequently remarked on their enjoyment of it, as they clamoured 
to contribute yet another verbal context for a numerical 
representation. The motivation, for the children, appeared to 
the researcher to be almost totally intrinsic. Granted, it 
would probably be reinforcing to subjects for them to have 
their contributions appreciated by peers but if peer approval 
alone was what was motivating the children, then they could 
just as easily. have taken. recourse to the most facetious 
contexts imaginable. But an alternative explanation is that the 
subjects did really want to rehearse their skill in translating 
to a verbal context; in the sense of it being a Piagetian 
schema. This translating-to-a-verbal-context schema is then the 
structure within which the child 'checks out' that he/she is 
making sense of the formalism of, in this study, addition and 
subtraction. 
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The pictorial representation of the subtraction protocol was, 
perhaps, the most problematic part of the protocol for most of 
the subjects. As anticipated by the researcher, the subjects 
initially drew pictures to represent the minuend and the 
subtrahend, and then proceeded to count the total number of 
pictures drawn. However, in that the subjects had made their 
own difficulty explicit, the researcher was able to ask them to 
'think again'. When the subjects tried to provide a verbal 
context for their drawings they found they were contradicting 
themselves, making an initial quantity smaller and yet ending 
up with more than they had started with!. By stressing to the 
subjects that they had to show that something had happened to 
the initial quantity but that the initial quantity had to be 
available for all to see, the subjects eventually resolved 
their problem by drawing the minuend and crossing out the 
subtrahend. 
The use of tally marks was quickly and easily assimilated by 
the subjects. This should not be surprising, given what has 
earlier been said about tally marks. In making their choice, 
about what type, if any, of counting aid to use, there seemed 
to be no pattern. Most subjects used all three types at 
different times and their choice seemed to depend as much as 
anything on what they felt like at the time; and this seems 
quite reasonable. If for us as adults, getting to work were 
equally practicable in all respects whether we travelled by 
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bicycle, car or train, no doubt our choice would also depend on 
what we felt like at the time! 
In summarizing an answer to the first question it can be said 
that subjects made considerable use of counting aids which they 
fully recognized as being a means to an end. 
lb CAN THE VERBAL CONTEXTS SUPPLIED BY THE SUBJECTS BE 
CATEGORIZED ACCORDING TO SOME CRITERION? 
In the verbal contexts provided by the subjects for steps 6,7 
and 9 in addition, the hierarchies of classification were very 
crude. Of the sixteen subjects, only seven consistently used 
immediately recognizable classifications such as boys, girls, 
toys, animals, sweets. Of the remaining nine subjects, the 
reader/observer would be strained to detect the 
classifications; which were mostly things to eat (for example 
carrots and lollipops) and things in the street (for example 
buses and houses). Other sub sets in the verbal contexts, such 
as people and Mars Bars, or kittens and ice-cream defy 
classification in all but the crudest sense of 'things'. It is 
perhaps significant that the seven subjects who did use easily 
recognizable classifications were the group of children earlier 
considered by the researcher to be the most proficient in terms 
of counting skill. These were also the subjects who had a 
repertoire of number facts at their disposal and were less 
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reliant on counting as a means of obtaining an answer to an 
addition operation. But since, as Gelman & Gallistel (1978) 
point out, children do not necessarily restrict themselves to 
counting collections of identical objects, it is perhaps 
reasonable to expect those subjects who computed addition 
operations by counting (as distinct from using number facts) 
would also provide verbal contexts in which miscellaneous and 
incongruent sub sets were to be added. 
Perhaps as a direct consequence of the nature of the 
subtraction operation, the hierarchy of classification appeared 
to be more refined than it had been for addition. What was 
subtracted and what was left were always sub sets of the 
original class of objects. In effect, the subjects were 
constrained by the subtraction operation and could do little 
else in respect of the classification content. 
The above analysis is, however, too simplistic. It implies that 
verbal contexts for all addition and subtraction operations are 
essentially homogeneous in nature and that while syntax, 
lexical items and context may vary, the underlying logical 
structure of the context is the same for all. Such an 
assumption is questionable. 
Carpenter & Moser (1982) suggest three dimensions on which the 
structure of verbal contexts can be analysed. 
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Firstly, there is the ACTIVE-STATIC dimension. Active contexts 
involve explicit or implicit reference to action that takes 
place. In other words something has to be 'done', usually to 
the initial quantity. Static contexts, on the other hand, 
require no action but rather a 'contemplation' or 
'consideration' of two given quantities. 
Secondly, there is the SET INCLUSION-DISJOINT QUANTITIES 
dimension. Set inclusion contexts are those where two of the 
quantities are necessarily a sub set of the third. In other 
words, either the two given quantities add up to the third, 
unknown quantity or the unknown quantity is what is left after 
a known quantity has been subtracted from a second, larger, 
known quantity. Disjoint quantities contexts imply no set- 
subset hierarchy, however. A disjoint quantities context can, 
then, involve 'things' which would not necessarily go together 
in a conventional, adult way because the disjoint quantities 
implies comparison. 
Finally, there is the INCREASE DECREASE dimension. This 
dimension only applies to contexts which already fulfil the 
action criterion in the active-static dimension, above. 
Contexts which involve action will result in an increase or 
decrease of the initial quantity. 
The permutations arising from combining these dimensions 
are, according to Carpenter & Moser (1982), as follows: 
1. The Joining Class ACTIVE, SET INCLUSION, INCREASE; 
2. The Separating Class ACTIVE, SET INCLUSION, DECREASE; 
3. The Part-Part-Whole Class STATIC, SET INCLUSION; 
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4. The Comparison Class STATIC, DISJOINT 
5. The Equalizing Add-On Class ACTIVE, DISJOINT, INCREASE 
6. The Equalizing Take-Away Class ACTIVE, DISJOINT, DECREASE 
A further complication to this analysis of verbal contexts is 
that for each of the different classes of verbal contexts there 
can be both addition and subtraction operations. The following 
outline may help to make clear what Carpenter & Moser (1982) 
seem to be saying. 
The Joining Class of verbal context has an initial quantity and 
some direct or implied action that causes a change in the 
quantity. 'The action causes an increase in the quantity. An 
addition operation in this class might be: Sheena has 3 
pencils. Bob gave her 4 more pencils. How many pencils does 
Sheena have now? A subtraction operation in this class might 
be: Sheena has 3 pencils. How many more does she have to buy to 
have 7 pencils altogether? 
The Separating Class of verbal context has an initial quantity 
and some direct or implied action that causes a change in the 
quantity. The action causes a decrease in the quantity. An 
addition operation in this class might be: Fred had some 
sweets. He gave 2 to Linda and now has 4 left. How many sweets 
did Fred have to start with? A subtraction operation in this 
class might be: Fred had 6 sweets. He gave 2 to Linda. How many 
sweets has Fred got left? 
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The Part-Part-Whole Class of verbal context describes a static 
relationship between two distinct quantities that are parts of 
a whole. An addition operation in this class might be: There 
are 4 hats and 2 coats in the cupboard. How many garments are 
in the cupboard? A subtraction operation in this class might 
be: Mary has 9 flowers. 6 of them are red and the rest of them 
are blue. How many blue flowers has Mary got? 
The Comparison Class of verbal context again describes a static 
relationship between two quantities but this time the 
quantities need not be parts of a whole. An addition operation 
in this class might be: Jimmy has 2 more footballs than Susie 
has dolls. Susie has 3 dolls. How many footballs has Jimmy got? 
A subtraction operation in this class might be: There are 5 
footballs and 3 dolls in the playroom. How many more footballs 
are there? 
Both of the Equalizing Classes of verbal context are complex to 
read about, and for most practical purposes quite unrealistic. 
However, a simplified interpretation would be that they firstly 
involve comparing two quantities and secondly that one of the 
quantities has to be changed so that the two quantities become 
equal. An addition operation in the Equalizing Class might be: 
There were 6 boys in the football team. 2 more boys joined the 
team. Now there are the same number of boys and girls in the 
team. How many girls are in the football team? A subtraction 
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operation in this class might be: There are 5 paint brushes and 
3 pots of paint on the table. How many paint brushes do I need 
to take away so that there will be the same number of paint 
brushes and pots of paint on the table? 
Carpenter & Moser (1982) claim that their taxonomy of verbal 
contexts has validity in that in their empirical work 
"children's solution processes clearly reflect" Carpenter & 
Moser's distinctions between types of verbal contexts. Using 
Carpenter & Moser's taxonomy as a criterion, the question turns 
on the extent to which the verbal contexts offered by subjects 
in this study can be classified. 
For each of the 16 subjects, ten verbal contexts were noted 
during the course of the teaching protocols, five contexts for 
addition and five for subtraction. The results of analysis of 
the verbal contexts offered by subjects were quite clear cut. 
All of the subjects when providing a verbal context for an 
addition operation, offered a context which fits into the Part- 
Part-Whole Class and all of the subjects when providing a 
verbal context for a subtraction operation, offered a context 
which fits into the Separating Class. Some examples are listed 
below. 
0 
Figure 7. _2 
Examples of Verbal Context Offered by Subjects 
for addition 
1. I bought 2 ice-creams and 3 worms. Altogether that made 5 
things.. . 
2.1 went to the sweetie shop and I got 3 ice-creams and 3 
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lollipops and altogether that made 6 things. 
3. I saw 2 houses and 4 skyscrapers and that made 6. 
4. I was walking down the street. I saw 4 girls and 2 boys. 
Altogether I saw 6 people. 
5. I went into a shop and bought 1 man and 5 apples. That 
made 6 things. 
for subtraction 
1. I got 4 balls and sold 1 of them. That left 3. 
2. I saw 3 cars and they all drove away. That left0 cars. 
3. There were 5 houses in the street. 4 went on fire and 
that left 1 house. 
4. I went to the toy shop and bought 3 dolls. 1 of them got 
broken and my mum chucked it in the bin. That left me with 
2 dolls. 
5. I had 6 precious things and the robber stole 1 of them 
and that left 5. 
Whether or not the children can deal with other types of verbal 
context, as defined by the Carpenter & Moser classification, 
remains to be seen. All that is being said at the moment is 
that the verbal contexts offered by subjects in this study fall 
into two main groups - that of Part-Part-Whole for addition and 
that of Separating for subtraction. 
lc DOES THE USE OF OPERATOR SIGNS EASILY BECOME INCORPORATED 
INTO THE NUMERICAL REPRESENTATION? 
When the subjects were required to draw a 'silly story' in the 
addition protocol (see steps 6 and 7) they, of their own 
volition, supplied the 'plus' and the 'equals' sign. This is in 
sharp contrast to Hughes's (1986) findings where the children 
in his study made no spontaneous use of the operator signs. 
Moreover, in this study, the subjects also provided the total 
numerosity without being instructed to do so. It would seem 
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reasonable to explain this phenomenon in terms of the 
preparatory steps to this point in the protocol having become 
so routinized that the subjects predicted that they would be 
required to 'complete' the story. But non of them completed the 
story by drawing the total numerosity. Each and all of them 
supplied the missing parts in symbolic notation. Perhaps the 
subjects were beginning to realize the utility of 
formalization. On the other hand, perhaps this was simply a 
chance finding and a function of the subjects being taught in a 
group situation where they were allowed to (and encouraged to) 
talk about what they were doing. 
It will be recalled that subjects found it much more difficult 
to pictorially represent subtraction. When they eventually 
found a means of depicting the minuend and the subtrahend, they 
made no effort (as they had previously done in addition) to 
supply the operator signs or the number which represented the 
outcome of the operation. The subjects were, however, perfectly 
willing to comply with the researcher's suggestion that the 
complete 'number story' should be recorded underneath the 
pictorial representations for subtraction and appeared to have 
no difficulty in doing so. 
Because of Hughes's (1986) findings that young children tend to 
disregard operator signs, it was anticipated, in this study, 
that a similar phenomenon might present itself. However, this 
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fear proved unfounded. Perhaps because in the protocols, time 
had been expended on explaining the significance of operator 
signs, the subjects did not regard them as arbitrary marks but 
as meaningful symbols which were as important to the 'number 
story' as the numbers themselves. Certainly there was no 
reluctance on the part of the subjects to use operator signs 
when they were undertaking the conventional addition and 
subtraction exercises. 
2a CAN THE CHILDREN TRANSLATE FROM A VERBAL CONTEXT TO 
OBTAIN THE SOLUTION TO AN ADDITION OR SUBTRACTION 
OPERATION? (This is subsequently referred to as the 
utilizability of the concept). 
Within each of the protocols, translating from a verbal context 
provided by the teacher could not distinguish between having 
the concept of addition and having the concept of subtraction. 
Bearing in mind that addition was taught first and then 
subtraction, the test of 'concept acquisition' had to wait 
until after subtraction had been taught so that the children 
could by process of elimination, or use of negative example, 
decide that subtraction was not addition and, conversely, that 
addition was not subtraction. 
The usual means of testing for 'concept acquisition' is to 
explore whether or not the learner can apply or utilize the 
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concept. This was duly done using the procedure outlined 
earlier. 
Table 7.3 The Number of Correct Responses for Utilizability of 
Addition and Subtraction 
Ss -Addition -Subtraction . -Total 










10 55 10 
11 55 10 
12 55 10 
13 55 10 
14 55 10 
15 437 
16 549 
Credit was given if it was obvious that the subject was 
appropriately increasing or decreasing a quantity. In other 
words a slight computational error of margin (+ or -1 of the 
correct answer) is included in the scores. Inspection of Table 
7.3 shows that most of the subjects were well able to 
distinguish between addition and subtraction. The high 
incidence of correct responses makes statistical analysis 
irrelevant. The simple answer to the question posed here is 
that subjects could utilize addition and subtraction concepts 
within the number domain of 10. 
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2b CAN THE CHILDREN TRANSLATE FROM A VERBAL CONTEXT TO 
IDENTIFY AN ADDITION OR SUBTRACTION OPERATION? 
(This is subsequently referred to as the evocability of 
the concept). 
Table 7.4 The Number of Correct Responses for Evocability of 
Addition and Subtraction 
















16 --4 .3 .7.. 
Inspection of Table 7.4 shows that subjects less readily 
identified a subtraction operation as being appropriate than 
they did an addition operation. Only one subject performed 
better on subtraction than on addition while eight subjects 
performed better on addition than on subtraction, with the 
remaining seven subjects performing equally well on addition 
and subtraction. On a related t-test, considered to be very 
robust, a significant difference was found between performance 
on addition and subtraction, t-2.8248 (p<. 02). The null 
hypothesis was that differences in performance in evoking 
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addition and evoking subtraction were due to guessing. Because 
the observed value of t was larger than the critical value, the 
null hypothesis can be rejected. The difference in scores 
between evoking addition and evoking subtraction would then 
seem to suggest that evoking subtraction was more difficult for 
subjects than evoking addition. 
2c IS THERE ANY APPARENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BEING ABLE TO 
UTILIZE AND BEING ABLE TO EVOKE ADDITION OR SUBTRACTION 
CONCEPTS? 
Table 7.5 The Number of Correct Responses for the Utilizability 
and Evocability of Addition 
Ss Utilizability Evocability Total (out of 10) 
1 5 5 10 
2 5 5 10 
3 5 4 9 
4 3 4 7 
5 5 4 9 
6 5 4 9 
7 5 5 10 
8 5 4 9 
9 4 3 7 
10 5 4 9 
11 5 4 9 
12 5 4 9 
13 5 4 9 
14 5 4 9 
15 4 4 8 
16 .5 - -4. .9 
Inspection of Table 7.5 shows that only one subject scored 
better on the evocability than on the utilizability of 
addition, four subjects scored equally well on the evocability 
and utilizability of addition but eleven out of the sixteen 
Chapter 7 Page 205 
THE CONTINUATION OF THE EMPIRICAL WORK 
subjects scored better on the utilizability of addition than 
they did on the evocability of addition. 
Table 7.6 The Number of Correct Responses for the Utilizability 
and Evocability of Subtraction 
Ss Utilizability Evocability Total (out of 10) 
1 5 5 10 
2 5 3 8 
3 5 4 9 
4 4 4 8 
5 5 3 8 
6 5 4 9 
7 5 5 10 
8 5 3 8 
9 5 4 9 
10 5 2 7 
11 5 2 `7 
12 5 4 9 
13 5 3 8 
14 5 4 9 
15 3 3 6 
16 4- 3-- - -7 
Inspection of Table 7.6 shows that twelve of the subjects 
scored better on the utilizability than on the evocability of 
subtraction while the remaining four subjects scored equally 
well on the utilizability and evocability of subtraction. 
On the criterion of scoring at least four out of five test 
items correct, all but three of the subjects (a different one 
in each condition) were able to utilize addition, to utilize 
subtraction and to evoke addition; but only half of the 
subjects were able 
to evoke subtraction. The breakdown of 
figures looks like this: 
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Table 7.7 Observed Frequencies of Evidence of Conceptualization 








1. sub'. -- 
8 subjs. 
.8 subs.. ' 
With the observed frequencies in three of the categories being 
so low, the expected frequencies, in these instances, fall 
below 5. Thus the use of the Chi-square test would yield 
unstable results. Statistical testing is, therefore, 
inappropriate at this point. There appears to be a relationship 
between being able to evoke and utilize addition. However, this 
apparent relationship does not seem to hold for subtraction. 
3a CAN THE CHILDREN, IF REQUIRED TO DO SO, ARTICULATE HOW 
THEY OBTAINED A SOLUTION WHEN THEY HAD TO UTILIZE A 
CONCEPT IN TEST PERFORMANCE? 
It had been a declared aim of the methodology of Bidirectional 
Translation, that the learners be encouraged to verbalize what 
they were doing: explaining how they did, and speculating on 
how they could, effect a computation. It seemed apposite to 
explore how supportive this strategy was to the subjects, 
particularly in the light of the uncertainties revealed in the 
relationships between the evocability and utilizability of 
addition and subtraction. 
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It will perhaps facilitate discussion to be able to refer to 
subjects' actual scores. The table below shows the distribution 
of correct responses for each of the classes of verbal context 
when the subjects were evoking and utilizing addition (+) and 
subtraction 
Table 7.8 Summary of Correct Responses in-each_Class of Verbal 
Context for each type of Conceptualization 
JOIN. - SEPA. -PART. 
COMP. EQUA. total 
EVOC +) 16 3- 16 15 16 66 out of 80 
EVOC(-) 2 16 16 4 14 52 out of 80 
UTIL(+) 16 14 16 14 16 76 out of 80 
UTIL(-) 15 16 . 16 13 . -16 76 out of 80 
total 49 49 -64 46 - 62 -270 out of 320 
As can be seen from Table 7.8, there was no particular example 
of verbal stimulus which was beyond the abilities of every 
subject. But Joining (Evoc -), Separating (Evoc +) and 
Comparison (Evoc -) 'polled badly' relative to the other 
examples. In the Joining Class only two subjects could state 
that a subtraction operation was required, yet fifteen subjects 
in a parallel condition could compute the subtraction 
operation. In the Separating Class only three subjects could 
state that an addition operation was required, yet fourteen 
subjects in a parallel condition could compute the addition 
operation. In the Comparison Class only four subjects could 
state that a subtraction operation was required, yet thirteen 
subjects in a parallel condition could compute the subtraction 
operation. 
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Somewhat concerned about this discrepancy, the researcher 
generated a series of isomorphs of those verbal contexts in 
which the subjects had performed so badly. She provided the 
subjects with Unifix Cubes and asked them to demonstrate with 
the cubes their processes for finding the answer. She further 
asked each subject, on completion of the task, whether an 
addition or subtraction operation had been performed. The 
results of this follow up study were consistent with the 
original findings and, as such, need not be discussed at 
length. Observations of the subjects' behaviours are, however, 
worthy of recording. 
In the Joining/Subtraction context the subjects set out the 
initial quantity of cubes as an addend, counted on the 
appropriate number of cubes till they reached the requisite 
number and then counted to what amounted to the second addend. 
When asked if they were adding or subtracting, the subjects 
stated that they were adding because they were taking more 
cubes from their 'bank'. 
In the Separating/Addition context the subjects constructed 
the addends and summed them but still maintained that they were 
subtracting because part of the quantity had been 'given away' 
and only some of it was 'left'. 
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In the Comparison/Subtraction context 
quantities were constructed and the diffe 
counted. Again the subjects maintained 
because, they argued, the smaller of 
quantities together with the difference was 
of the disjoint quantities. 
the two disjoint 
rence observed, and 
they were adding 
the two disjoint 
equal to the larger 
Clearly then, the subjects could give reasons for their 
behaviour and, what is more, their explanations shed possible 
light on the earlier, observed 'failure' of half of the 
subjects to evoke subtraction. 
Firstly, the subjects had tactical strategies for dealing with 
the verbal contexts. These strategies would appear to be based 
on counting. If the subjects do not have number facts available 
for instant recall (and there was very little evidence that 
they had) their own well developed counting skills are the only 
meaningful strategies they possess for addition and 
subtraction. In the case of Joining and Comparison contexts for 
subtraction it made sense to perform the subtraction operation 
by complementary addition or 'adding on'. 
Secondly, the subjects have, as yet, poorly developed executive 
strategies. They identify key words such as 'more' and 
'altogether' with addition, and 'left' and 'take away' with 
subtraction and will assign verbal contexts containing these 
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words accordingly. This does not mean, at this early stage of 
their formal education, that the children act on their 
executive decision. The Separating context for addition is a 
case in point, where the subjects counted additively but still 
claimed that it was a subtraction operation. 
That the subjects could 'talk through' what they were doing is 
not in doubt, when they were utilizing the concepts. Their 
evocability of concepts was, however, on their own terms. They 
viewed complementary addition as addition (what could be more 
reasonable! ) and they also viewed the comparison of disjoint 
quantities as addition. These 'misconceptions' as to what is 
classed as addition and what is classed as subtraction do, 
however, appear to have affected the subjects' performance on 
the evocability of subtraction. This point will be taken up 
later. 
3b GIVEN A PREDETERMINED SELECTION OF CLASSES OF VERBAL 
CONTEXT WITH WHICH TO TEST CHILDREN'S CONCEPTUALIZATIONS, 
IS THERE ANY APPARENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TEST 
PERFORMANCE IN TRANSLATING FROM A CONTEXT AND EARLIER 
PRE-TEST PERFORMANCE TRANSLATING TO A CONTEXT? 
Inspection of Table 7.8 shows that, with the exceptions 
discussed in the previous section, children were well able to 
translate from verbal contexts. 
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It will also be recalled that the researcher's classification 
of verbal contexts provided by subjects during the teaching 
protocol, using the Carpenter & Moser (1982) taxonomy, resulted 
in subjects' offerings being exclusively' Part-Part-Whole for 
addition and Separating for subtraction. 
Given that Part-Part-Whole and Separating Classes were favoured 
by the subjects initially, it is' not surprising that in the 
test performance both categories resulted in high performance 
scores for both evocability and utilizability. But given also, 
the"restricted classification of texts offered by the subjects, 
it"is interesting that they -performed so well on contexts 
belonging to other classifications. 
Allowing for the possible 'misunderstandings' 'on the part of 
the subjects in evoking operations in the Joining Class for 
subtraction, the Separating Class for addition and the 
Comparison Class for subtraction (as discussed earlier) it 
seems reasonable to conclude that the subjects' experience of 
providing verbal contexts in the exposure to Bidirectional 
Translation possibly enabled the subjects to cope with a range 
of verbal contexts. 
3c WHAT CLAIMS CAN BE MADE FOR THE METHODOLOGY? 
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Claims for the methodology will be discussed in terms of the 
conceptualizations evidenced, and will not include 
considerations such as children's enjoyment of/engagement in 
the protocol or mechanical representations which, though 
important in themselves, are not the main focus of this study. 
The subjects were clearly able to utilize addition and to 
utilize subtraction. This suggests that subjects could 
distinguish between addition and subtraction operations. That 
they could extract the appropriate operation from the verbal 
context demonstrates that they had conceptual understanding of 
addition and subtraction. They could, in essence, perform 
successfully on the translation problem. Given what was earlier 
claimed for, in the synonymity of successful performance on the 
translation problem and conceptual understanding, it can be 
argued that the subjects had cognitive control of both addition 
and subtraction (albeit within a limited number domain). 
Crudely put, the subjects understood what they were doing when 
they added or subtracted, in that they knew when to add or 
subtract and how to add or subtract. 
In the light of this finding therefore, it would seem 
reasonable that young children should be exposed to the 
formalism of addition and subtraction and, presumably, to other 
types of arithmetical operations, by the type of approach 
adopted in Bidirectional Translation. If children were able, in 
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much higher proportions than are currently documented, to 
perform successfully on the translation problem, then much of 
the concern which has prompted this whole piece of research 
would die away. 
But as Skemp (1971), Donaldson (1976) and Flavell (1979) have 
pointed out, conceptual understanding is not restricted to only 
having cognitive control of the concepts in question. Mature 
conceptualization involves also having metacognitive control. 
Translated into the terms of this study, this means that being 
able to add and subtract effectively (yes, even when the 
operation is couched in a verbal context) is not enough. The 
subjects must, further, know that they could add or that they 
could subtract (without necessarily doing so) to effect an 
appropriate solution to a translation problem. In other words 
the subjects must be aware of their own mental activity insofar 
as they can determine in advance of actual implementation, or 
hypothesize in the absence of actual implementation, which 
operation is needed for translation problem solution. 
Now it could be argued that the researcher's pursuit of 
metacognition in primary one children is somewhat ambitious 
given the research evidence (Piaget, 1928; Reid, 1966; 
Karabenick & Miller, 1977; Renwick, 1984; Garofalo & Lester, 
1985) which suggests that children of 56 years of age are 
incapable of exercising metacognitive control. However, given 
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the views of Brown (1978), Flavell (1979), Brown & DeLoache 
(1983) and Nisbet & Shucksmith (1984,1986) that metacognition 
is an influence on cognition and that at least some notion of 
metacognitive control can begin to be developed in young 
children, it is the researcher's considered opinion that 
metacognition through the medium of evocability is worthy of 
exploration at least. 
At first glance, the subjects appeared not to be able to evoke 
the concepts as readily as they could utilize them. However, as 
further exploration found out, the subjects' 
'misconceptualizations' of some types of addition and 
subtraction would according to the subjects' own reasoning, 
appear to be, tied to the semantics of the context which 
'carries' the logical structure of the operation. There have 
been many investigations into the analyses of verbal contexts 
(Carpenter & Moser, 1982; Nesher, 1982; Verngaud, 1982; Dickson 
et al, 1984) and of how differing combinations of syntax and 
vocabulary variably affect performance. Engagement in this 
debate is not part of this study. However, that the same or 
similar words can be arranged in a variety of legitimate 
combinations to convey different meanings cannot be ignored 
since, as has been demonstrated in this study, different types 
of verbal context will affect the subjects' apprehension, not 
of what they are necessarily doing but of what they think they 
are doing; the case in point being when subjects believed 
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themselves to be adding when they were subtracting and 
conversely believed themselves to be subtracting when they were 
adding. But the subjects' 'errors' were only errors on the 
criterion of mature, adult, mathematical conceptualization. 
There was nothing, actually, inherently wrong in what the 
subjects were doing or in their thinking about what they were 
doing. Without the protocol of Bidirectional Translation to 
establish amongst the children that discussion about what one 
was actually doing was the 'norm', it seems unlikely that any 
of the insights gained in this study would have been available 
to the researcher. 
This difference between what the adult accepts as so, and what 
the child believes to be so, has implications for the teaching 
of addition and subtraction. The child needs help to adjust 
his/her conceptualizations to those commonly held in the 
mathematical world; just in the way that the child has to 
adjust from using his/her own idiosyncratic list of counting 
words to the conventional listing. Without the common frames of 
reference it is impossible to communicate clearly with others. 
The child who never learns that complementary addition is 
subtraction will have extreme difficulty in discussion with the 
teacher who does not see that complementary addition can be 
viewed as addition, particularly in the later stages of formal 
education when addition and subtraction are but a part of the 
task in hand. But how is the teacher to know that the child 
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conceptualizes complementary addition as addition and not as 
subtraction if there has been no effort made to elicit what the 
child thinks he or she is doing? 
For the young child at an early stage in number work, the 
strategy of latching on to key words such as 'more' or 'left' 
to make an executive decision does not seem to be too 
dangerous. His/her heavy reliance on the tactical business of 
counting ensures that a reasonably accurate computation can be 
performed. Up to a point this seems perfectly satisfactory. But 
there frequently comes the time (most noticeably in the middle 
and upper primary stages) when the teacher, in helping the 
child 'digest' the translation problem, says something like, 
"tell me how you are going to find the answer" (Dickson et al, 
1984) or "what shall we do? " (Kilpatrick, 1981), particularly 
as by then the translation problem may be a complex one in the 
sense of several operations to be computed (Charles & Lester, 
1984). What is then counter productive is to allow the child to 
continue to believe that all verbal contexts can be represented 
numerically simply by applying the operations suggested by the 
key word. In the context, 'Fiona had some carrots. She gave 3 
to the rabbit and now has 2 left. How many did she have to 
start with? ' the word, 'left' is not a cue to subtract. 
Similarly, in the context, 'Mr Brown has 4 shirts. How many 
more shirts does he need to have 6 altogether? ' the application 
of the addition operation will result in the wrong answer since 
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the word, 'more' is not the cue to add. However, if the child 
has been successful with this approach (because it has always 
previously happened that 'more' and 'left' have correctly been 
associated with addition and subtraction operations 
respectively) and believes the he/she always will be successful 
with this approach, then the child is likely to use it even 
when it is inappropriate. One possible corollary from this is 
that the child abandons his/her earlier, intuitive attempts to 
understand the relationship expressed in the verbal context and 
instead adopts some quasi-mathematical rote heuristic. 
The young subjects in this study certainly seemed to appreciate 
the need to search for meaning in the verbal context. As 
teachers we must nurture this phenomenon and not allow it 
(through an overdue emphasis on 'performance') to become 
subjugated to correct answers or speedy progression through a 
prescribed syllabus. In turn this suggests two possible 
recommendations to be included in policies for the teaching of 
mathematics: 
firstly, that there be an acknowledgement of the necessity to 
'revisit' abstract mathematical concepts over time. Only then 
can what were initially fragmented concepts have a chance of 
becoming developed in anything resembling a 'complete way'; 
secondly, that there be a genuine attempt on the part of the 
teacher to elicit from the child exactly what the child thinks 
he/she is doing when working on a translation problem. Just in 
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the way that no teacher would wittingly allow a child's 
incorrect overt performance to continue without some attempt to 
help the child make the correction, so too does the teacher 
need to appreciate that faulty performance may be due not to a 
lack of competence but to a less mature or disoriented 
conceptualization of the task. One way of accessing this 
conceptualization is through some exploration of evocability. 
Granted, the measure of evocability used in this study may be 
deemed to be a bit crude, but it is a start. 
In summary: 
(i) the subjects appeared to respond well to being taught the 
formalisms of addition and subtraction through the method of 
Bidirectional Translation; 
(ii) in their operations the subjects could clearly distinguish 
between addition and subtraction (that is they could utilize 
addition and subtraction) which is tantamount to saying that 
the subjects had cognitive control of the two concepts; 
(iii) in their reflections on hypothetical operations there 
appeared to be some confusion as to what constitutes addition 
and what constitutes subtraction (that is there was some 
difficulty in correctly evoking addition and subtraction) which 
in turn suggests that the subjects' metacognitive control of 
the concepts was less refined; 
(iv) this confusion is understandable insofar as it may be a 
function of the type of verbal context used, but nevertheless 
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is a confusion which should be regarded as legitimate and as 
worthy of 'teaching' as any aspect of pedagogical content, if 
the different types of verbal context are accorded equal 
veracity. 
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THE EXPERIMENT 
The findings of the Main Study were pleasantly rewarding to the 
researcher. It did seem possible to teach addition and 
subtraction in some comprehensible fashion such that learners 
were aware of what they were doing. They knew when and how to 
compute. They could make sense of their computations in terms 
of hypothetical, real-life scenarios. And they could speculate 
on whether addition or subtraction operations were an 
appropriate 'fit' for the particular translation problems under 
consideration. There was still, however, a large unanswered 
question, "Was Bidirectional Translation's 'success' merely a 
function of the idiosyncrasies of this particular teacher? ". 
Put more prosaically (or scientifically? ) were the findings of 
the Main Study conducted with a tiny sample, generalizable to a 
larger population? To find, or try to find, an answer to this 
question, the methodology had to be tested in some systematic 
way and, as characterizes much educational research, the most 
appropriate vehicle for such testing was seen as the 
experiment, a means of controlled observation. 
Factors to be considered 
While the experimental style of data collection does allow 
conclusions to be drawn about cause and effect, it is 
nevertheless an approach which is fraught with difficulties. 
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These difficulties can be reduced to what Campbell & Stanley 
(1963) refer to as two principles: those of internal and 
external validity. 
Internal validity means that the results obtained in the 
experiment are due to the experimental 'treatment' rather than 
to uncontrolled, extraneous factors. In terms of this study, 
performance on addition and subtraction test items would have 
to be demonstrably tied to the teaching methodology. 
External validity means that the results obtained in the 
experiment would apply in the real world, at other times, to 
other groups of people, in other geographical locations. In 
terms of this study, could any qualified primary teacher use 
the methodology? 
The principles of internal and external validity are 
inextricably linked. The tighter the control of the experiment 
itself (in terms of controlling variables) the higher the 
probability that the study is internally valid. However, the 
elimination of uncontrolled variables which freely reign in the 
real world proportionately reduces the external validity of the 
study. And yet, external validity is of little value if one can 
have no confidence in the the internal validity of the 
experiment. The solution lies in achieving the best possible 
trade off between factors involved in external validity and 
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those involved in internal validity. But what are those 
factors? Campbell & Stanley (1963) refer to the following: 
for internal validity 
1. the history. of-the subjects: This refers to 'events' in the 
subjects' environment, which are beyond the control of the 
researcher, and which may have a favourable or disturbing 
effect upon the performance of the subjects such that 
performance measures were being wrongly attributed to the 
experimental 'treatment'. Limitations on internal validity by 
virtue of history are dealt with by using a control group which 
can be expected to have experienced the same 'events' (that is, 
can be expected to have the same history) as the experimental 
group. 
2. the maturation of-the subjects: This refers to maturational 
and developmental experiences which occur normally and which 
could, rather than the experimental 'treatment', be responsible 
for a particular outcome. Particularly over extended time, it 
can be difficult to determine whether improved performance is 
due to the independent variable, or to maturation, or to an 
interaction between the two. Here again, the use of a control 
group composed of persons who can be expected to have had the 
same or similar developmental experiences can enable the 
researcher to control for this confounding effect. 
3. testirr : Tests may make subjects more aware of hidden 
purposes of the researcher, and as a result may act as a 
Chapter 8 Page 223 
THE EXTENSION OF THE EMPIRICAL WORK: THE EXPERIMENT 
stimulus to change on the part of the subjects. This is 
particularly problematic, it seems, if there is pre-testing 
prior to the experimental 'treatment'. The subsequent post-test 
may not then be measuring the effects of the independent 
variable but be measuring the consequent effects of the pre- 
test experience. In traditional experimental designs, this bias 
can be avoided by not having a pre-test. 
4. instrumentation: The measuring tools or techniques must be 
as reliable and as up-to-date as possible, otherwise the 
experiment's validity is threatened. Additionally, however, the 
researcher must handle his/her measuring instruments with care. 
As the experiment proceeds, the researcher can, unwittingly, 
affect the measures obtained by giving different subjects 
different cues, by asking different subjects different 
questions, or by coding the data differently. To avoid 
unreliable and invalid information, it is important to have at 
least one but preferably both of the following: 
to have a predetermined format for asking questions/recording 
data; 
to have interviewers/observers constant across time. 
5. selection of subjects: The selection of subjects is probably 
the most important factor in experimental research. To evaluate 
properly the influence of the 'treatment' variable it is 
necessary that both the experimental and control groups be as 
closely as possible equivalent in respect of all the factors 
that may influence the dependent variable except for the 
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factor(s) chosen as the independent variable. In practice it is 
extremely difficult to select the two groups from the 
population who are equivalent or comparable in all respects and 
the usually favoured resolution to this difficulty is to use 
some form of randomization: either selecting subjects randomly, 
or randomly assigning subjects to different treatments, or 
randomly assigning experimental 'treatments' to selected 
groups. 
6. stability: Test findings can be unreliable in that they can 
occur once but not consistently. To control for this factor the 
data need to be examined statistically. Statistical tests 
indicate the probability of the findings being due to chance. 
for external validity 
1. The Hawthorne Effect: This refers to the possibility that 
participants in an experiment, just because they know they are 
participants, will react more positively towards the 
independent variable than the independent variable really 
justifies, and thereby enhance the findings. The phenomenon of 
the Hawthorne effect often operates in experimentation in 
curriculum research: the subjects, pleased at having been 
singled out to participate in an experimental project, react 
more strongly to their pleasure than to the 'treatment'. (But 
when such projects are tried on a non-experimental basis they 
often yield different results. ) This means that performance 
measures may be more a function of the researcher's 
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intervention per se than the specifics of the intervention. 
This reactive effect can contribute considerably to the 
invalidity of the findings and there is no way of eradicating 
it. In order to make some judgement as to the 'true' effects of 
the experimental treatment, it is important to cause the 
control subjects to feel that they too are participating in the 
experiment by the researcher's introduction of some pseudo 
intervention which makes the control subjects feel they are 
involved and are important but which has no relation to the 
independent variable being evaluated. In this way the 
researcher can attempt to 'create' parity between the control 
and experimental subjects. 
2. sample bias: If one wishes to make generalized statements 
about populations (and that, after all, is the purpose of 
experimentation) it is essential that the sample truce 
represents the population in all its vagaries. This means 
controlling for factors such as geographical location and 
'culture', and using subjects whose performance in the target 
area of study covers a wide range. 
The researcher's task 
Using a Posttest-Only Control Group Design, the researcher was 
to assess the effects of Bidirectional Translation. Half of the 
subjects would constitute the experimental group, the remainder 
the control group. The experimental group was to experience 
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Bidirectional Translation, which would involve the researcher 
in some induction of teachers in the protocol of the 
methodology. The control group was to be taught addition and 
subtraction 'by whatever means the teachers in that group 
typically used. After the teaching methodologies had been 
effected, the researcher was to test a cross section of all the 
children who had been involved. 
Negotiating access to the subjects 
Taking full account of the provisos outlined above, the 
researcher planned and executed her access to a sample of 
subjects as follows: 
1. The researcher sought permission of the Director of 
Education to pursue her research interests in a number of 
schools, number as yet unspecified. 
2. Negotiations took place between the Glasgow Division 
Education Officer, the Primary Adviser with responsibility for 
Mathematics and the researcher; which resulted in agreement 
that the researcher could approach a manageable number (for the 
researcher) of schools to solicit their participation. 
3. The researcher decided that, given her teaching commitments 
which, incidentally, radically switched in February 1988 from 
teaching primary one children to teaching student teachers at 
the local college of education (to where the researcher had 
been seconded to 'lecture in psychology) the total number of 
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schools which she could comfortably 'manage' would be about 
twelve. 
4. An initial list of about twenty schools was drawn up on the 
basis of intelligence made available by the local education 
authority. Such intelligence consisted of the sizes of school 
rolls; the number of primary one classes in any given school; 
whether or not the school was in an area of priority treatment; 
the social and cultural composition of schools; the 
geographical location of schools and any features which were 
'peculiar' to a school. One 'peculiar' feature is, for example, 
that a small number of schools have a nursery class which is a 
part of the school whilst, for the most part, nursery education 
is provided in establishments which are distinct and autonomous 
from mainstream primary schools. The criteria for the selection 
of the provisional list of schools from the hundreds which were 
available to the researcher will be discussed later. 
5. Letters were sent to the head teachers of twelve schools. 
The letters merely indicated the researcher's area of interest 
and asked permission to visit each school with a view to talks 
between herself, the head teacher and the primary one teacher. 
Follow-up telephone calls to secure an invitation to visit, 
allowed head teachers to accept, or decline the offer of 
participation in the research without feeling pressurized or 
'losing face'. Three head teachers declined on the grounds that 
they had undertaken other piloting or inservice work and were 
thus fully committed. For these refusals another three schools 
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Were selected by the researcher. The replacement schools agreed 
to participate. 
6. Initial visits to experimental and control schools were 
carried out in February 1988. In the experimental schools, the 
researcher briefly outlined the rationale for Bidirectional 
Translation, talked the teacher through the guidelines for 
implementing the methodology, provided the teacher with the 
necessary materials and arranged to meet again with the teacher 
to collect feedback and have a chat with the children. In the 
control schools, the researcher merely indicated that she was 
collecting data on teachers' views of the teaching of addition 
and subtraction, had the teacher complete a questionnaire and 
arranged with the teacher to return to the school towards the 
end of the school term to have a chat with the children when 
they would have completed the teacher's usual programme for 
the teaching of addition and subtraction. 
The guidelines and questionnaire mentioned in (6) are appended 
at the end of this chapter. 
7. In May/June the researcher, by arrangement, visited all 
twelve schools having obtained permission to test 15 children 
in each school over two successive days for each school. 
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Factors which were considered 
The experimentation which took place in this research 
endeavoured to secure the best possible balance between 
internal and external validity. Much of what will be stated in 
this section has already been implied, but in the interests of 
precision, the factors constituting internal and external 
validity will be examined in terms of this piece of research. 
to attain internal validity 
1. The limitations of this study meant that the variable of 
history could not be controlled for beyond the most rudimentary 
levels: to have thoroughly investigated historical events in 
the subjects' environments would have meant research on a scale 
which would be impracticable for someone working single-handed. 
However, a few simple precautions were taken to attenuate the 
worst excesses of historical contamination. No schools were 
chosen which had been involved in closures or mergers as a 
result of local government rationalization in education. No 
schools were chosen which had experienced a particularly 
traumatic or dazzling event, such as a fire or a prestigious 
award/visit. These precautions were thought to eliminate 
variables such as stress or over-excitement which may have 
been implicated in the performance measures. A further 
precaution taken was that only schools which had one primary 
one class could be included, lest there be any notions' of 
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streaming, however tacit, in operation. If there was only one 
primary one class in the school, all the primary one children 
had to be there! 
2. The variable of maturation was controlled for by using only 
primary one children both in experimental and control schools 
and conducting the testing over a time scale of weeks rather 
than months. 
3. The possibly adverse effects of pre-testing were avoided by 
not conducting any pre-tests. A two-group design was used 
instead. 
4. The variable of instrumentation was controlled for by the 
researcher herself doing all the testing and using a 
predetermined format for this. 
5. The variable of subject selection was complex to handle. 
Constraints of practicality and ethics meant that it was 
necessary, though not perhaps ideal, to consider schools as 
experimental or control. But since schools vary on a variety of 
dimensions such as the cultural composition of its population, 
the ratio of pupils to teachers and the diversity of socio- 
economic status, it would be very easy to have an experimental 
group comprising children from advantageous circumstances and a 
control group comprising children from disadvantageous 
circumstances, with the resulting findings being heavily 
contaminated. Given that it was desirable to have a sample 
which was representative of a population of primary one 
children, and given that the experimental and control schools 
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were to be as equitable as possible, the following compromise 
in the selection of subjects was reached. Factors such as the 
geographical location of schools (whether inner city or in a 
peripheral housing estate); the cultural composition of 
individual school populations (mainly monocultural or mainly 
multicultural) and the incidence of compensatory provision in 
schools for 'disadvantaged' pupils (whether or not the school 
was designated as being in an area of priority treatment) were 
recognized as being powerful influences on the child's 
performance in school. These factors were therefore the initial 
criteria by which schools were selected. These factors do not, 
however, manifest themselves in isolation. Differing 
permutations result in schools which can be identified as: 
multicultural/A. P. T. /inner city schools, 
multicultural/non A. P. T. /inner city schools, 
monocultural/A. P. T. /inner city schools, 
monocultural/non A. P. T. /inner city schools, 
monocultural/A. P. T. /housing estate schools, 
monocultural/non A. P. T. /housing estate schools. 
The identities of schools having been determined, it was then a 
matter of selecting two schools of each 'type', one of which 
was arbitrarily designated as experimental and the other as 
control. 
A further compromise in the selection of subjects was that the 
subjects tested by the researcher were selected by their class 
teachers. The researcher requested 15 subjects in each school 
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who: 
a) had completed the, programme of addition and 
subtraction; 
and 
b) were in the teacher's professional opinion 'good' (5 
subjects), 'average' (5 subjects) and 'poor' (5 subjects). 
This is a somewhat irregular method for selecting subjects for 
testing but the researcher was at pains not to give 
participating teachers the impression that it was they who were 
being assessed, and so she considered it prudent, in the 
circumstances, to have the teachers select the subjects. 
However, the method comes close to random selection and 
probably did not damage the experiment. 
6. The variable of stability was controlled for by subjecting 
the test performance data to statistical analyses. 
to attain external validity 
1. The variable of the Hawthorne Effect was controlled for by 
having the teachers in the control schools complete a 
questionnaire on the teaching of addition and subtraction at 
the outset and securing their agreement for a return visit by 
the researcher. Neither the experimental nor the control group 
was made aware of the other's participation in the research, 
and since each group received the same number of visits from 
the researcher, each received (at face value) the same amount 
of researcher intervention. 
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2. The variable of sample bias has largely been dealt with in 
what was said about sample selection. Perhaps it should be 
added, however, that the schools were drawn from north, south, 
east and west of the city. 
The Scope and Aims of the experimentation 
The aim was to investigate the effect of Bidirectional 
Translation on the conceptual understanding of addition and 
subtraction. Specifically, the experimental hypothesis was that 
children exposed to the methodology of Bidirectional 
Translation will perform significantly better on addition and 
subtraction test items than children who are exposed to 
traditional methods which place a heavy reliance on computation 
alone. 
The scope of the experiment was restricted to exploring the 
extent of conceptualization of addition and subtraction. 
Specifically, the extent to which young children could evoke 
and utilize addition and subtraction operations was at issue. 
Procedure 
A list of 20 test items, 10 for evocability and 10 for 
utilizability, was used as it had been in the Main Study. The 
number domain used was within 10 and number triples were 
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randomly assigned to test texts, which, similarly, were 
presented to subjects in random order. The texts of the test 
items are included at the end of this chapter. 
The researcher visited each school on two successive days, on 
one day to test for evocability and on the other to test for 
the utilizability of addition and subtraction. Presentation of 
evocability and utilizability test items were counterbalanced. 
The researcher worked in a corner of the classroom withdrawing 
subjects one at a time from the main body of the class. The 
researcher spent a morning with the class on each visit. 
Interview time with each subject was about 10 minutes. The 
instructions to each subject were: 
for-evocability. 
I'm going to read you a silly story.. Listen carefully and 
tell me if you should add or subtract to find the answer 
9. Well done, now let's try some more. 
for utilizability 
I'm going to read you a silly story. You see if you can 
find out the answer and tell me what it is ... Well done, now let's try some more. 
After the subjects made a response, a few seconds were allowed 
to elapse before another verbal context was presented. The 
purpose of this was to enable the subject to reflect upon, and 
possibly change his/her decision. If the subject did make a 
change in his/her decision, he/she was asked by the researcher 
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to clearly indicate which response the subject believed to be 
correct. 
Each verbal context was read and reread to the subject. Any 
subsequent lapse of memory on the part of the subject was 
remedied by the researcher's reading the verbal context yet 
again. 
Successful/unsuccessful performance on each test item was 
noted. 
To conclude the researcher-visits to the schools, the 
researcher debriefed the participating teachers as follows. 
For the experimental teachers the researcher acknowledged their 
participation and explained that the children seemed to have a 
sound grasp of what they were doing when they added or 
subtracted. She further indicated that if the same results were 
found in other school participating in the research she would 
have grounds for recommending that the approach of 
Bidirectional Translation be adopted by other teachers. She 
also invited teachers' comments and collected what written 
feedback they had available. 
For the control teachers the researcher expressed her thanks 
for allowing her time to chat with the children and explained 
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that she now hoped to try to develop some method of linking the 
children's achievements in computation with contexts for 
addition and subtraction such that children could solve 
arithmetical problems more easily. She also invited teachers' 
comments on her 'idea'. 
In summary: 
(i) 180 subjects, 90 experimental and 90 control, from twelve 
Glasgow primary schools participated in assessment of their 
grasp of understanding of addition and subtraction; 
(ii) this grasp of understanding was measured in terms of 
evocability and utilizability; 
(iii) the experimental subjects were, before testing, taught to 
add and subtract using the methodology of Bidirectional 
Translation; 
(iv) the control subjects, before testing, had been taught to 
add and subtract by whatever was the teacher's usual 
methodology; 
(v) claims are made for the experimental design being both 
simple and efficient, a Posttest-Only Control Group Design. 
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Teaching Primary One Children to Add and Subtract with greater 
understanding: a research investigation. 
Guidelines for teachers participating in the investigation. 
Effie Maclellan, Division of Education and Psychology, 
Jordanhill College. 
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Preface 
The research evidence from researchers in Britain and elsewhere 
indicates that children can learn to add, subtract, multiply 
and divide when such operations are in the form of 'sums' such 
as 9+6,4x2,6-3. However, many children are unable to 
a) translate such an operation into a hypothetical, real world 
context: in other words they cannot envisage a situation in 
which such an operation would be required 
and conversely 
b) extract the appropriate numerical , 
operation from a 
hypothetical real world context: in other words they have 
extreme difficulty in solving the word problems as they 
typically appear in mathematical textbooks. 
I believe that unless children can. at least to some extent be 
proficient in (a) and (b) above (or, to put it more 
theoretically, bidirectionally translate between the numerical 
representation and a verbal context) the concept of addition or 
subtraction or multiplication or division has not established 
itself in the child's mind. It is with the aim of introducing 
the concepts of addition and subtraction in a fuller and more 
meaningful way that the following methodology has been 
developed. 
At several point in the Series of Steps for teaching Addition 
and Subtraction, there will be instructions to take out a 
specific number of cubes. This number is not sacred. Teachers 
should feel free to choose their own examples using small 
numbers. 
Throughout, frequent reference is made . 
to the terms 'number 
story' and 'silly story'. This is not meant. to be patronizing 
towards teachers. It is simply an easily understood distinction 
between formal, notational representation and verbal 
contextual ization of a numerical operation; and in using the 
terms, 'number story' and 'silly story' the children understand 
the distinction. 
In all of this booklet I have tried to avoid jargon. However 
there is one exception, found only in step 6 of Subtraction, 
where reference is made to the terms, minuend and subtrahend - 
purely because this is the most economical way of explaining 
what is subtracted from what: 
thus 9 minuend 
-6 subtrahend 
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The materials needed in using the following methodology are few 
and simple. The Unifix Cubes typically found in infant 
classrooms, or their equivalents are perfectly suitable as 
'concrete apparatus'. Additionally, the teacher needs some 
magnetic numerals and operator signs and a magnetic surface on 
which to use them. 
I'd like you to try out the following steps with your different 
groups of children. 
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Series of steps for-teaching addition 
Step 1 Setting the scene. 
The group of children is seated round the table, each child 
having a stack of 10 Unifix Cubes. The children are asked to 
take two cubes from their stacks. A magnetic numeral '2' is 
displayed on the magnet board. 
2 
MAGNET BOARD 
Attention is drawn to the two cubes in front of each child and 
to the numeral '2' on the board. The children are told that 
they are to take more cubes from their stacks and that to show 
on the board that they are taking more cubes, a sign is used. 
The children are told that the sign says 'plus' or 'add on'. 
The magnetic '+' is affixed to the board. 
2+ 
MAGNET BOARD 
The children are now asked to take a further three cubes from 




A magnetic '3' is displayed on the board. 
---------- --- --------- 
2+3 
MAGNET BOARD 
Attention is drawn. to the cubes in front of the children and to 
the display on the board. The children are asked to find out 
how many cubes they took from the. stack altogether. After the 
total has been ascertained, the teacher explains that another 
sign is needed to show that something has been found out about 
2+3. The children are told that the sign says 'equals' or 
'makes' or 'is the same as'. The magnetic '-' is affixed to the 
board as is the magnetic 151. 
2+35 
MAGNET BOARD 
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Attention is drawn to the cubes in front of the children and to 
the 'number story' on the board (two plus three equals five). 
The children are invited to 'read' the number story aloud. This 
entire procedure is repeated many more times over successive 
days using different number combinations within 10. Zero is 
introduced by instructing the children to take out 4 cubes and 
then take out no cubes. 
Step 2 Let's Pretend. 
The children are introduced to the notion that cubes can be 
used to represent just about anything in the real world. The 
teacher says to the children, "Let's pretend 
_the 
cubes are 
bananas" or "cars" or whatever. The children are instructed to 
take out three bananas and then another three bananas and to 
find out how many bananas they have in front of them. As above, 
considerable practice is given, and every addition activity is 
accompanied by its representation in magnetic numeral form. 
Step 3 Silly Stories. 
The children are told to listen to a 'silly story'. While they 
are listening they have to take from their stack of cubes the 
numbers mentioned in the 'silly story' 
"Mummy gave me three lollipops and four sweets". 
The children are asked to show their three lollipops (whereupon 
each child holds up the three Unifix Cubes) and their four 
sweets (whereupon each child holds up the four Unifix Cubes). 
The teacher asks, "How many things did Mummy give me 
altogether? " When the total has been identified the teacher 
asks, "How did you find out the answer? " 
Step 4 Silly Stories and Number Stories. 
The teacher provides a complete 'silly story': 
"There are four blue sweets and two red sweets in the bag 
so that makes six sweets altogether". 
The children are invited to use the magnetic numerals and signs 
to represent the 'silly story' as a 'number story' (4+2-6). The 
children 'read' the 'number story' (four plus two equals six) 
and are required to indicate which number represents the blue 
sweets, which number represents the red sweets, which sign 
represents the operation of addition and which sign represents 
the outcome of the operation. Again, much practice is given in 
this activity. 
Step 5 Number Stories and Silly Stories. 
The teacher provides a complete 'number story' on the magnet 
board (for example 1+3-4) and the children are invited to 
provide a corresponding 'silly story'. Allow as many children 
as time allows, to provide verbal contexts for any given 
numerical representation. 
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Step 6 Drawing a story - first version. 
The children are instructed that instead of telling a 'silly 
story' they have to draw a 'silly story' for a bit of a number 
story which will be provided. The instruction 'draw 2+3' is 
given orally and is also put on the magnet board for the 
children to see. Provide paper and pencils/pens/ crayons and 
observe what happens. When each child has pictorially 
represented his/her 'silly story' ask the child to explain 
his/her story and scribe the story in front of the child. This 
procedure of drawing a 'number story' is repeated regularly 
over successive teaching sessions. 
Step 7 Drawing a story - second version. 
The children are invited to draw their own 'silly story' with 
no numerical stimulus being provided. In other words the 
children are not told of how many of each sub set to draw. 
There is now greater need than before for the children to 
describe/ explain their stories to the teacher (since both the 
numerical components and the verbal contexts are the children's 
own with no constraints imposed by the teacher) who again 
scribes at the child's dictation. 
Step 8 Strategies for finding the answer. 
The children are told that they will be given a bit of a 
'number story' (for example 3+4-) and that they will have to 
find the answer. The teacher asks the children how they will 
find out the answer if they do not already know. The children 
make various suggestions: 
a) count on their fingers 
b) count with cubes 
c) draw pictures 
each of which is positively received by the teacher who then 
points out that: 
a) sometimes we might not have enough fingers (as when 
summing any numbers the total of which is greater than 
10) 
b) cubes are not always available 
c) pictures can take a long time to draw. 
The teacher the demonstrates a 'method which she sometimes 
uses'. Whereupon she writes 3+4. ' on the blackboard and sets out 
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The results are compared 
fingers, cubes and tally n 
in setting down 'number 
(referred to as strokes) 
methods is valid and that 
use) is to be theirs. 
using each of the three methods - 
iarks. The children are given practice 
stories' and in using tally marks 
but are reassured that each of the 
the final choice (of which method to 
Step 9 Does it work? 
Only now are the children considered ready to undertake the 
conventional addition exercises of adding two numbers the total 
of which is within 10. The children undertake this activity 
outwith the direct supervision of the teacher - that is when 
she is working with other groups of children in the class. 
However, to check that the earlier steps in the series have 
been of use to the children, random, one-to-one interviews are 
held between the teacher and the child when the teacher in the 
light of a completed exercise: 
a) asks the child how he/she found the answer to a particular 
operation, say 6+2; 
b) invites the children to provide a 'silly story' for a 
particular addition operation, say 5+0; 
c) requests the child to peruse all the examples in the 
exercise and identify which 'number story' is being referred to 
when the teacher provides a 'silly story'. 
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Questions to guide the teacher's observations of the children 
whilst teaching addition. 
Step 1 How do the children find the 'altogether' number. Do 
they 
a) use cubes, if so how many? 
b) count on their fingers, if so how many? 
c) make use of number facts, if so how many? 
d) other? 
Step 2 What comments, if any, do the children make when they 
are pretending that the Unifix Cubes are objects in the real 
world? 
Step 3 Can the children report how they performed the 
addition operation? Do they make reference to strategies such 
as those outlined in Step 1? 
Step 4 What hesitancies/difficulties, if any, do the children 
have when using the magnetic numerals/signs to record a 
'story'. For example, do the children use the operator signs 
effectively? 
Step 5 Please include, about 6, transcriptions of children's 
'silly stories'. 
Step 6 a) Do the children insert the operator signs 
appropriately? 
b) Do the children complete the addition operation of 
their own volition? 
Step 7 as for Step 6 
Step 8 a) What suggestions do the children make as to how the 
answer can be obtained? 
b) How do the children respond to the tally marks? 
Step 9 Please comment on the children's performance in the 
one-to-one interviews for 9 (a), (b) and (c). 
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Series of-steps for teaching-subtraction 
Step 1 Setting the scene. 
The group of children is seated round the table, each child 
having a stack of 10 Unifix Cubes. The children are asked to 
take 6 cubes from their stacks. A magnetic numeral 161 is 
displayed on the magnet board. 
6 
MAGNET BOARD 
Attention is drawn to the six cubes in front of each child and 
to the numeral '6' on the board. The children are told that 
they are to take some cubes away from their set of six and that 
to show on the board that they are taking cubes away a sign is 
used. The children are told that the sign says 'minus' or 




The children are now asked to take two cubes away from their 
stack of six and to return them to the 'bank'. A magnetic '2' 
is placed on the board. 
6-2 
MAGNET BOARD 
Attention is again drawn to the board which now displays 6-2. 
The children are asked to find out how many cubes they have 
left. After the answer has been ascertained the teacher reminds 
the children that a sign is needed to show that something has 
been found out about 6-2. The magnetic '-' is affixed to the 
board as is a magnetic '4'. 
6-24 
MAGNET BOARD 
The children are reminded that they started off with six cubes 
and that they took away two of them. They are now left with 
four cubes in front of them. Attention is drawn to the 'number 
story' on the board (6-2-4) and the children are invited to 
'read' the 'number story' (six minus two equals four) aloud. 
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The entire procedure is repeated many more times over 
successive days using different number combinations within ten. 
Zero is used by instructing the children to take out eight 
cubes and then take away no cubes. 
Step 2 Let's Pretend. 
The children are reminded that cubes can be used to represent 
anything in the real world. The teacher tells the children, 
"let's pretend the cubes are dogs" or "houses" or whatever. The 
children are instructed to take out five dogs and then to take 
three dogs away and to find out how many dogs are left. As 
before, considerable practice is given and every subtraction 
activity is accompanied by its representation in numerical 
form. 
Step 3 Silly Stories. 
The children are told to listen to the 'silly story' and to 
operate with the cubes accordingly: 
"Mummy had four apples but she gave me one to eat". 
The children are asked to show their four apples (whereupon 
each child holds up his/her four Unifix Cubes) and to show that 
one was eaten (whereupon each child demonstrates the 
subtraction). When the children correctly identify how many 
apples are left, they are asked by the teacher how they found 
out the answer. 
Step 4 Silly Stories and Number Stories. 
The teacher provides a complete 'silly story': 
"Three cups were on the shelf. One of them got knocked on 
to the floor so that left only two cups". 
The children are invited to use the magnetic numerals and signs 
to represent the 'silly story' as a 'number story' (3-1-2). The 
children 'read' the 'number story' (three minus one equals two) 
and are required to indicate which number represents the cups 
at the beginning of the story, which number represents the cup 
that met with the accident, which number represents the cups at 
the end of the story, which sign represents the operation of 
subtraction and which sign represents the outcome of the 
operation. Many such verbal contexts are provided by the 
teacher. 
Step 5 Number Stories and Silly Stories. 
The teacher provides a complete 'number story' on the magnet 
board (for example 7-4-3), and the children are invited to 
provide a corresponding 'silly story'. Allow as many children, 
as time allows, to provide verbal contexts for any given 
numerical representation. 
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Step 6 Drawing a story - first version. 
The children are instructed that instead of telling a 'silly 
story' they will have to draw a 'silly story', for a bit of a 
'number story' which will be provided. The instruction 'draw 5- 
3' is given orally and is also put on the magnet board for the 
children to see. Provide paper and pencils/pens/crayons and 
observe what happens. Some teacher intervention may be required 
because the children may pictorially represent the five and 
also the three and proceed to add rather than subtract. If this 
happens, still request the child to explain/describe his/her 
'silly story'. If required to reflect on their own story the 
children may not be too happy with a story in which they have 
five sweets, eat three of them and then be left with eight! Ask 
the children how they can show on paper the initial quantity, 
the operation and the result. Some may suggest rubbing out the 
subtrahend. This is perfectly reasonable but in so doing: 
a) nobody will be able to see how many things were present at 
the beginning of the story; 
b) nobody will be able to see how many things were taken away. 
By emphasizing that the minuend and the subtrahend both be 
visually evident, hopefully some child or children will suggest 
that the minuend is drawn and that the subtrahend is 
represented by crossing out. Considerable practice is again 
required. 
Step 7 Drawing a story - second version. 
The children are invited to draw their own 'silly story' with 
no numerical stimulus being provided. In other words the 
children are not told how many things to draw initially or how 
many to score out. They must, however, verbally report the 
context in order that it can be written down by the teacher. 
Step 8 Strategies for finding the answer. 
The children are told that they 
'number story' (for example 7-2-) 
find the answer. The teacher asks 
answer if they do not already know. 
suggest one/all of the following: 
a) use their fingers 
b) use cubes 
c) use strokes 
will be given a bit of a 
and that they will have to 
how they will find out the 
Hopefully the children will 
The teacher checks that the children are able to use all of 
these strategies. 
Step 9 Does it work? 
only now are the children considered ready to undertake 
conventional subtraction exercises, within ten. The children 
undertake this activity outwith the direct supervision of the 
teacher, who is meanwhile working with other groups of 
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children. However, as with addition, random, one-to-one 
interviews are held between the teacher and the individual 
child to check if the earlier steps in the series have been of 
use to the child. In each interview, and in the light of a 
completed subtraction exercise, the teacher: 
a) asks the child how he/she found the answer to a particular 
subtraction operation, say 8-3; 
b) invites the child to provide a 'silly story' for a 
particular subtraction operation say 2-2; 
c) requests the child to peruse all the examples in the 
exercise and identify which 'number story' is being referred to 
when the teacher provides a 'silly story'. 
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Questions to guide the teacher's observations of the children 
whilst teaching subtraction. 
Step 1 How do the children find what is 'left' after 
subtracting. Do they 
a) use cubes, if so how many children do? 
b) count on their fingers, if so how many? 
c) make use of number facts, if so how many? 
d) other? 
Step 2 What comments, if any, do the children make when they 
are pretending that the Unifix Cubes are objects in the real 
world? 
Step 3 Can the children report how they performed the 
subtraction operation? Do they make reference to strategies 
such as those outlined in Step 1? 
Step 4 What hesitancies/difficulties, if any, do the children 
have when using the magnetic numerals/signs to record a 
'story'. 
_For 
example, do the children use the operator signs 
effectively; do they order the numbers in the same sequence as 
in the 'silly story'? 
Step 5 Please include, about 6, transcriptions of children's 
'silly stories'. 
Step 6 a) Do the children complete the subtraction operation 
of their own volition? 
b) If the children depict the minuend and the 
subtrahend as two distinct entities do they insert the operator 
signs appropriately, and, if so do they 
c) complete the subtraction operation appropriately? 
Step 7 as for Step 6 
Step 8 What suggestions do the children make as to how the 
answer can be obtained? 
Step 9 Please comment on the children's performance in 
the one-to-one interviews for 9 (a), (b) and (c). 
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Questionnaire on the teaching of Addition -and- -Subtraction 
Operations to Primary-One Children 
1. Are you using a commercially produced Maths Programme or 
Scheme? YES NO 
If yes, which one? 
2. Do you have children in your class who came to school 
already able to add? YES NO 
3. Do you have children in your class who came to school 
already able to subtract? YES NO 
4. Do you aim to teach automatic recall of addition number 
bonds? YES NO 
5. Do you aim to teach automatic recall of subtraction number 
bonds? YES NO 
6. Do you prefer to teach addition first and then subtraction? 
YES NO 
7. Do you prefer to teach addition and subtraction as converse 
operations? YES NO 
8. Do you explain the '+' sign as 'plus'? 
YES NO 
9. Do you explain the '+' sign as 'and'? 
YES NO 
10. Do you explain the '+' sign as 'add on'? 
YES NO 
11. Do you explain the '-' sign as 'minus'? 
YES NO 
12. Do you explain the '-' sign as 'subtract'? 
YES NO 
13. Do you explain the '-' sign as 'take away'? 
YES NO 
14. Do you explain the '-' sign as 'equals'? 
YES NO 
15. Do you explain the sign as 'the same as'? 
YES NO 
16. Do you allow children to use their fingers to find the 
answer? YES NO 
Please give a reason for your point of view. 
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17. Do you approve of children using their fingers to find the 
answer? YES NO 
Please give a reason for your point of view. 
18. Do you 'embed' the addition operation in a verbal context - 
i. e. provide a word problem? YES NO 
Please give a reason for your answer. 
19. Do you 'embed' the subtraction operation in a verbal 
context? YES NO 
Please give a reason for your answer. 
20. In your professional opinion is Maths teaching beat kept as 
a distinct curricular area? 
YES NO 
Please give a reason for your answer. 
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Items to test-the conceptualization of Addition and Subtraction 
The Utilizability. of. Addition 
Joinin : Betty has (x) dollies. Granny gave her (y) more 
dollies. How many dollies has Betty got now? 
Separating: Fiona had some carrots. She gave (x) carrots to the 
rabbit and now she has (y) carrots left. How many did she have 
to start with? 
Part-Part-Whole: (x) girls and (y) boys went out to play in the 
playground. How many children went out to play? 
Comparison: Susan has (x) hats. Mummy has (y) more hats than 
Susan. How many hats has Mummy got? 
Equalizing: There were (x) red cars in the car park. (y) more 
red cars came in. Now there are the same number of red and blue 
cars in the car park. How many blue cars are there? 
The Utilizability of Subtraction 
Joinin : Mr Brown has (x) shirts. How many more shirts does he 
need to have (z) shirts altogether? 
Separating: John had (z) pencils. He gave(x) to his big 
brother. How many pencils does John have now? 
Part-Part-Whole: Daddy has (z) saws. (x) of them are very blunt 
and the rest are very sharp. How many very sharp saws does he 
have? 
Comparison: There are (z) men and (x) women standing at the bus 
stop. How many more men are at the bus stop? 
Equalizing: There are (z) forks and (x) knives in the drawer. 
How many forks should I take out so that there are the same 
number of forks and knives in the drawer? 
The Evocability. of Addition 
Joinin : Tom has (x) bananas. Susan gave him (y) more bananas. 
How many bananas has Tom got now? 
Separating: Neil had some toys. He gave (x) toys to his little 
brother and now he has (y) toys left. How many did he have to 
start with? 
Part-Part-Whole: There are (x) girls and (y) boys in the room. 
How many children are in the room altogether? 
Comparison: Mary has (x) cats. Christine has (y) more cats than 
Mary. How many cats does Christine have? 
Equalizing: There were (x) boys in the playground. (y) more 
went out. Now there are the same number of boys and girls in 
the playground. How many girls are in the playground? 
The-Evocability"of Subtraction 
Joinin : Karen has (x) lollipops. How many more lollipops does 
she need to have (z) lollipops altogether? 
Separating: Imran had (z) sweets. He gave (x) to Linda. How 
many sweets does Imran have now? 
Chapter 8 Page 253 
THE EXTENSION OF THE EMPIRICAL WORK: THE EXPERIMENT 
Part-Part-Whole: Eva has (z) pens for colouring with. (x) of 
them are blue and the rest are red. How many red pens has Eva 
got? 
Comparison: There are (z) girls and (x) boys in the cloakroom. 
How many more girls are in the cloakroom? 
Equalizing: There are (z) cups and (x) saucers on the table. 
How many saucers should I take away so that there are the same 
number of cups and saucers on the table? 
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RESULTS 
The purpose of a chapter such as this is twofold. First, it 
presents the results of the study in a summary form and then it 
points out some patterns observed within the data. In both of 
these processes interpretation is taking place. The summary 
involves data reduction and it is necessary to show that the 
categories or dimensions implied in this process are reasonable 
ones. Here descriptive statistics can provide rigour. The 
process of extracting patterns involves making distinctions and 
comparisons and again statistical tests can ensure that the 
author's interpretation is true to the data. 
The remainder of this chapter will thus attempt to describe, 
and generalize from: 
(i) how the subjects performed on the different tasks; 
(ii) variations and associations within the data; 
(iii) differences between the experimental and control 
subjects. 
The data being dealt with in this chapter will be considered to 
be on an interval scale. However, it is acknowledged that this 
involves an assumption common in dealing with test results in 
education and psychology; that the correct answer to any one 
item is exactly equivalent (in terms of the 'amount' of the 
underlying competence expressed) to the correct answer for any 
other item. 
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The dubiety expressed about the scale of measurement is not 
merely cautionary, but has implications for the type of 
statistical tests used on the data. Statisticians of the 
'purist' school would claim that at least an interval scale is 
a necessary condition for the use of parametric tests. 
Statisticians of the more 'liberal ' school would, on the other 
hand, claim that parametric tests are so robust that they can 
still be applied even if the equal units in the interval scale 
are more quasi than real. For the researcher who is naive in 
statistical theory, it is not clear which type of advice one 
should follow. As a result, the position being adopted here is 
as follows. 
The data are assumed to be on an interval scale. Having said 
that however, it does not necessarily mean that the tests used 
will be, exclusively parametric, since another necessary 
condition for the use of parametric tests is that the results 
be normally distributed. As will be seen later this assumption 
is not met in the data in this study. But here again, there is 
some disagreement amongst the experts. Some would claim that 
parametric tests should not be used if the data are skewed, 
others would claim that there can be considerable deviation 
from normality without the result of the parametric test being 
affected. 
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While the non parametric tests are not so powerful as their 
parametric counterparts (that is, they can 'lose' valuable 
information in the data), they nevertheless have greater 
generality. To use a parametric test inappropriately can 'add' 
information which is not justified. Although the parametric 
test can detect significance where a non parametric test might 
not do so, the corollary to that is that if a non parametric 
test does find significance so must its parametric counterpart. 
Accordingly then, non parametric tests will be used 
principally, and only in instances where there seems further 
cause to tease out the data, will parametric tests be used. 
SUMMARY OF-OBSERVATIONS 
There were 90 experimental subjects and 90 control subjects. 
Overall, 20 responses for each subject were scored. 
Table. 9.1 Frequency Distribution of-Class Intervals-of Correct 
Scores for-180 Subjects 
scores experimental 
between - frequencies 
18 - 20 15 
15 - 17 24 
12 - 14 22 







S. D. 5.89 
Sk. 0.38 ------ -- -------. - 
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The frequency distribution can also be depicted graphically as 
the following bar graph shows. 
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Overall frequency distributions are of limited interest given 
that the test items were not all of one type. The following 
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table shows the number of correct responses (in percentage 
terms) to each type of item within each class of verbal 
context. 
Table 9.2 Percentage Matrix of Correct= Respons 
different items for 180 Subjects 
Type of 
concept. 
Class of Verbal Context 
- 
Join Sepa Part Comp Equa MEANS 
Util + 87.8 64.4 94.4 40.6 36.1 64.7 
Util - 42.2 84.4 67.8 21.7 39.4 51.1 
Evoc + 48.9 12.8 56.7 28.3 27.2 34.8 
Evoc - 7.2 -. 47.8 37.8 .-5.6. -23.3 24.3 
MEANS 46.5 52.4 64.2 -24.1 31.5 - 43.7 
Visual inspection of Table 9.2 shows the numbers of correct 
responses for all of the subjects and conceals the difference 
in performance between the experimental and control subjects. 
So what can be gleaned from Table 9.2 is information regarding 
overall mean performance, and as such is not of great interest. 
On average more subjects responded correctly when they were 
required to utilize concepts than when they were required to 
evoke concepts. More subjects responded correctly when addition 
was at issue than when subtraction was at issue. And finally, 
amongst the different classes of verbal context, more subjects 
responded correctly to the Part-Part Whole class of verbal 
context than to any other. 
This variability in correct response can be more specifically 
described by tabulating the percentage of correct respondents 
es- to the 
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for each of the twenty items. Again, however, these figures do 
not distinguish between experimental and control subjects. 
Table 9.3 Percentage of Correct 











































)ondents-for-each item (. for 
key to reading Table. 9.3 The first 
represents the class of verbal context: 
- Joining, S- Separating, C- Compari. 
The letters UTIL and EVOC represent. 
evocability of concepts and the + and - 
and subtraction. 
letter (in brackets) 
P- Part-Part Whole, J 
son and E- Equalizing. 
the utilizability and 
signs are for addition 
HOW THE-SUMMARY DIVIDES FOR EXPERIMENTAL AND CONTROL SUBJECTS 
The above figures have given only a global picture of task 
performance, which is of minor importance in this study. It is 
more important to see how the experimental and control subjects 
performed separately. 
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Table 9.4 Frequency Distribution of Class Intervals of Correct 
Scores for 180 Subjects 
scores experimental control 
between frequencies frequencies 
18 - 20 12 3 
15 - 17 24 0 
12 - 14 21 1 
9- 11 20 4 
6-8 8 13 
3-5 4 43 
0-2 1 26 
Number 90 90 
Mode 14 4 
Median 14 4 
Mean 13.122 4.378 
S. D. 4.354 3.514 
Sk. -0.61 0.32 
Figure 9.2 Bar Graph to show Frequency of Scores for 
experimental and control subjects 
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From inspection of the data above, the findings are very much 
as anticipated, and as we shall see, the patterns within them 
are consistent. The results indicate that experimental subjects 
performed better than the control subjects, with the scores of 
the experimental subjects bunching towards the top end of the 
scale but the scores of the control subjects bunching towards 
the bottom end of the scale. This strong difference favours 
the methodology of Bidirectional Translation. 
For each group of cases the modal and median values were the 
same but the mean value was different. For the experimental 
group the results were negatively skewed so that the mean was 
slightly lower than the median while for the control group the 
results were positively skewed so that the mean was higher than 
the median. The variance of scores for the experimental 
subjects was greater than that for the control subjects because 
the control subjects performed so poorly that their scores did 
not allow much room for variance. Again, differences in the 
directions indicated are not unexpected. 
While experimental subjects overall performed better than the 
control subjects, it still has not been made clear that for 
each type of verbal context and for each type of 
conceptualization, the experimental subjects scored higher than 
their control counterparts. It will be remembered that there 
were five types of verbal context (Joining, Separating, part- 
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Part Whole, Comparison and Equalizing) and four types of 
conceptualization (utilizability of addition, utilizability of 
subtraction, evocability of addition and evocability of 
subtraction). The frequencies of occurrence for each is 
tabulated below. 
Table 9.5 Matrix of Correct Respon_ses_for. 90. Experimental. (Exp) 
and 90 Control (Con) Subjects 
------------ --- --- 
Type of Class of Verbal Context 
concept. -. loin . --Se pa - .. Part-----Comp .. -- E qua Exp/Con Exp/Con Exp Con Exp Con Exp/Con 
Util + 89 69 80 36 89 81 62 11 48 17 
Util - 60 16 87 65 85 37 34 5 60 11 
Evoc + 82 6 20 3 87 15 48 3 45 4 
Evoc -- -12 --1 . 80.. -6 -. 64 . 4---10 . -0---39 -. 3 
Table 9.6 Summarizing Totals from Table-9.5 
Column Totals 





Exp Con Exp Con 
Join 243 92 ütil + 368 214 
Sepa 267 110 Util - 326 134 
Part 325 137 Evoc + 282 31 
Comp 154 19 Evoc - 205 14 
E ua. .. 192 . -35 
Totals 1181 393 ... 1181 . 393 
Inspection of Tables 9.5 and 9.6 allows the following 
observation: 
For the five classes of verbal context, the order of 
performance was Part-Part-Whole > Separating > Joining > 
Equalizing > Comparison. This trend was the same for both 
experimental and control subjects. The same similarity was 
found for the types of conceptualization where the order of 
performance was the utilizability of addition > the 
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utilizability of subtraction > the evocability of addition > 
the evocability of subtraction. 
As might be expected, the correct response to the different 
test items was variable. Below follows a listing of item means. 
Table 9.7 Item Means for-experimental and control subjects in 
rank order 
Exp. Subjs. Con. Subjs. 
Item Mean Item Mean 
(P)UTIL+ 0.989 (P)UTIL+ 0.900 
(J)UTIL+ 0.989 (J)UTIL+ 0.767 
(S)UTIL- 0.967 (S)UTIL- 0.722 
(P)EVOC+ 0.967 (P)UTIL- 0.411 
(P)UTIL- 0.944 (S)UTIL+ 0.400 
(J)EVOC+ 0.911 (E)UTIL+ 0.189 
(S)UTIL+ 0.889 (J)UTIL- 0.178 
(S)EVOC- 0.889 (P)EVOC+ 0.167 
(P)EVOC- 0.711 (C)UTIL+ 0.122 
(C)UTIL+ 0.689 (E)UTIL- 0.122 
(J)UTIL- 0.667 (J)EVOC+ 0.067 
(E)UTIL- 0.667 (S)EVOC- 0.067 
(E)UTIL+ 0.533 (C)UTIL- 0.056 
(C)EVOC+ 0.533 (P)EVOC- 0.044 
(E)EVOC± 0.500 (E)EVOC+ 0.044 
(E)EVOC- 0.433 (E)EVOC- 0.033 
(C)UTIL- 0.378 (C)EVOC+ 0.033 
(S)EVOC+ 0.222 (S)EVOC+ 0.033 
(J)EVOC- 0.133 (J)EVOC- 0.011 
(C)EVOC- 0.111 (C)EVOC- 0.000 
key to -reading -Table . 
9.7 The first letter (in brackets) 
represents the class of verbal context: P- Part-Part Whole, J 
Joining, S- Separati ng, C- Comparison and E- Equalizing. 
The letters UTIL and EVOC represent the utilizability and 
evocabilit y of concepts and the + and - signs are for addition 
and subtra ction. 
Perusal of Table 9.7 shows that at the very top and the very 
bottom of the listings, the rank orderings are the same. In 
total 8 of the items occupy the same ranks for each group of 
subjects but the remaining 12 are slightly different. 
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VARIATIONS WITHIN-THE DATA 
The rank ordering of item means (see Table 9.7) suggested a 
similarity of pattern for both the experimental and control 
subjects. In order to test this null hypothesis that the 
relative percentages of correct response to each item was a 
function of chance and nothing whatsoever to do with the nature 
of the items, the data in Table 9.7 were subjected to the 
Spearman Rank-Difference Test. The rho coefficient was 0.955, 
significant at the 1% level (two tailed). This high positive 
correlation between the ranks is not surprising given the 
'parallel' performance between experimental and control 
subjects observed in Tables 9.5 and 9.6. 
It did seem to be emerging from the data that conceptualization 
could be inhibited or facilitated by the type of verbal context 
which the subjects were working within at any one time. The 
matrix of correct responses (see Tables 9.5) suggested that the 
different classes of verbal context could be ordered in terms 
of difficulty. To test the null hypothesis that there was no 
significant difference between the different classes and that 
differences were a function of chance, the Page's L Trend Test 
was used. For both the experimental (L=206.5, p<0.01) and 
control (L=211.5, p<0.001) groups the null hypothesis, was 
rejected. Overall, there was a trend showing that subjects 
performed best on Part-Part-Whole items, followed by 
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Separating, Joining and Equalizing items. The subjects 
performed least well on Comparison items. 
While the Page's L Trend Test demonstrated a global trend, it 
was not clear if this trend held for each type of 
conceptualization. In other words, did the trend hold for the 
utilizability of addition, the utilizability of subtraction, 
the evocability of addition and the evocability of subtraction? 
So to test the null hypothesis that for each type of 
conceptualization there was no significant difference between 
the different classes of context and that differences were a 
function of chance, Chi-Square Tests were run on the data from 
each type of conceptualization 
In the experimental group, for each type of conceptualization, 
the same trend was found (significant at the 1% level), that 
the Part-Part-Whole Class was easiest followed by the 
Separating Class, the Joining Class, the Equalizing Class and 
finally the Comparison Class. In the control group the trend 
was repeated in the utilizability of concepts, and in the 
evocability of addition. It was not possible to run the Chi- 
Square Test for the evocability of subtraction since the 
expected frequencies in this instance were less than five, at 
which point the computed value forX2 would have been unstable. 
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Table " -9.8 "- "Chi-Square -- -values ." for - .. different -" types -' of 
conceptualization in experimental subjects 
Type of 
-concept . - - ý(2values -. -d. 
f. -. si gnificance-leveI 
Util + 17.73 4 p <0.01 
Util - 29.01 4 p <0.01 
Evoc + 55.26 4 p <0.01 
Evoc 93.99. -- ... 4- ----- - -<0.01-------- 
Table ., 9.9. - Chi- 
conceptualization 
Type of 
concept ..... 'X2values. --d. f. -significance. level 
Util + 90.39 4 p <0.01 
Util - 89.53 4 p <0.01 
Evoc +. -. .. 16.58 . -4-. -. . ---p. <0.01--. --- . 
Clearly then, there is a difference between the different types 
of verbal context. Intuitively, this seems to make sense. The 
Equalizing Class had items which, by definition, had to be 
wordy and thus made perhaps rather heavy demands on the 
individual's processing capacity. Similarly, the Comparison 
Class had items which traditionally teachers have known (Floyd 
et al, 1982), and which research (Donaldson & Balfour, 1968; 
Donaldson & Wales, 1970) has substantiated, can be problematic 
for young children. 
ASSOCIATIONS WITHIN-THE DATA 
Given the earlier theorizing in chapter three, on the close 
relationship between cognition and metacognition and the 
possibility that utilizability and evocability of concepts 
could be manifestations of these two strands of 
luare -. values -. for. different . types. of 
n control subjects 
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conceptualization, it seemed appropriate 'to explore the 
relationships between the utilizability and evocability scores. 
Was there any association between the utilizability of addition 
and the utilizability of subtraction, between the evocability 
of addition and the evocability of subtraction, between the 
utilizability and the evocability of addition, between the 
utilizability and the evocability of subtraction? To test the 
null hypothesis that the utilizability and evocability of 
concepts were essentially unrelated, the Chi-Square Test of 
Association was used on the data. 
Table 9.10 Chi-Square -values - for different types -. of 
conceptualization in experimental subjects 
Type of 
concept values- -d. f. -sig nificance level 
Util +- 13.05 4 p <0.02 
Evoc +/- 109.78 4 p <0.001 
Util/Evoc + 27.41 4 p <0.001 
Util/Evoc'- -26.48 - ---4--- -- -<0.001-. -. - 
For the control subjects the Chi-Square Test could only be 
computed for the utilizability of addition and subtraction 
(since in the other types of conceptualization expected 
frequencies fell below five), where it was found 1-45.32, 
p<0.001. 
The above findings are quite interesting. There is significant 
association between utilizability and evocability of addition 
and subtraction concepts, this association being particularly 
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noticeable for subjects who have been exposed to a teaching 
methodology which puts emphasis on talking about what one is 
doing. 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE-EXPERIMENTAL AND CONTROL SUBJECTS 
This entire research study was mounted in the hope of finding a 
more effective means, than seems currently available, of 
teaching children to add and subtract with greater 
understanding. The acid test would be whether or not children 
exposed to Bidirectional Translation performed any better than 
those who had not been. The raw data clearly showed differences 
between experimental and control groups but were these 
differences really significant? To test the null hypothesis 
that differences found between experimental and control 
subjects were due to chance and nothing whatsoever to do with 
the independent variable of Bidirectional Translation, the 
Wilcoxon Test should (according to the introductory rationale) 
have been run on the data. However, visual inspection of the 
data showed that within each type of verbal context, and for 
each type of conceptualization, the experimental subjects 
almost invariably scored higher than their control counterparts 
which would cause a preponderance of ranks of one sign, leading 
to significance. Since the difference was obviously 
significant, it seemed reasonable to seek the size of the 
difference. To do this, the correlated t-test was needed. A 
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further argument in defence of the t-test at this point is that 
in a large-sample case (large meaning more than eight pairs of 
scores) the violation of the assumption of normality becomes 
less important since the sampling distribution of the Wilcoxon 
T statistic itself approaches the normal distribution. Thus t 
values were computed. 
Table 9.11 ' Differences between experimental and control 
subjects 
class/concept t value significance 
J UTIL+ 4.81 0.000 
(J)UTIL- 7.60 0.000 
(J)EVOC+ 21.05 0.000 
(J)EVOC- 3.24 0.002 
(S)UTIL+ 7.92 0.000 
(S)UTIL- 4.78 0.000 
(S)EVOC+ 3.94 0.000 
(S)EVOC- 19.33 0.000 
(P)UTIL+ 2.64 0.010 
(P)UTIL- 9.27 0.000 
(P)EVOC+ 18.25 0.000 
(P)EVOC- 12.63 0.000 
(C)UTIL+ 9.43 0.000 
(C)UTIL- 5.67 0.000 
(C)EVOC+ 8.90 0.000 
(C)EVOC- 3.34 0.001 
(E)UTIL+ 5.12 0.000 
(E)UTIL- 8.95 0.000 
(E)EVOC+ 7.95 0.000 
(E)EVOC- 7.16 0.000 
key to reading Table 9.11 The first letter (in brackets) 
represents the class of verbal context: P- Part-Part-Whole, J 
Joining, S- Separating, C= Comparison and E- Equalizing. 
The letters 'UTIL and EVOC represent the utilizability and 
evocability of concepts and the + and - signs are for addition 
and subtraction. 
The differences between the experimental and control subjects 
for every class. of verbal context and every type of 
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conceptualization are very clear and strongly support the value 
of Bidirectional Translation. They are highly significant and, 
at times, of considerable magnitude. This was particularly 
noticeable for some instances of evocability of concepts. 
While the differences between experimental and control groups 
seem to give some credence to the hypothesis that Bidirectional 
Translation does enable children to conceptualize addition and 
subtraction in a more comprehensive fashion than other methods 
do (insofar as only 3 items produced scores above 50% amongst 
control subjects whilst 15 of the 20 items produced scores of 
at least 50% amongst the experimental subjects, as can be seen 
in Table 907), it cannot be claimed that Bidirectional 
Translation 'solves' the problem of teaching addition and 
subtraction. Even with the methodology of Bidirectional 
Translation, 5 of the items produced scores of less than 50%. 
This, in turn, raises questions as to how appropriate it is for 
us as teachers to address ourselves to all the types of verbal 
context which were used in the study. Given the comments 
earlier, on the complexity of the Comparison and Equalizing 
Classes, it may be that such items are inappropriate at such an 
early stage of schooling. But how are we to make decisions as 
to what to include and what to exclude? 
If we were to adopt as a criterion of mastery, that when 80% of 
the class is successful in a given content area the concepts 
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and skills involved therein are deemed broadly 'suitable' for 
the learners in question, then we would not include Comparison 
and Equalizing Classes, both of which fell below a 70% success 
rate for the experimental subjects, and below 20% for the 
control subjects. On an 80% criterion of mastery it can be seen 
from Table 9.7 that 8 of the items were achieved using 
Bidirectional Translation whereas only 1 item was achieved 
using alternative methods. So even if Bidirectional Translation 
cannot 'solve' the problem of teaching addition and 
subtraction, it nevertheless seems to have some 'power' in the 
teaching process. 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ADDITION AND SUBTRACTION 
It was a deliberate strategy in this research to teach addition 
and subtraction operations separately, for the reason given 
earlier. Opinion is divided on this. Because the operations 
are complementary, some teachers would advocate their being 
taught simultaneously. This view presupposes that because the 
adult/sophisticated learner understands the operations to be 
related so will the novice learner. If the novice learner does 
conceive of the operations as being complementary, then, 
logically, there should be no difference, at least in terms of 
evocability (where computation is not required), between 
performance on addition and performance on subtraction. To test 
the null hypothesis that differences between the evocability of 
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addition and the evocability of subtraction were random, t- 
tests were computed on the data. 
Table 9.12 Differences between addition and subtraction in 
terms of evocability (exp. subis. ) 
class/concept ýt value 2 tail prob. 
Join 17.65 0.000 
Sepa -12.18 0.000 
Part 5.23 0.000 
Comp 7.72 0.000 
E qua 1.35 0.181 
Table 9.13 Differences between addition and subtraction in 
terms of evocability (cont. subjs. 
class/concept t value 2 tail prob. 
Join 2.29 0.025 
Sepa -1.35 0.181 
Part 3.52 0.001 
Comp 1.75 0.083 
E qua 1.00 0.320 
Both the experimental and control subjects found addition 
easier than subtraction in all classes of verbal context except 
the Separating Class. However, the difference was not 
significant in the Equalizing Class for the experimental 
subjects and the differences were only significant for the 
control subjects in the Joining and Part-Part-Whole Classes. 
A somewhat similar pattern was found when differences between 
the utilizability of addition and the utilizability of 
subtraction were found. 
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Table 9.14 Differences between addition and subtraction in 
terms of utilizability (exp. subjs. ) 
- class/concept t value 2 tail prob. class/concept t value 2 tail prob. - 
Join 6.50 0.000 
Sepa -2.39 0.019 
Part 2.03 0.045 
Comp 6.34 0.000 
E qua -- -2.64 - . 0.010 - 
Table 9.15 Differences between -addit 
terms of utilizability (cont. subis. 
subtrac 
class/concept t value 2 tail prob. 
Join 11.29 0.000 
Sepa -5.48 0.000 
Part 9.23 0.000 
Comp 2.52 0.013 
E qua 1.51 0.134 
in 
Both experimental and control subjects found subtraction easier 
than addition in the Separating Class and, additionally, the 
experimental subjects found subtraction easier than addition in 
the Equalizing Class. Apart from the Equalizing Class for the 
control subjects, all other differences were significant. 
The consistent finding is that addition is easier than 
subtraction except in the case of the Separating Class (in all 
types of conceptualization, for all subjects) and in the case 
of the Equalizing Class (for experimental subjects in the 
utilizability condition). There is no clear explanation for 
this. Perhaps in the case of the Separating Class, the only 
possible hint lies in what the subjects had said to the 
researcher in the Main Study (see Chapter 7) when a similar 
phenomenon had occurred. There, the subjects had performed very 
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badly on Separating (evocability +) items because they had been 
influenced by the semantics of the verbal context to the 
detriment of its logical structure. By default, then, they had 
performed better on subtraction items. But this explanation is 
only partial insofar as it may account for the evocability 
condition. Perhaps the only reasonable explanation, in the 
absence of further information, is that in the few cases where 
the subjects had found subtraction easier than addition they 
had somehow given greater prominence to cues such as 'gave' and 
'take out' than they had in other instances, and that sometimes 
this corresponded to the correct answer and sometimes it did 
not. 
It would appear then, that by whatever method young children 
are taught to add and subtract, they do not experience the 
complementary operations as being of equal ease/difficulty. 
DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE EXPERIMENTAL GROUP AND WITHIN THE 
CONTROL GROUP 
While differences between the experimental group and control 
group were obvious, what was not so immediately clear was if 
there was any overall difference within the experimental group 
and, again, within the control group. There were 6 experimental 
schools and 6 control schools. Tabulated below are the total 
number of correct responses for each school. 
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Table 9.16 Total Number of Correct Responses for each school 
out of a possible 300 
School Experimental Control 
A 259 (86.3%) 89 29.7X 
B 156 (52%) 39 (13%) 
C 196 (65.3%) 77 (25.7%) 
D 183 (61%) 59 (19.7%) 
E 188 (62.7%) 68 (22.7%) 
F 200 (66.7%) 61 (20.3%) 
Visual inspection of Table 9.16 clearly shows variation in 
performance both among the experimental and control schools,. 
but again, are these differences significant? To test the null 
hypothesis that the sample schools within each group were from, 
respectively, the same populations the Kruskal-Wallis test was 
applied to the data. 
Within the experimental group there was a significant 
difference (H - 21.44, p<. 001). This difference was an overall 
difference amongst the samples in the experimental group, and 
while it does not indicate which pairs of samples were 
significantly different from each other, the fact that there 
was an overall difference is justification for further analysis 
of pairs of samples (Siegel, 1956). The Mann-Whitney test 
showed School A to be significantly different from each of the 
others (for example, as compared with School F- which was 
second in terms of performance - the value of U was 52.5, 
significant at the probability level of . 02, two-tailed). What 
this difference is caused by is not clear. It could be that 
School A performed better because the children were 'brighter', 
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or the teacher was more effective, or some combination of both. 
Nor can it be excluded that some other, indeterminate 
environmental factors may have been at work. School A in the 
experimental group was the 'matched pair' of School A in the 
control group, and inspection of Table 9.16 shows School A in 
the control group also to demonstrate 'best performance'. 
Similarly, for both experimental and control groups School B 
demonstrated 'poorest performance'. 
Within the control group the difference in performance amongst 
the six schools was not significant. Within group variations 
are, then, clearly less than differences between the 
experimental and control groups. This would appear to be 
attributable to Bidirectional Translation. 
In Summary 
(i) the sample of children exposed to Bidirectional Translation 
performed significantly better on number conceptualization 
tests than did the sample of children who were not exposed to 
Bidirectional Translation; 
(ii) for both the experimental and control groups there was a 
significant trend in terms of the difficulty of the different 
classes of verbal context - Part-Part-Whole contexts were 
easiest, Separating contexts were more difficult, Joining 
contexts were even more difficult, Equalizing contexts 
presented further difficulty and Comparison contexts were the 
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most difficult; 
(iii) this trend held for the four different types of 
conceptualization - the utilizability of addition, the 
utilizability of subtraction, the evocability of addition and 
the evocability of subtraction; 
(iv) differences between addition and subtraction performance 
were less clear cut - in most instances performance on addition 
was better than performance on subtraction though this 
difference was not always significant; 
(v) for the experimental subjects the utilizability and 
evocability functions were significantly associated; 
(vi) within the experimental group only, there was a 
significant overall difference in performance; 
(vii) the methodology of Bidirectional Translation would appear 
to significantly affect performance - reasons for this will be 
explored in the next chapter. 
Chapter 9 Page 278 
CONCLUSIONS FROM THE DATA 
The research written about in this thesis was an attempt to 
make a contribution to the pedagogy of early number work in 
primary education, particularly in the areas of counting, and 
addition and subtraction which follow on from counting. In 
this, the final chapter, a number of issues need to be 
'revisited' and commented upon, in an attempt to understand 
what was happening. But attempts at explanation imply causal 
mechanisms, which can be difficult to pin down, which may not 
be correct, and even if correct may not be complete. 
Nevertheless, there follows an attempt to understand the 
relationship between teaching methodology and test performance: 
firstly by the negative process of eliminating some of the 
likely causal factors (and acknowledging where methodological 
flaws preclude this! ); 
and 
secondly by the positive process of positing a psychological 
concept which might substantiate the findings. 
This twin-pronged approach is an attempt to leave the reader 
With a reasonably coherent and integrated impression of the 
experimental findings. 
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A Process of Elimination 
If, in teaching young children to add and subtract, we want to 
promote the individual's understanding of what he/she is doing 
then the methodology of Bidirectional Translation would seem to 
be worthy of consideration for teaching purposes. Children 
exposed to this method perform better than children who are 
not. This rather sweeping generalization presupposes that the 
samples of control and experimental subjects were alike in all 
respects apart from the teaching techniques they experienced. 
While every reasonable sampling precaution was taken in the 
name of the internal and external validity factors outlined in 
a previous chapter, it is freely acknowledged that in the field 
of social science one is working with people in whom there are 
a multitude of extraneous variables not all of which may 
actually be controlled for. 
One possible flaw in the design of the experiment was that 
control subjects were asked to comment on 'silly stories' when, 
in fact, they may have been confused by the referents. The word 
'silly' may have implied that no real logic need be applied to 
the problem. Unlike the experimental subjects, the control 
subjects had not systematically built up an association between 
the term 'silly story' and the contextualization of addition 
and subtraction operations. With hindsight, this seems a 
glaring error and if it has foundation, could invalidate the 
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data collected. Undoubtedly, the control subjects would have 
had experience of being told stories; if not at home, at least 
at school. It is also probable that they would have had some 
notion of what the word, silly, meant; as being slightly 
amusing albeit somewhat ridiculous. Although the experimental 
subjects did generate amusing and implausible verbal contexts, 
this was not the researcher's principal intention. It was her 
intention, merely, that the subjects should locate an addition 
or subtraction operation in some sort of scenario which had 
meaning for each child, and the use of the terms 'silly story' 
and 'number story' had been coined for experimental subjects to 
make clear the distinction between verbal context and numerical 
representation. If the term, 'silly story' confused some of the 
control subjects, which is one possible explanation to be 
deduced from some of the control subjects' failure to make a 
response to the stimulus item, it did not confuse all of the 
control subjects. It was not a characteristic of control 
subjects that they failed to respond, although many of them 
responded wrongly. Out of the 90 control subjects only 5 scored 
zero out of a total of twenty items. And while most of the 
control subjects performed miserably when required to evoke a 
concept, 85 of the 90 were able to utilize a concept, even if 
such utilization did not extend to all classes of verbal 
context. While not trying to defend what now is seen as a 
design fault, it would seem, on balance, that the control 
subjects did have some grasp of what the term, 'silly story' 
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meant. This does not, however, preclude the possibility that 
the control subjects' responses might have been different if 
the term 'silly story' was a part of their working vocabulary, 
as it was for the experimental subjects. Any replications of 
this work would require the issue of terminology to be 
resolved. 
Another possible factor to account for the large difference 
between experimental and control subjects inheres in the 
piloted methodology. It is possible that the newness of the 
approach, rather than the structure of the approach energized 
the participating teachers into more effective teaching. This 
possible source of contamination could not really be obviated 
in this research. An attempt to control for the Hawthorne 
Effect was made in having the teachers of control subjects 
complete a questionnaire on the teaching of addition and 
subtraction. The answer to the question of whether it was the 
newness of Bidirectional Translation or the structure of 
Bidirectional Translation which effected superior performance 
can only be found if the methodology were to be taken on board 
more generally by teachers and were to exposed to testing after 
a passage of time. In other words, it is only when 
Bidirectional Translation is no longer new that the power of 
its structure can be analysed. However, even at this stage it 
is possible to make claims for the power of Bidirectional 
Translation in terms of its structure. Firstly, the statistical 
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analyses (in the previous chapter) showed that differences 
between the experimental and control groups were clearly 
greater than any variations within the experimental and control 
groups. This would seem to suggest that Bidirectional 
Translation is robust enough to withstand any differences among 
teachers. And secondly, participating teachers, of their own 
volition, made comments to the effect that the methodology 
assisted them insofar as: 
1. it enabled the children to remain on task without 
prompts or reminders from the teacher; 
2. the children were enthusiastic about Maths lessons, 
whereas in the teachers' previous experiences with the 
same content, Maths sessions had been a struggle for the 
children and tortuous for the teacher; 
3. the teachers themselves had found the approach a 
learning experience since they had not hitherto 
appreciated just how much time the children needed to 
explore the language of addition and subtraction and 
unpack the meaning of the symbolism in terms of everyday 
events; 
4. the teachers, again of their own volition, said they 
would use the methodology when teaching subsequent groups 
of young children to add and subtract. 
New or old, any approach which removes pressure and 'nag' from 
teaching, and which gives the child 'ownership' of his/her 
learning, and which does not lead to the 'de-skilling' of the 
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child is welcomed by the teacher (Ausubel & Robinson, 1969; 
Desforges & Cockburn, 1987; Ashman & Conway, 1989). While these 
claims for Bidirectional Translation cannot be fully 
substantiated in this piece of research, it would seem that 
there is at least some justification for them. As a result, the 
newness factor is not probably of much significance, insofar as 
the approach of Bidirectional Translation appears to support 
the teacher's function and the child's learning. 
The final factor to be considered which might explain the 
significant differences between control and experimental 
subjects is the subjects themselves. The two groups could have 
been inherently so different that Bidirectional Translation 
neither facilitated the experimental subjects nor did 
alternative methodologies disadvantage the control subjects. 
After all, there was no pre-testing done by the researcher on 
any subjects, there was no standardized measure taken of their 
performance in number prior to the teaching of addition and 
subtraction. The possibility that the experimental subjects 
would have post-tested well irrespective of what methodology 
they had experienced, and the possibility that the control 
subjects would have post-tested badly if they had been exposed 
to Bidirectional Translation cannot be denied. However, it is 
probably unlikely that experimental and control groups each 
Were homogeneous in all of the multitude of variables on which 
human beings differ. Six experimental and six control schools 
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were involved and while traditional indicators such as 
intelligence and social class were not investigated, sampling 
procedures did attempt either to randomize or counterbalance 
the effects of the more obvious variables. The extent to which 
such attempts were successful in neutralizing intervening 
variables cannot really be determined. None of the 
participating schools were previously known to the researcher 
so there was no personal bias on the part of the researcher, 
such as selecting schools where she knew she would get entry 
and co-operation. But the real reason for the schools agreeing 
to participate may in itself have been a biassing feature. They 
may, for example, have agreed to participate because of some 
perceived increase in importance for doing so rather than for 
the more altruistic reasons of furthering work in children's 
learning. If, however, schools did agree to take part for 'the 
wrong reasons', this chance factor would at least apply equally 
to the experimental and control schools. As such, this would 
weaken the external validity of the experiment although not the 
internal validity. 
The solution to the imponderables raised here would seem to lie 
in much larger samples being used in further replications of 
the work to try to negate the differences found here. If the 
differences between Bidirectional Translation and other 
methodologies still continued, then it would be reasonable to 
conclude that the design flaws outlined here were not critical. 
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A Process of Substantiation 
Nevertheless, if, for the moment, it can be assumed that 
sampling was adequate the question that has to be asked is what 
was it about Bidirectional Translation that effected the 
difference in performance? Why did children experiencing 
Bidirectional Translation perform better than those children 
who did not? 
The effects of Bidirectional Translation suggest genuine 
optimism in the teaching of addition and subtraction, optimism 
that it is possible rather than impossible to teach children to 
compute in ways which, from the very beginning, have face 
validity for them. This is not to say that teachers are 
redundant or that teaching addition and subtraction are trivial 
activities, but it does raise questions as to the traditional 
role of the teacher in this curricular area. The classroom 
folklore suggests that children come to school with virtually 
no numerical experience and with blank numerical minds. The 
classroom folklore further suggests that the remedy for this 
tabula rasa state is to force impressions on the minds of 
children by providing them with numerical experience, by 
showing them how to express this experience in regular 
mathematical forms; and that children hold such impressions in 
their minds by continuing to rehearse them until they 'stick'. 
This model clearly must have some plausibility since it has a 
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dominant hold in the pedagogy of number. Yet the orientation of 
the model is at odds with the recent research which clearly 
demonstrates that 'children come to school with a wealth of 
numerical impressions and experience (albeit informal) which 
they are perfectly willing to share with teacher and peers in 
the school context. The teacher who fails to take account of 
this phenomenon is not facilitating the child's learning - the 
very task with which the teacher is charged! 
Perhaps, as Hughes (1986) points out, the concept of 
translation is the useful thinking tool when considering the 
intervention the teacher should make to facilitate the child's 
learning: 
Mastering, the formal code of arithmetic involves 
negotiating a complex of subtle and inter-related 
transitions. Some of these transitions can be 
distinguished: from actual to hypothetical situations, 
from concrete to abstract elements, from spoken to written 
language, from embedded to disembedded thought, from words 
to symbols and from the informal to the formal. This 
sequence is not intended to suggest any particular linear 
order, although clearly some transitions must precede 
others. At any stage in a child's mathematical 
development, they are therefore involved in consolidating 
what they already understand, and in trying to link up the 
novel and unfamiliar with their existing state of 
knowledge. 
The transitions outlined above are not peculiar to mathematics, 
though they are an integral part of it. Such transitions can 
and do occur in other areas of knowledge. Thus making the 
transitions must be a characteristic learning tool. The idea of 
translation becomes a tool that the teacher can use, a tool 
that does not dehumanize learning because it corresponds to one 
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aspect of the voluntary activities of mental processing. To 
translate means to turn from one form into another, to express 
the sense of something in an alternative form of 
representation. And when, as individuals we are making our 
translations we make them in terms of what we already know! 
Translation then can act as a tool because it encapsulates an 
awareness, a precise awareness that allows the teacher to seek, 
and find, definite ways of helping the child to make explicit 
the existing 'state' of his/her own learning. Translation also 
makes clear to the pupils that they own a personal resource 
which will bring learning nearer, if they choose to use this 
resource. But translation is also a tool in a less metaphorical 
sense. As was demonstrated earlier in this thesis, translation 
becomes a technique for dynamically exploring the articulation 
of mathematical situations so that the learner becomes familiar 
with the interconnections of the mathematics and how the 
learner's own processing defines the structure. 
Throughout, there has been an emphasis on translation, which 
may suggest that such a tool can be applied everywhere in the 
learning of mathematics. It is not, however, the author's 
intention to leave readers with the impression that translation 
is a multi-purpose tool capable of teaching anything. Complex 
learning jobs require a variety of tools, most of which have 
probably not- been invented. The research described and 
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discussed here has focussed on one tool that has proved useful. 
There is no implication that it is the only one or the only 
kind. Rather, the work here seems to the author to serve as a 
paradigm for the invention of tools to support the teaching of 
mathematics. 
If translation is one useful tool in the teaching of addition 
and subtraction then perhaps another is modelling, or learning 
by observation. Modelling is not to be thought of as blind, 
mindless imitation, nor in terms of crude stimulus-response 
mechanisms. Rather, modelling is the adoption of selected 
actions and behaviours on the part of the learner, such 
selection being mediated by cognitive processes. What might 
these processes be? 
1. Perception 
One cannot learn much from observing another unless one attends 
to, or accurately perceives, the salient cues and distinctive 
features of the other's behaviour. In other words it is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for the learner to see 
the model and what the model is doing. Beyond that, however, 
the learner must also attend to the model with enough 
perceptual accuracy to extract the relevant information to use 
in imitating the model. This is not to say that all of the 
modelled behaviour will be 'taken on board' by the learner. A 
myriad of factors involving the learner, the model and the 
.......... ._..... ......... 
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interaction between the two can militate against the learning 
process. 
2. Encoding 
A second possible process in learning by observation concerns 
long-term memory storage of behaviours that have been modelled 
at one time or another. Crudely put, one cannot be affected 
much by observation of another's behaviour if one has no memory 
of it. Indeed without the facility to recall what the model 
did, the learner is unlikely to demonstrate any enduring 
behavioural change. 
For the learner to benefit from the behaviour of the model when 
the model is either no longer present to serve as a guide, or 
present but not exhibiting the specific behaviours to be 
learned, the learner must code the modelled behaviour in some 
symbolic form which may later be recalled to enable the 
performance of the behaviour. This coding could be in the form 
of a visual image the kind of everyday phenomenon which 
allows us to 'see in our mind's eye' a picture of a person or 
an event previously experienced. Another possible coding could 
be of a verbal kind - vocal or subvocal commentaries of what 
the model is doing which can be rehearsed internally without an 
overt enactment of the behaviour. Both types of coding seem 
intuitively plausible. 
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3. Recoding 
A third possible process involved in learning by observation 
consists of translating the symbolically coded memories into 
appropriate behaviour. Even with accurate perception, and 
efficient encoding which has included rehearsal the learner may 
still be unable to enact the behaviour correctly. The co- 
ordination of component parts of the total behaviour may not be 
sufficiently refined. It is at this point that practice is 
required; practice to learn, not practice to the point of 
monotony. Furthermore, the practice will only be valuable to 
the learner if he/she can make self-corrective adjustments to 
the behaviour on the basis of informative feedback. 
4. Motivation 
The fourth and final process is possibly to do with positive 
reinforcement. Reinforcement is whatever actual or anticipated 
consequence of a behaviour encourages one to continue to engage 
in the behaviour. However well one has perceived, encoded and 
decoded a particular behaviour, it is unlikely to find 
expression in overt terms if it is negatively sanctioned, 
unfavourably received or in some way decidedly uncomfortable 
for the participant. The reinforcer can be experienced either 
directly or vicariously, and it can come from within the 
learner (i. e. the learner can find the behaviour intrinsically 
satisfying) or from a source external to the learner. The point 
of importance about reinforcement is that it provides the 
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learner with information, information as to what to expect as a 
result of performing the behaviour correctly or incorrectly, 
and this information is essential if one is to correctly 
anticipate the probable consequences of one's actions and 
thereby make informed choices. Without the capacity for 
anticipatory behaviour, all manner of human thinking activity 
such as reasoning by analogy and hypothesis testing would be 
unavailable to us. 
How modelling can explain Bidirectional Translation. 
In Bidirectional Translation the teacher was the initial and 
principal model. Teachers, especially teachers of young 
children, are generally perceived as being of high status. Many 
parents will testify to their young child's constant and 
somewhat irritating reference to the teacher being the source 
of all knowledge, the fountain of all goodness and the model of 
excellence to which the child aspires! Beyond the general 
notion, however, of the teacher being a person who commands 
considerable attention from his/her young pupils, can 
Bidirectional Translation be explained in terms of modelling? 
In terms of perception, there were many key points to which the 
learners had to attend: the connection between numbers (the 
abstract ideas) and the numerals (the written symbols), between 
words and operator signs; the connection between verbal 
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contexts and'numerical representations; the connection between 
verbal context, pictorial representation and numerical 
representation; the means by which answers could be found. The 
learner's attention to these key features was a function or 
the teacher's repeated provision of opportunity for each of 
these to be the focus of a learning/teaching session. 
In terms of encoding, both visual imagery and verbal rehearsal 
were being encouraged. The learners saw, and subsequently 
reproduced, the construction of a numerical representation of a 
verbal context. They also made representations of their visual 
images of addition and subtraction operations when they drew 
pictures of-their 'silly stories' (their self-generated verbal 
contexts). Verbal rehearsal was being made quite explicit when 
the learners were required to 'read' the 'number stories' and 
signal as to what each component part of the numerical 
representation meant. Verbal rehearsal was further encouraged 
when the'learners were invited to share with their peers their 
methods of solution for obtaining answers. 
In terms of recoding, the learners were constantly being 
required to effect the translation from one 
form to another; 
from verbal to numerical and from numerical to verbal. This was 
a critical part of Bidirectional Translation, and 
proportionately, took up the largest amount of teaching and 
learning time. At the inception of each of the steps of the 
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methodology there were frequent false starts which needed time, 
patience and practice to correct. 
In terms of motivation, the learners were reinforced in various 
ways. There was lots of praise from the teacher for even the 
most tentative approaches to the desired performance. As well 
as being directly reinforcing to the particular learner making 
the contribution, the praise was vicariously reinforcing to the 
learner's peers within the group of children who were currently 
with the teacher. When the learners were required to provide 
verbal contexts for numerical representations there was what 
seemed a never ending succession of offers to contribute 'silly 
stories'. Each learner was very willing to, and indeed 
clamoured to, make several contributions. This can be 
interpreted as a need for either direct or vicarious 
reinforcement from the teacher or it can be interpreted as a 
need for self reinforcement: the generation of yet another 
context by the learner being further 'evidence' for the learner 
that his/her little 'hypothesis' was a correct one in the given 
situation. 
What seems to becoming clear in all of this is that modelling 
and translation are not discrete. Translation is a part of 
modelling, possibly in all of the cognitive processes of 
modelling but most certainly in the process of recoding. In the 
.......... 
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ordinary everyday world, recoding and translation are probably 
two referents for the same concept. 
Modelling has its origins in, but is not restricted to, 
behaviourism, a theory which, posits that all behaviour is 
lawfully determined, predictable and capable of being brought 
under environmental control through stimulus response 
mechanisms. The strictest form of behaviourism will not 
countenance mentalistic explanatory constructs on the grounds 
that their empirical validation is impossible. Modelling, on 
the other hand, while acknowledging that external stimuli and 
environmental responses are powerful determinants of human 
behaviour, - gives a central role to these cognitive processes 
for the regulation and organization of human activity. 
To the reader, it might seem that there is some tension or 
conflict developing. On the one hand Bidirectional Translation 
can be explained in terms of a psychological concept which has 
strong behaviourist connotations. On the other hand, however, 
the researcher's whole thesis was driven by the premise that 
the child's conceptualization and understanding of what he/she 
was doing was of primary consideration, and such 
conceptualization was held to be rooted in Piagetian ideas. So 
the question which arises from this is, to what extent is 
modelling compatible with Piagetian or neo-Piagetian thinking 
where concern for individual development, discovery learning, 
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and active involvement on the part of the child are all of 
paramount importance? 
Fifteen or twenty years ago, when the implications of Piagetian 
theory were becoming better understood, a psychological 
explanation for the paucity of achievement in number work at 
school would have been that children were being asked to engage 
with material for which they had not yet developed the relevant 
schemata. Since, according to Piaget (1964), "learning is 
subordinate to development". Piagetian theory was commonly 
interpreted as meaning that there are definite limits on the 
extent to which the child's progress can be accelerated by 
environmental influences, and that the passage of time rather 
than experience promotes internal growth. Whatever 
misunderstandings there may have been in this explanation, a 
colloquial description for this state of affairs was that 'the 
child was not ready'. The notion of readiness seemed to be 
subject to various interpretations. At one extreme, it became a 
universal but tautologous explanation: whenever a child failed 
to learn, or refused to engage in a task, the child must not 
have been 'ready' (Sharp & Green, 1975). More usually, 
'readiness' would be strongly associated with biological 
maturation, because Piaget had shown that children's thinking 
was different for different age groups. This can be criticised 
as an unjustified inference of causation. 
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While some sort of readiness notion appears to be implicit in 
Piagetian theory, it nevertheless does not constitute 
justification for delaying or terminating attempts to teach the 
child whatever he/she is allegedly not ready for! Taken to its 
logical conclusion, one could wait forever and some children 
would still not be ready. The notion of readiness might be a 
more useful one if it were stripped of the underlying 
assumption of biological maturation and recast in terms of 
conceptual maturation. In order to engage in a specific type of 
complex cognitive task (such as mathematics or reading, which 
occupies a large part of early schooling), the child must have 
a variety of abilities and predispositions, which can be 
identified if we, as teachers, understand the task and the 
demand it poses. To be able to learn to add and subtract 
involves knowing, at least, that these are activities which, in 
the real world, people engage in frequently in a wide variety 
of contexts. It further involves learning how to engage in 
these activities and, where need be, how to communicate the 
findings of these activities in recognized and recognizable 
forms. By acknowledging that each of the component parts is 
necessary and by structuring these component parts of addition 
and subtraction into a form which progressively embraces all of 
the parts (which was what the methodology of Bidirectional 
Translation was attempting to do), the need to make assumptions 
about the child's state of readiness is obviated. Specific 
learning experiences 'prepare' the child for subsequent 
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learning. Furthermore, a structure such as Bidirectional 
Translation provides a practical procedure for instituting 
remedial intervention. 
The 'mystique' of discovery learning (as being distinct from, 
and superior to, reception learning) can similarly be 
dismantled. There seems to have developed in education, the 
polarised view that only discovery learning is meaningful and 
that all reception learning is rote in nature. Discovery 
learning is claimed by its advocates (Shulman & Keisler, 1966) 
to be inherently more meaningful, to be retained longer and to 
motivate further learning more effectively than reception- 
learning approaches. But sight seems to have been lost of what 
Ausubel and others (Ausubel & Robinson, 1969) were saying which 
was that if the learner attempts to retain an idea by relating 
it to what he/she already knows, and thereby make some sense of 
it, then meaningful learning will result. By contrast, if the 
learner merely memorizes 'an idea, without relating it to 
his/her existing knowledge, then rote learning is said to take 
place. 
In what Ausubel was saying there is nothing, to suggest that the 
only meaningful learning which takes place is effected through 
'discovery'. For meaningful learning to take place it is 
critical that what is to be learned should somehow connect with 
what is already known. Sometimes this connection is best made 
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by the teacher structuring the material which is to be learned 
and if all that is required on the part of the learner is 
assimilation, then the teacher's job is relatively easy. If, 
however, accommodation is required of the learner the teacher's 
job is more complex in that two possibilities emerge. One is to 
leave the learner to restructure his/her schemata, as in some 
form of discovery learning. The other is to find out more about 
these schemata and shape the teaching accordingly: a technique 
such as as Bidirectional Translation can help in that the 
structured dialogue which forms the spine of the approach 
allows the learner to reveal his/her existing knowledge. 
A main disadvantage of discovery learning is that there must be 
a high prospect of success to sustain the learner through the 
process of trial and error. Such 'discovery' as there is, is 
likely to be time consuming and not easy to guarantee. Of 
perhaps lesser importance in practical terms is the objection 
to discovery learning raised by Ausubel & Robinson (1969). 
They point out that it is a repudiation of the very concept of 
culture. We do not make progress by continually Ire-inventing 
the wheel'. Modelling, on the other hand, allows the learner to 
I observe the target response Which, if complex, might never be 
'discovered'. 
Active involvement, the third of the so called Piagetian ideas, 
is similarly vague. The assumption that has been espoused by 
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many educators, particularly those who claim to be 
'progressive' in their philosophy, is that children need to 
learn by doing. Few psychologists would discount the importance 
of direct personal experience on a task in assisting learning. 
It is, however, quite another thing to insist that a child must 
be engaged in direct performance before any real learning can 
occur. Consider the practical problem in requiring children to 
directly participate: the teacher is faced with the child who 
is reluctant to perform on a particular task, particularly if 
the task is unfamiliar. Even the promise of attractive rewards 
for task performance does not encourage or effect 'activity'. 
An intuitive explanation for this phenomenon is that the child 
is afraid of failure. Whatever the real explanation is, if 
inducements do not succeed, the teacher is left with three 
alternatives: one is to 'force' the child to participate, which 
is somewhat self-defeating and objectionable on moral grounds; 
another is to postpone the teaching until some future time when 
the child is 'ready', which, as has been argued above, is 
something of a fallacy. The third alternative (and for the 
author, the only sensible course of action) is to have the 
'recalcitrant' child watch another child/other children 
participate first. In most situations, the observing child 
will, after a few demonstrations, 'assert' his/her right to 
participate: yet another example of the child learning through 
modelling. 
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At this juncture it is perhaps worth making clear what Piaget 
himself regarded as active learning. As Schwebel & Raph (1973) 
point out the nature of the activity is critical. That 
"children move about the classroom, that seats are not fixed, 
and that children even hop, skip, and jump do not make the 
active process educative". What makes any active process 
educative is the effect of the experience on the child's 
subsequent behaviour. If the activity causes no intellectual 
change, then the activity has not facilitated learning. Kamii 
(1973), in summarizing what Piaget said about active methods, 
points out that what makes an 'active' method active is not the 
external actions of the learner but the criterion of the 
learner actively constructing his/her own knowledge. This in 
turn requires some systematization on the part of the teacher 
such that "structuring, elaborating and reasoning processes" 
are a genuine part of the contact between teacher and learner. 
However, along with the more common misrepresentations of 
Piagetian theory, there is perhaps a small but nevertheless 
significant gap in the folklore about what Piaget really said. 
And that is that he himself recognized modelling to be germane 
to intellectual development. Around the time when the young 
child is making the transitions from the sensori-motor to the 
pre-operational stages of development, the child can be seen 
employing what is referred to in Piagetian terms as deferred 
imitation. As Flave. ll (1977) reports: 
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One of Piaget's children, for example, watched in mute 
fascination while another child threw a three-star temper 
tantrum. She then produced an excellent imitation of it 
the next day. 
For the observed behaviour to be reproduced so accurately after 
a temporal delay means that in observing the other, the child 
must have represented the event mentally; a classic example of 
modelling. 
Nor is deferred imitation only to be witnessed at the start of 
the pre-operational stage. The teacher of young children 
frequently has opportunity to witness his/her pupils in 'free' 
or sociodramatic play. Here the teacher sees the child being 
mummy or daddy or whoever. The enactment of such roles involves 
dialogue and behaviours which, without a memory of having 
observed a related or similar scenario, would be impossible for 
the young child to produce. Clearly then, modelling is a 
powerful learning medium for young children. They would appear 
to use it spontaneously. That being the case, it makes sense 
for the teacher to capitalize on it. 
For the teacher who has professed but ill-formed notions of 
'child-centred' education, the idea of teaching through 
explicit modelling may seem an anathema. But child-centred 
education need not imply non-intervention while we wait for 
growth. Rather it means active partnership between teacher and 
child ensuring that children's mental experiences are 
structured in ways that are most likely to be fruitful. For 
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this to happen it seems important that the child should 
understand the purpose of the activity in which he/she is 
engaging, should anticipate success, and should be engaged 
in 
the task to the extent that he/she can direct his/her full 
attention to the learning that is supposed to be brought about 
by the task. This thesis has been but a tiny attempt in this 
direction. Hopefully it will encourage a more eclectic approach 
in the teaching of early number work. 




Short description of Logic People. 
Logic People are a variation of the Logic Blocks which are to 
be found in many infant departments. Sometimes the Logic Blocks 
are referred to as Attribute Blocks because each set consists 
of blocks of plastic, not all of which have the same 
attributes. Typically a set of Logic Blocks (or Attribute 
Blocks) consists of 
triangles, squares, circles and rectangles which are: 
red, blue or yellow; 
large or small; 
thick or thin. 
By playing different games with this material, the child has 
the experience of classifying the blocks of plastic according 
to differing attributes. 
Logic People are less abstract than the Logic Blocks in that 
the pieces of plastic are people rather than geometric shapes. 
A set of Logic People consists of__ 
men, women, girls and boys who are: 
red, blue, yellow or green and who are 
sitting, walking or standing. 
There was nothing inherent in the Logic People which caused the 
researcher to use them as countables. They were used because 
they were easy for the children to lift, hold and move around, 
and, because the children were already familiar with them 
through free play activities. 
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